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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on hospital response to regulation and risk
preferences.
Chapter 1 analyzes the Medicare Flex Program which allowed rural hospitals with fewer
than 25 beds to convert to "Critical Access Hospital" status and receive cost-based Medicare
reimbursement. Converting hospitals decrease their inpatient capacity by 30 percent on
average to satisfy the bed requirement. They also drop services such as obstetrics, intensive
care, and inpatient and outpatient surgery. Medicaid days fall by almost 30 percent at
converting hospitals. The results suggest a 6 percent increase in neonatal mortality for high-
risk babies delivered by mothers residing in counties with a hospital conversion. There is no
significant effect on neonatal mortality among all births.
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein and Mark Cullen) analyzes
the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage de-
cisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied
by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with
an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We
find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset
allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" in-
dividuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent
of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of a California regulation mandating maximum patient-
to-nurse ratios for inpatient hospital units. I compare changes in inputs for hospitals for
which the legislation was more or less binding, based on the initial patient-to-nurse ratio.
Hospitals with higher baseline ratios decrease patient-to-nurse ratios by substituting toward
licensed nurses, rather than decreasing patient days or lengths of stay. There is suggestive
evidence of substitution away from aides and orderlies. The skill ratio of licensed nurses
decreases slightly as hospitals hire relatively more licensed vocational nurses. Total costs
increase in hospitals with higher baseline ratios. These results are slightly smaller and no
longer significant in robustness checks. Estimating these effects on a sample of unaffected
units generally finds small, insignificant effects.
Thesis Supervisor: Amy Finkelstein
Title: Ford Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Spillovers of Medicare Policy: The
Case of Critical Access Hospitals
1.1 Introduction
In a multipayer health care system, the actions of one payer may affect the costs, access
and health outcomes of patients covered by other payers. Understanding these spillovers is
particularly important in designing Medicare policy as Medicare is the dominant payer for
health care services in the United States. In this paper I assess the effects of a Medicare
policy that restructured reimbursement for rural hospitals on county-level access to hospital
services. In particular, I document large spillover effects on non-Medicare patients through
closures of obstetrics units and an increase in neonatal mortality for high-risk babies.
Through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress implemented the Medicare Rural
Hospital Flexibility Program (henceforth Flex Program), which provided generous cost-based
reimbursement for Medicare services for small rural hospitals. To qualify, hospitals could
have at most 25 inpatient beds; further, they were required to be more than 35 miles away
from the nearest hospital or be designated by the state as a "necessary provider." This setting
is particularly suited for examining the role of spillovers, because it concerns a large change
in Medicare policy for the rural hospital sector. In addition, by conditioning eligibility on
the total number of beds, the program prompted a sharp decrease in hospital size which
resulted in diseconomies of scope between Medicare and non-Medicare patients and hence
negative spillover effects.
This paper is motivated by the striking finding (Gowrisankaran et. al., 2011; Schoenman
and Sutton, 2008) that converting hospitals decreased their size by about one third on average
in order to satisfy the bed requirement. Figure 1-1 shows the distribution of hospital size
11
for hospitals with fewer than 150 beds in 1997 and 2007.' The change in the distribution of
hospital size is immediately apparent, with a mass point at 25 beds in 2007.
The empirical analysis uses variation across hospitals in the decision to convert and the
timing of conversion to estimate the effect of conversion on the change in hospital size,
inpatient days, patient mix and services offered. The analysis is conducted both at the
hospital level and at the county level. The identifying assumption is that the particular
timing of the conversion is uncorrelated with changes in the outcomes of interest. To assess
the validity of this assumption, I examine differential trends prior to conversion for hospitals
(or counties) converting in different time periods, as well as non-converters.
Policymakers argued that converting hospitals would reduce their size by eliminating
unused capacity, with no direct impact on patient care. However, I find that total volume of
care at these hospitals, as measured by total inpatient days, decreases by almost 20 percent.
Hospitals discontinue services that are dependent on inpatient capacity, such as intensive-
care units and inpatient surgery. In addition, hospitals increase their Medicare share of
patients and drop services that are more Medicaid-intensive. In particular, hospitals are 12
percentage points less likely to provide obstetric services 5 years after conversion compared
to similar hospitals that do not convert. In the last part of the paper, I investigate whether
the reduction in obstetric services had an impact on neonatal mortality.
Did the reduction in obstetric services upon conversion have any impact on the birth
outcomes for the mothers residing in the county where a conversion took place? While the
closure of specialized services in rural areas raises concerns about access to care, there is
ample evidence on the benefits of consolidating specialized hospital services. To explore
this issue, I supplement the hospital-level analysis with data from the linked birth/infant
death Vital Statistics files to examine the effect of hospital conversions in a given county on
neonatal (28-day) mortality for births of mothers residing in that county. I find that, after
conversion, the share of births delivered outside the county of residence increases by about 10
percent. There are no clear effects on overall neonatal mortality. I find suggestive evidence
for an increase in neonatal mortality for very low birth weight (VLBW) babies. The point
estimates suggest that, if all hospitals in a county convert, neonatal mortality among VLBW
babies increases by about 6 percent.
Spillovers have received little attention in the literature, despite their potential impor-
tance and ubiquity. Finkelstein (2007) provides indirect evidence that the disproportion-
ately large impact of the introduction of Medicare on the health care sector compared to a
small change in health insurance can be partially explained by spillover effects through large
'This is a sample of hospitals most "at risk" to convert and includes both converters and non-converters.
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fixed-cost investments and jointness in the hospital production function. There is also some
evidence of the spillover effects of HMO penetration on care in non-HMO markets which is
summarized in Chernew, Baicker and Martin (2010).
Another strand of the literature finds evidence of spillover effects from Medicaid policies
in the long-term care setting. This literature looks at the effect of Medicaid nursing-home
reimbursement on quality and finds that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement can lead
to a decrease in the quality of care in nursing homes for all patients (Nyman, 1988; Gertler
and Waldman, 1992; Grabowski, 2001). The key driver of this result is a technological
nonseparability in quality provision across private-pay and Medicaid patients in markets
with excess demand by Medicaid patients. The underlying policy that gives rise to the
excess demand is a constraint on expanding or building nursing homes. This constraint is
similar to the policy I am analyzing, but the overall mechanism is different from my setting.
In the context of the Flex Program, the constraint on the expansion of capacity increases
the opportunity cost of providing non-Medicare services.
The Flex Program has been studied in the economics literature by Gowrisankaran et. al.
(2011). They use a dynamic oligopoly model of the rural-hospital industry to analyze the
impact of the program. They find that the program prevented the exit of about 6 percent
of currently operating hospitals. However, they find that after conversion, patients travel
longer distances to get care and that the program has decreased overall welfare for patients
in rural areas. They do not model the changes in service provision, which makes it difficult
to run counterfactual simulations that would not have limited hospital size.
There is a wide literature suggesting that for many procedures there is a positive cor-
relation between volume and outcomes (Halm, Lee, and Chassin, 2002; Gaynor, Seider and
Vogt, 2005). This implies that consolidation of services into larger centers could be beneficial
for patient outcomes (Phibbs et. al., 1996). On the other hand, decreased access to services
could delay emergency care and decrease the use of routine, preventive services. The effect
of the decrease in the availability of specialized services on patient welfare is thus ambigu-
ous. This paper can shed some light on the question of whether obstetric care and other
delivery services should be provided locally or centralized in larger, regional hospitals. This
paper also adds to an extensive literature in health policy analyzing the effect of access to
maternity services on birth outcomes (Nestbitt et. al., 1990).
This paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of size-dependent policies.
Existing papers emphasize potential distortions caused by size-dependent policies (e.g. firms
above a certain size are mandated to provide maternity benefits), finding that productive
firms do not expand (Garicano et. al., 2012). This paper uses micro-level panel data on firms
to directly look at the changes in firm size when such a policy is introduced. Due to the
13
large financial consequences of this policy, the effects on firm size are very large. In addition
to the direct effects on firm size, hospitals drop services, such as obstetrics, with effects on
neonatal mortality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background
information on the Medicare Flex program and Critical Access Hospitals. I also discuss the
differences in hospital incentives under the prospective payment system (PPS) and cost-based
reimbursement. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 describes my methodology and
results for the hospital-level and county-level analyses. Section 1.6 discusses the neonatal
mortality results. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background
Rural hospitals are an important part of the health-care network, representing about half of
U.S. hospitals and about 20 percent of total inpatient days. Despite their importance, they
have generally been understudied. Rural hospitals tend to be smaller than urban hospitals,
with about three-fourths having fewer than 100 beds. Understanding the impact of policies
on rural hospitals is important as they are often the only source of care for patients residing
in the surrounding area. Because rural areas generally have a larger percentage of elderly
residents and are poorer than urban areas, these hospitals are more dependent on Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursements.
1.2.1 The Flex Program
In 1982, the federal government attempted to control cost growth under Medicare through
the creation of a prospective payment system (PPS) for hospitals. In the early 1990s, there
was widespread concern that the switch to prospective payment reimbursement for Medicare
inpatient services in 1983 had accelerated the closure rate of rural hospitals. Because PPS
pays on a per-case basis, small, low-volume hospitals could have difficulties covering their
fixed costs because they have relatively fewer patients over which to spread their overhead
expenses. A U.S. General Accounting Office report from 1991 recommended the implemen-
tation of policies targeted at hospitals "whose closure would raise concern about access due
to the isolation of the hospital." The Flex Program was implemented through the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997. The intention of the program was to safeguard access to health care
in rural communities. The program was based on two experimental programs: the Med-
ical Assistance Facility (MAF) demonstration project in Montana, and the Essential Access
Community Hospital-Rural Primary Care Hospital Program.
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The most important part of the program was the creation of Critical Access Hospitals
(CAHs), originally envisioned to be limited-service hospitals in rural areas, which would
be restricted in size and provide emergency, outpatient and limited inpatient services. If
designated as a CAH, a hospital receives payment for its reasonable costs of providing inpa-
tient and outpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries, rather than being paid the PPS fixed
amount for those services.
In order to qualify, hospitals were required to have at most 25 inpatient beds, 2 an average
length of stay below 96 hours, and be located at least 35 road miles from the nearest short-
term general hospital.3 States could waive the distance requirement by designating hospitals
as "necessary providers" using their own set of criteria. Appendix A summarizes the details
of the legislation and the changes to the program that took place in 1999, 2000 and 2003.
One of the most significant provisions of the law was the limit on the number of hospital
beds for CAHs. The intention of this requirement was to target small hospitals, which were
perceived to be particularly disadvantaged by the fixed-price Medicare reimbursement, and
to contain hospital expansion under the cost-based reimbursement. It was generally believed
that hospitals would only drop underutilized capacity, and that any reduction in capacity
necessary for meeting the CAH requirements would not have a significant impact on patients.
Due to the flexibility allowed to the states in setting criteria for "necessary provider"
designations, the final number of conversions was larger than initially estimated, and fewer
than 20 percent of the existing CAHs are located more than 35 road miles from another
provider (MedPAC, June 2005). Approximately 20 percent of CAHs are located less than 5
miles from another hospital, and 65 percent are between 15 and 35 miles from the nearest
hospital (MedPAC, October 2009). Starting on January 1st, 2006, states could no longer
waive the distance requirement, which effectively put a stop on all new conversions after that
date.
The program and conversion process is state-administered. States were required to de-
velop comprehensive rural health plans and submit them for CMS approval before any of
their hospitals could become eligible for CAH designation (Dalton et. al., 2003). Each
state had to establish an office of rural health that would oversee the conversion process
and establish criteria for necessary-provider designation. In order to convert, hospitals had
2Obstetric labor and delivery beds were excluded from the bed count, but postpartum and birthing room
beds in which the mother remains after giving birth are counted. In the original legislation, hospitals were
allowed only 15 acute-care beds, plus an additional 10 if they were used as swing beds for post-acute care.
This constraint was later relaxed such that all 25 beds could be used to acute care.
3 Initially, only hospitals that were classified as non-metropolitan for Medicare PPS reimbursement pur-
poses and were either under non-profit or government control could qualify. This was relaxed in 1999,
allowing for-profit hospitals to participate, as well as facilities that were identified as rural by their own state
regulation.
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to undertake a financial feasibility analysis, hold a public town hall meeting for community
feedback, submit an application requesting conversion, and be subjected to a comprehensive
field survey to check whether or not it met the criteria for conversion. The entire conversion
process could take at least 6 to 8 months.4
By 2009, about one quarter of all U.S. community hospitals, representing half of all rural
hospitals, had converted to CAH status. Critical access hospitals are located in 45 states,
with five states - Nebraska, Texas, Minnesota, Iowa and Kansas - accounting for almost a
third of all CAHs. In South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Montana, more
than half of all hospitals have critical access status. Figure 1-2 shows the number of hospital
conversions by year. The conversions that take place before 1998 are hospitals that were part
of the demonstration project. These hospitals were automatically switched to CAH status
and will be excluded from the analysis. Conversions almost stop after 2006 when states were
no longer able to designate "necessary provider" hospitals.
Some hospitals decided not to convert to the CAH status. In some cases, the medical
staff was concerned about the potential reduction in the scope of services. There was also
variation across states in the amount of information and support that hospitals received from
their state programs, which affected the rate and number of hospital conversions. Some
communities were reluctant to support a hospital's conversion, because they perceived it
as the last step before closure (GAO, 2003). Some decided not to convert, because they
expected their Medicare PPS payment rates to be higher than their reported costs under the
CAH cost accounting (MedPAC, June 2005).
1.2.2 Hospital Incentives
Hospitals that convert to the CAH status experience three major changes: a reduction in
inpatient capacity for those with more than 25 beds, a change in Medicare reimbursement
from PPS to cost-based payments, and a cap on the average length of stay. To simplify, I will
focus mostly on the impact of the first two factors. The limit on length of stay seemed to be
easily met by hospitals, even before conversion. As in, Cutler (1995), who studies the switch
from cost-based reimbursement to PPS in 1983, I think of the change in reimbursement
induced by conversion as an increase in the marginal reimbursement per patient, and a
change in the average reimbursement that depends on individual DRGs.
Under PPS, the hospital is paid a fixed amount per diagnosis and is not reimbursed on
the margin for extra costs incurred for a given patient. This gives hospitals an incentive
to cut costs on the margin, usually by cutting length of stay. The payment for a given
4Based on reading of conversion manuals, application procedures, and case studies.
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patient is based on their assigned diagnosis related group (DRG). The price for a given DRG
is standardized across hospitals, with some adjustments to account for differences in wage
levels, outlier cases, medical training expenses and share of low-income patients. Because of
this, the PPS reimbursement gives hospitals an incentive to select patients from DRGs that
are more generously reimbursed relative to their cost. Within a DRG, the hospital has an
incentive to treat the less complicated cases which tend to be lower cost. For a given patient,
hospitals have an incentive to keep costs down by not doing extra procedures on the margin,
or by discharging patients sooner.
Under cost-based reimbursement, payments are not based directly on the type or number
of services provided to Medicare patients. Instead, payments are based on each hospital's
costs and the share of those costs that are allocated to Medicare patients. The total cost
is estimated using cost accounting data from Medicare cost reports. For inpatient services,
Medicare pays a share of the inpatient costs equal to the share of Medicare inpatient days.
Therefore, under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals have higher marginal reimbursements
per patient and reduced incentives to cut down costs compared to PPS.
By revealed preference, hospitals that decide to convert earn more profits than before
conversion'. Holding average costs per patient constant, this implies that the average price
each hospital receives per Medicare patient has gone up.6 Therefore, the switch to cost-based
reimbursement increased marginal and average reimbursement for Medicare patients at the
converting hospitals.
For hospitals with fewer than 25 beds, the main change upon conversion is the change
in reimbursement. These hospitals do not have to reduce their inpatient capacity when
switching to CAH;7 however, after conversion, the limit on beds can restrict their ability to
expand and add more services. Due to the relative increase in average reimbursements for
Medicare patients compared to non-Medicare patients, hospitals will have an incentive to tilt
their patient mix towards Medicare patients. Thus, even smaller hospitals might experience
a reduction in non-Medicare services, such as obstetrics and deliveries. 8
In addition to the changes above, hospitals with more than 25 beds will also have to
reduce their number of inpatient beds upon conversion in order to qualify for the program.
These hospitals should experience one-time, persistent reduction in hospital size. The impact
5This is supported by preliminary analysis using measured of profitability from HCRIS.
6Note that this ignores variation across DRGs. It is possible that certain procedures were more profitable
under PPS, but I will abstract from this in the current paper.
7Because of the change in restrictions, we could see a slight reduction in inpatient capacity and days for
hospitals with fewer than 25 beds that convert before 2003.
8Note that for this to be true we need a source of diseconomies of scope, even in the absence of the
constraint on beds. Such sources could include fixed shared resources, such as physicians, capital, nursing
personnel.
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of this reduction in capacity on inpatient days depends on the amount of unused capacity
prior to conversion. As hospitals cut their inpatient capacity, they might be forced to also
eliminate certain services that rely on specialized inpatient beds, such as intensive care units,
surgical services and delivery services.
Hospitals' incentives for cost-reduction are substantially diminished under cost-based
reimbursement. Therefore, holding size constant, total expenditures should go up after
conversion. The decrease in size at hospitals with more than 25 beds will attenuate some
of this increase, so the overall effect of conversion on total expenditures is ambiguous. The
service intensity per patient day, measured as total expenditures per patient day should go
up because of the increase in marginal reimbursement.
There are two sources of spillovers to non-Medicare patients. The restrictions on hospital
size imposed by the CAH designation induce changes in infrastructure that will affect all
patients treated at those hospitals. The restriction on hospital size will lead to diseconomies
of scope between Medicare and non-Medicare patients. In addition, because of the increase
in average reimbursement for Medicare patients, under diseconomies of scope, hospitals will
tend to specialize in Medicare patients and reduce their volume and services for non-Medicare
patients, and in particular, Medicaid patients. In the empirical analysis, I will try to dis-
entangle the two effects by comparing the changes for hospitals above and below and bed
threshold.
1.3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
For the analysis of the CAH program I start with panel data on hospitals from the American
Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals for fiscal years 1994 to 2009. From
this survey, I use information on hospital location, number of hospital beds, inpatient days
by patient type, total expenditures, and services provided by the hospital, such as obstetrics,
intensive care services, inpatient and outpatient surgery.
I link the hospital data to a database maintained by the Flex Monitoring Team which
contains information on the effective date, supplied by CMS, upon which the facility began
receiving cost-based reimbursement from Medicare. I consider this the "date of conversion"
for the rest of the analysis. These two data sets allow me to estimate changes in the outcomes
of interest at the hospital level, before and after the date of conversion.
The primary data source for birth outcomes is the 1995 to 2007' Linked Birth/Infant
9The U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth was revised in 2003. Because of this revision certain items
such as years of maternal education, month when prenatal care was started and procedures used during birth
were not comparable across years and were not used in the study. [NCHS Technical Appendix 2005]
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Death data released by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS, 1995-2007). The
birth data is collected from birth certificates, and is a census of all births in the United
States. The restricted-use data used for this study contains information on the mother's
county of residence and the county of occurrence for the birth. In addition, the data has
demographic information such as mother's age, education, race and marital status. There
are measures of fetal health, such as birth weight. Information about mortality rates can be
computed using the linked files, which match information on infant deaths to the natality
files. Due to some changes in data reporting, 0 I will focus on neonatal mortality (up to 28
days). The data also contains information on whether the mother has received any prenatal
care, whether the birth occurred in a hospital and whether a doctor was present at delivery.
Finally, I use measures of two obstetric procedures which are available on the birth certificate
throughout this period: cesarean section delivery and induction/stimulation of labor.
I use the Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) Codes of the zip codes where each
hospital is located to characterize hospitals as urban or rural. RUCAs are a Census tract-
based classification scheme that utilizes commuting information to characterize all of the
nation's census tracts regarding their rural and urban status. This definition commonly
used by federal programs to determine rural status for eligibility. I use a RUCA code of 4
or above to denote a rural area.
County-level population measures are from the Surveillance Epidemiology and End Re-
sults (SEER) population database.
The final sample has all general and surgical non-federal short-stay hospitals in the AHA.
Table 1.1 shows some summary statistics for the hospital sample in 1997 and 2007, for the
entire sample, and separately for converters and non-converters with fewer than 120 beds.
At the baseline, converters are much smaller and are more likely to be for profit. They are
less likely to have intensive care units, birthing rooms or obstetrics. Their average expen-
ditures per day are slightly lower than for the sample of non-converters. The disparity in
services offered between converters and non-converters increases in 2007, while their average
expenditures are slightly higher.
The county sample for analyzing hospital outcomes is constructed by aggregating the
hospital level sample to the county level. The linked birth/infant death data is merged to
the AHA data based on the county of residence of the mother and the year of the birth. The
final sample consists of about 2400 counties which have at least one general, non-federal,
'
0For the later years NCHS has only released the period files which report infant deaths that have occurred
in a given year, but not necessarily of babies born in that year. Because of this I will restrict my attention to
neonatal (28-day) mortality and drop the births that occur in December (for which the 28-day window could
fall into the next year) from my analysis. This guarantees that I can accurately measure 28-day mortality
for all the births in that year.
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community hospital in the American Hospital Association survey and about 710 counties
which have a nonzero number of births and no hospitals data."
Table 1.2 presents some baseline summary information on the counties in the final sample,
separately for counties with at least one conversion, counties with at least one hospital but
not conversions and counties with no hospitals. The first three rows show the number of
counties, the number of AHA hospitals and the number of births in the final sample.
The next set of rows present summary information on hospital characteristics for hospitals
located in the county. These measures come from the AHA survey data and summarize access
to care for patients in the area. Counties with CAH hospitals tend to be smaller, they have
fewer hospitals on average and are less likely to provide intensive care units and obstetrics.
This is not surprising since most of these hospitals are located in rural areas.
The next set of rows of Table 1.2 present summary statistics on the neonatal (28-day)
mortality rate. I focus on one-month mortality, rather than one-year mortality for two rea-
sons. First, most deaths during the neonatal period are associated with events surrounding
the prenatal period and the delivery, compared to post-neonatal deaths which are more often
associated with environmental factors. Second, due to changes in data reporting, for births
that occur after 2003, I can only link the birth and death information for births that occur
within 28-days after birth and do not occur in December. Neonatal deaths represent about
65 percent of all infant deaths that occur within one year of birth.
1.4 Effect of CAH Conversion on Hospital Outcomes
The empirical analysis has three parts. First, I briefly document the changes experienced
by hospitals upon conversion. The first part of the analysis is conducted at the hospital
level. To tie in to the conceptual discussion in Section 1.2.2, I also present some results to
compare the difference in outcomes for hospitals above and below 25 beds. This gives more
insight into the underlying mechanisms that were responsible for the observed changes. In
the second part, to examine the impact of conversion on access to care, and outcomes, the
analysis will be run at the county level. Here I document the impact of conversion on county-
level aggregates of hospital outcomes, and measures of services provided at the county level.
Finally, I look at the impact of county-level hospital conversion rates on birth inputs and
county-level neonatal mortality.
"Approximately 22.5 percent of counties in the birth dataset do not have a hospital. According to the
Center for Disease Control, in 2005, about 21 percent of counties in the U.S. did not have a hospital.
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1.4.1 Hospital-Level Analysis Methodology
In this section, I outline the empirical methodology used to estimate the effect of hospital
conversion to critical access status on hospital-level outcomes. My analysis uses variation in
when and whether hospitals converted to investigate the effects of conversion on hospital size,
utilization, and services offered. The concern is that hospital CAH status is not randomly
assigned; hospitals can decide whether and when to convert. The decision to convert is made
by the hospital, but external factors, such as changes in the federal legislation and variation
in the state rural programs, affected whether and when a given hospital could convert. As
it was clear from the summary statistics, converting hospitals are on average smaller, more
likely to be non-profit and less likely to offer different types of services. Differences in levels
are not necessarily a concern, as all the regression specifications include hospital fixed effects,
but differences in levels could be indicative of differential trends. I will try to examine this
in the specifications below.
To examine how conversion to critical access status affects hospital-level outcomes, I start
with an event-time study analysis framework. This allows me to estimate time-varying post-
conversion effects, as well as to investigate whether there are any differential trends in the
variables of interest between converters and non-converters in the years before conversion.
Examining pre-existing trends is particularly important in this context, where the decision
to convert is made by the hospital.
I estimate the following linear regression
Yht = #3T CAHh,tT + h + Yt + 1 lrurallh t + Xt + 6 ht, (.1
Yht is the outcome of interest. CAHht is an indicator, equal to 1 if the hospital converts to
CAH status in year t. I normalize the effect for the year before the conversion, T = -1, to
zero. The CAHht indicators are equal to 0 if the hospital never converts within the sample
period." Year fixed effects, -yt, control for year-specific shocks that are common across
hospitals; for example, national changes in Medicare reimbursement. Hospital fixed effects,
ah, control for time-invariant differences across hospitals, such as a hospital's inherent market
characteristics determined by its location. In addition, I include a separate linear trend for
rural hospitals to allow for differential trends over time between rural and urban hospitals.
This regression also controls for the local county total population, and the population of
women aged 15 to 49 (Xct).
12Since hospital conversions practically stop after 2006, when states can no longer waive the distance
requirement, most hospitals that have not converted by 2009 will never convert.
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The series of coefficients #, are the main estimates of interest. For r > 0, #, is an
estimate of the change in the outcome of interest, T years after conversion, in hospitals that
converted r years ago, relative to hospitals that did not convert. Similarly, for T < 0, #3 , is
an estimate of the change in the outcome of interest T years before conversion. The estimates
#, for T < 0 allow me examine whether there are different trends for converting and non-
converting hospitals in the years prior to conversion. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level to adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-county correlation over time
To summarize these effects, I also report the results from a more parsimonious regression
model. This specification allows for a mean shift in the outcome of interest at the time of
conversion.
The specifications include separate dummy variables for the year before conversion and
two years before conversion. These coefficients will measure any effects differential effects
between converters and non-converters that start showing up as the hospital undergoes
the conversion process, but before it has been certified as a critical access hospital. Finding
significant effects during this period could suggest that converters were changing differentially
from non-converters even in the absence of the critical access program. However, the approval
process was quite lengthy. The approval process varied across states, but often required a
financial evaluation of the impact of conversion, approval from the local community, and
undergoing an evaluation to check that the hospital satisfied the CAH requirements. I do
not have any precise information for the date at which hospitals initiated the conversion
process. In my analysis, I assume that hospitals started planning to convert two years prior
and any effects observed during this period can be attributed to the conversion process.
In the implementation, I include separate indicators for these two years and report these
coefficients in the tables of results. Therefore, all of the estimates are relative to three or
more years before the time of conversion.
The regression I am estimating is:
Yht = #1 [Post CAH]ht + #_1 CAHh,tl + # 2CAH,t+2
+Y 1[Ever CAH] T +ah + -Yt + 1 [rural]h t + Xt + Eht (1.2)
1 [Post CAH]ht is an indicator variable equal to 1 if hospital h has CAH status at time t.
The two indicator variables CAHh,t+l and CAH,t+2 are equal to 1 if the hospital converts
to CAH status at t+1 or t+2, respectively. The interaction term 1 [Ever CAH) T allows for
a separate linear trend in event time for converting hospitals. 1 [Ever CAH] is an indicator
equal to 1 if the hospital ever converts to CAH status during my sample period. This is
interacted with T, the number of years before or after conversion, which takes both positive
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and negative values. The coefficient of interest, #, then measures the change in the outcome
of interest in hospitals that convert, before and after conversion, relative to hospitals that
did not convert, allowing for a differential trend in event time.
To allow for a more flexible change around the time of conversion, I will also estimate
a model that allows both a mean shift and a trend break at the time of conversion. This
will capture more flexibly the dynamics of the effects in the years after conversion for the
different outcomes.
Yht = /1 [Post CAH]ht + _1 [Post CAH]ht T + I_ 1 CAHh,t+1 + /- 2 CAHh,t+2
+-y1 1 [Ever CAH] T + ath + -Yt + 1 [rurallh t + Xct + Cht (1.3)
The term 1 [Post CAH]ht T is the interaction of an indicator for whether the hospital
currently CAH status with the number of years since the time of conversion. This term will
be equal to 0 in the years before conversion and start at 1 in the year after conversion. All
other variables remain the same.
I do not control for any time-varying hospital-level characteristics in these regressions, as
most of these are outcomes of the conversion to critical access status. Therefore, I cannot
separate the effect of the hospital conversion to critical access status from the effect of other
changes in hospital organization and services that happen at the same time as the conversion
but are not caused by the conversion to CAH status. The regressions include controls for
county-level population to account for possible changes in patient demand around the time of
conversion which could influence both the decision to convert and which services to offer. In
all regressions standard errors are clustered at the county level to adjust for heteroskedasticity
and within-county correlation over time.
1.4.2 Hospital-Level Results
The outcomes of interest will be organized into three categories: general hospital level mea-
sures of output and costs (hospital beds, inpatient days and total expenditures), inpatient
days composition (Medicare days, Medicaid days, Medicare share of total inpatient days and
Medicaid share of total inpatient days) and hospital services offered (obstetrics, intensive
care facilities, outpatient surgeries and inpatient surgeries).
The results for the first set of outcomes are presented in Table 1.3 and Figure 1-3. Figure
1-3 plots the /#, coefficients from estimating specification (1.1) for 9 years before and after
the date of conversion. Because of the timing of the conversions, the #, coefficients are
estimated off a smaller number of hospital conversions in the tails. As most conversions take
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place between 1999 and 2005, the coefficients for 6 years before up to 4 years after the time
of conversion are estimated on the largest sample.
The time pattern of the #,s identifies changes in the dependent variables in hospitals
that converted to critical access status, in years relative to the time of conversion. The
estimates for T < 0 allow us to investigate whether there are any differential trends in the
variables of interest between converters and non-converters, prior to conversion. The dashed
line at -3 demarcates the transition period before the actual conversion. I will focus on the
estimates before r = -3 to investigate pre-existing trends and after T = -1 to look at the
effect of conversion, and mostly ignore the period between -3 and -1. The coefficients
are normalized relative to the year before conversion (T = -1) which is set to zero. This
underestimates the total effect of conversion to CAH if the change from year -3 to year -1
should also be attributed to the conversion process. The dashed lines indicate the 95 percent
confidence interval for each coefficient.
Consider first the results of conversion on the change in inpatient capacity. There is a
slight downward trend over time in the /3 ,s before the date of conversion. This indicates that
converting hospitals were declining in size relative to non-converting hospitals, even before
the time of conversion. The period between r = -6 and r = -3 is mostly flat. At the
time of conversion, there is a sharp mean shift. Hospitals converting to critical access status
experienced a decline in number of beds of about 15 percent on average from T = -1 to
T = 0.
Estimates in column (1) of Table 1.3 confirm these results. The overall drop in hospital
size, relative to three of more years before conversion, is 19 percent. Note that the coefficient
on the separate trend for converting hospitals is negative and significant. However, the
magnitude is much smaller compared to the mean shift. At the 0.4% rate of decline, hospitals
would have taken more than 40 years to reach the same total decline. Column (2) also
includes a break in trend at the time of conversion. I also report the estimated effect five
years later and the standard error of this estimate. The results are similar. The estimated
change 5 years later is 14.2 percent.
The second panel of Figure 1-3 shows the results for total inpatient days. The graphs
show no pre-existing trends in inpatient days before the time of conversion. The magnitude
of the estimates is similar to that for beds. Hospitals experience a 17 percent decrease in
inpatient days at the time of conversion. This shows that, contrary to expectations, the
reduction in hospital beds was not just idle capacity. The change in inpatient days is a one
time shift at the time of conversion.
The last panel of Figure 1-3 shows the results for total expenditures. As described in
Section 1.2.2, the effects on expenditures are ambiguous. Expenditures are increasing in
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converting hospitals, relative to non-converters, before the time of conversion. There is a
one time drop at the time of conversion. Then the trend continues. The regression estimates
confirm the findings of the graph. There is a drop in expenditures of 6.6% at the time of
conversion. Expenditures in converting hospitals are increasing by 1.1% per year relative
to non-converters, but this does not seem to accelerate at the time of conversion. This is
perhaps surprising, if we thought that the cost-based reimbursed would tend to accelerate
the increase in spending.
The second set of results looks at the effect of conversions on Medicare and Medicaid
patients and patient mix. As explained in Section 1.2.2 hospitals will have an incentive to
substitute towards more Medicare patients to increase their reimbursement from Medicare.
However, it is not necessarily a priori clear how Medicare patient days will be impacted by
the change in total capacity.
Figure 1-4 and Table 1.4 show these estimates. Medicare inpatient days fall at the time
of conversion, but slowly recover over time. By the end of the period once cannot reject that
they are back to their pre-conversion levels. The Medicare share over this period increases
by about 6 percentage points. The estimates in Table 1.4 confirm these findings. Medicare
days drop by about 21% at the time of conversion, but the post conversion trend is positive.
Medicare days recover by about 1.8% per year. The Medicare share of days increases by
about 0.5 percentage points per year.
Medicaid days drop by 16.3 percent at the time of conversion and continue to decrease by
about 2.4 percent per year. Therefore, the Medicaid share decreases by about 0.4 percentage
points every year (column (7)).
The last set of outcomes of interest is whether hospitals provide a series of services which
tend to be more dependent on having inpatient capacity. Figure 1-5 shows the estimates for
the four outcomes of interest. The estimates show no differential trends in converters relative
to non-converters for obstetrics and intensive care facilities. For inpatient and outpatient
surgery, it seems like converting hospitals were increasing their provision before the time
of conversion. All four outcomes experience a sharp change in trend around the time of
conversion. The changes in trend generally occur at T =-3. As before, I attribute this
change to the transition to CAH status. However, I cannot reject the hypothesis that both
the conversion and the closure of obstetrics services, for example, were precipitated by some
other trends, such as a sharp decline in natality.
Table 1.5 shows the regression estimates for these outcomes. They all experience a
significant drop at the time of conversion, continued by a negative change in trend over the
post-conversion period. I estimate that five years after the time of conversion, hospitals that
convert are 12.7 percentage points less likely to offer obstetrics units, 14.3 percentage points
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less likely to have intensive care units, 7.5 percentage points less likely to offer outpatient
surgery and 13.2 percentage points less likely to offer inpatient surgery. These drops are
significant. At the baseline, in 1997, 58 percent of converting hospitals have obstetrics and
56 percent have ICUs.
The findings from the hospital-level analysis show a large impact of CAH conversions on
hospital outcomes. I find that hospital size and total inpatient days decreased by almost a 20
percent, hospitals substitute towards more Medicare patients, and many converting hospitals
close their obstetrics units, ICUs and stop offering surgical services. In the next section, I
explore the underlying mechanisms for these effects by comparing the changes in hospitals
above and below the bed threshold.
1.4.3 Reimbursement Change versus Capacity Reduction
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, hospitals are subject to two main changes upon conversion, a
change in reimbursement from prospective to cost-plus and a decrease in inpatient capac-
ity for hospitals with more than 25 beds.13 Comparing the response to the legislation for
hospitals that were above and below the threshold can give us some insight into the effect
of the reimbursement change versus the combined effect of the reimbursement change and
the capacity constraint on outcomes. However, hospitals below the threshold could still be
affected by the bed cap. First, the bed cap was set until 2003 at 15 acute beds and at most 10
post-acute (swing) beds and was later relaxed to 25 beds which could all be acute. Second,
even if hospitals do not have to decrease their inpatient capacity to be able to convert, the
bed cap will still limit their ability to expand in the future.
To examine these differences, I run the following specification:
Yht = #>251 [Post CAH~ht x 1 [Beds > 25|h + #<251 [Post CAH]ht x 1 [Beds < 25],
+#3iCAH,t+1 + #- 2CAH,t+2 + ah + Yt + 1 [rural]h t + 1 [bed q] t + Xct + (4)
where I interact the indicator for post-conversion with two separate indicators for whether
the hospital was above or below the bed threshold in 1997. In addition, the specification
allows for separate linear trends by quintile of initial hospital size 1 [bed q]h t.
The results are shown in Table 1.6. At the bottom of the table I also show the magnitude
of the difference #>25 - #<25 and the p-value for the test that the effects are equal. The
assumption is that smaller hospitals respond mostly to the reimbursement change, while
larger hospitals have to respond both to the reimbursement change and the capacity reduc-
"Of the final converters, about 230 hospitals had fewer than 25 beds before conversion.
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tion. Assuming the response to the reimbursement change is similar across the threshold,
this difference measures the effect of the reduction in capacity.
This table includes the main outcomes of interest: total beds, inpatient days, expendi-
tures, medicare days, medicaid days and obstetrics services. Column (1) shows the effect
of conversion on beds. The reduction in inpatient capacity is only 5 percent for hospitals
below the threshold, compared to 29 percent for hospitals above the threshold. However,
the decrease in inpatient days, shown in column (2), is quite large even for hospitals below
the bed threshold. Inpatient days decrease by almost 14.6 percent at hospitals below the
threshold compared to almost 26 percent at hospitals above the threshold. This effect could
partially be due to the initial requirement that hospitals could have at most 15 beds used
for acute services. This can also represent a demand response to the changes in the types of
services offered by the hospitals.
Column (3) shows the effect of conversion for hospitals. As expected, expenditures in-
crease by 6 percent for smaller hospitals which only respond to the reimbursement change,
but did not have to significantly reduce their capacity. The effect is zero for larger hospitals.
Column (4) shows the effect of conversion on Medicare inpatient days. Even small hospi-
tals experience a significant decline in Medicare inpatient days, but most of the effect comes
from the larger hospitals. This suggests that the overall decline in Medicare inpatient days
is due to the decrease in capacity in larger hospitals. The non-zero effect at smaller hospitals
is somewhat surprising. As before, part of this could be due to changes in the types of ser-
vices offered. For example, one common use for intensive care units in rural areas would be
monitoring for elderly patients who have pneumonia. Closing these units means that these
patients would now be transferred to a larger hospital in the area and Medicare days would
decrease.
Column (5) shows the effect of conversion on Medicaid inpatient days. The drop in in-
patient days for Medicaid patients is almost twice as large as that for Medicare days. The
difference in the effects for hospitals above and below the threshold is not statistically signifi-
cant. Similarly, the decrease in obstetrics services at hospitals above and below the threshold
is almost the same. These findings suggests that an important mechanism in the closure of
obstetrics units and the large decline in Medicaid inpatient days was the reimbursement
change and not the reduction in capacity. This is important for the generalizability of these
findings. While the reduction in hospital size was a peculiarity of this particular program,
reimbursement changes are frequent and, as these findings show, can have large spillover
effects on other patients.
The Medicare program and private insurers are often viewed as cross-subsidizing care for
Medicaid patients. However, in the presence of diseconomies of scope, hospitals may respond
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to a reimbursement increase for Medicare patients by substituting away from the relatively
lower reimbursed Medicaid patients. I find that in this particular setting, the latter effect
dominates: increasing reimbursement for Medicare patients can crowd out care for Medicaid
patients.
1.4.4 Hospital Level Robustness Checks
Table 1.7 explores the robustness of the hospital level findings across different samples and
specifications. The specifications in this table are variations on the trend break model, and
the estimates listed are for the five-year effect.
The first row shows the baseline estimates from the previous tables as a reference. The
next sets of results include first state linear trends, and then state-by-year fixed effects. The
estimates are similar across these three specifications.
The last rows explore the stability of the estimates to using other sample. The next
specification uses only the sample of converters. In this specification, estimating the year
dummies in the year when many hospitals have already converted will capture some of the
effect of conversion and is collinear with a dummy for conversion. Therefore, I instead a
include a dummy for 5 years after conversion separately and report the coefficient on that in
the tables. The effects for services offered are now smaller but still significant. The effects
for Medicare and Medicaid days now change signs and are not significant.
The following specification only uses the sample of rural hospitals for estimation. The
last row drops the hospitals that converted after 2005, when conversions almost stop. These
hospitals do not have as many years in the sample after conversion to estimate longer-horizon
effects.
1.5 County-Level Analysis
The hospital-level analysis has a couple of weaknesses, some of which can be addressed by
looking at hospital outcomes at a more aggregate level. One concern is that the measured
drop in inpatient days captures substitution away from converting hospitals towards other
hospitals and not a real reduction in care. If patients travel to non-converting neighboring
hospitals to receive their care, then the control group in the above analysis is contaminated.
If this is an important phenomenon, the estimates above will tend to overestimate the true
effect of conversion on outcomes at CAH hospitals. By looking at these utilization measures
aggregated to the county level, I am able to capture this substitution across hospitals within a
county. Additionally, the previous analysis does not capture the impact of the CAH program
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on hospital exit rates. By aggregating the outcomes to the county level, I can measure total
available inpatient capacity and inpatient days which will also capture changes due to hospital
exit. This section will describe the analysis methodology at the county level.
As in the hospital-level analysis, I start the county-level analysis with a flexible event-time
study to examine the changes in the outcomes of interest over this time period. There are
two main conceptual differences in the county-level analysis: number of events and event size.
First, if more than one hospital in the county converts to CAH then the county experiences
multiple events during the analysis period. Second, depending on how many hospitals the
county has and the size of those hospitals, the impact of a conversion could be very different.
To deal with the first issue is simple conceptually. Take a county with more than one
conversion and order these in the order of occurrence. First, start with an event-time frame-
work where we estimate the effects of the 1st conversion, 2 nd conversion, and so on separately,
treating these as separate events with separate pre-post indicator variables for the years rel-
ative to the time of the nth conversion. Then, assuming the effects are the same for the first,
second, and subsequent conversions, I pool across the different events and estimate a single
series of coefficients.' 4
To deal with the second issue, I parameterize the effect of a hospital conversion on county-
level outcomes by the fraction of county beds in the converting hospital (measured pre-BBA).
For example, a county with two hospitals of equal size, one of which converts, will experience
an event of size .5 at the time of conversion. For counties with just one hospital this will be
equivalent to the previous hospital-level specification. 5
Formally, the estimated regression equation is:
Yt = x FrBedse,t_, + , + -yt + 1[rural]ct + Xct + Ect, (1.5)
FrBedsc,t_, is the fraction of pre-BBA beds that converted in county c at time t - F.
Compared to the classical event-study specification, for a given year t, more than one of the
event-time terms will be nonzero if the county has experienced more than one conversion.
The series of coefficients #, are the main estimates of interest. An "event," for purposes
of the county-level plot, should be thought of as "an event of size 1," i.e. 100% of the beds
14For more details on this see Appendix B. Sandler and Sandler (2012) show in Monte-Carlo simulations
that other ways to deal with multiple events, such as ignoring subsequent events or duplicating observations
to have one observation per-individual-event-time can create trends in the outcome variable before and after
an event and can lead to biased estimates and suggest this strategy for estimation.
15One can also define an indicator variable equal to 1 if the county has had any conversions and use that in-
stead. However, this will ignore important heterogeneity across counties in the impact of the conversion. For
example, while most counties have only one hospital, Los Angeles County has 106 hospitals and experiences
one conversion during this period.
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in the county convert to CAH, and the measured effects should be scaled down for events of
different sizes.
The regression also includes county fixed effects, 6c, to control for time-invariable county-
specific factors, such as geography, and time fixed effects, 'yt, to control for year-specific
shocks that are common across counties. In some specifications I allow for a separate linear
trend for rural counties to relax the assumption of parallel trends. Controls for county-level
total population and female population 15 to 49 are included as before.
To summarize these results, I also run the following regression, which is analogous to the
hospital-level mean-shift specification:
Yht = 3 ( FrBedse,t_, + f_1FrBedsc,t+1 + /- 2FrBedsc,t+2
T>O
+6c + -Yt + 1[AnyCAH]ct + 1 [rural] c t + Xct + Eht (1.6)
The first term E>O FrBedsc,t, is the total fraction of beds that have converted up to
time t. This is analogous to including an indicator for the time after conversion interacted
with the total fraction of beds that are currently in CAH hospitals. The next two terms are
analogous to the dummies for the year before and two years before conversion, but here they
are interacted with the fraction of beds that convert at time t + 1 and t + 2 respectively.
Because of the inclusion of the pre-conversion terms, all of these estimates are measured
relative to three or more years before conversion.
The indicator 1[AnyCAH]c is equal to 1 if a given county has at least one hospital
conversion. The specification includes an interaction of this indicator with a linear trend to
allow counties with at least one conversion to have a different trend relative to counties with
no conversions.
The coefficient of interest is # and can be interpreted as the change in the outcome of
interest if all the hospitals in a given county convert to CAH status. For counties with at
least one conversion, the average share of beds that converts is 85 percent. The regressions
are unweighted, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The outcomes of interest are those from the hospital-level regression. The outcomes are
constructed as aggregates of hospital characteristics for all non-federal, short-term general
U.S. hospitals in the county in a given year of the AHA data.
1.5.1 County-Level Results
The results from estimating equation 1.5 for the county-level outcomes of interest are shown
in Figures 1-6, 1-7 and 1-8. I plot the series of coefficients f, against T estimated from
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equation 1.5. The coefficient #_1 for the year before conversion is normalized to zero.
The coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the outcome of interest if all the
hospitals in a given county convert to CAH status. To simplify the discussion, I will refer to
these estimates as the effect on converting counties. To interpret the estimates, it helps to
keep in mind that for counties with at least one conversion, the average share of converting
beds was 85 percent.
Figure 1-6 shows the estimated effects for total beds, inpatient days and total hospital
expenditures. The measured effects are comparable to those at the hospital level. Table 1.8
shows the results from estimating regression 1.6 on the outcomes of interest. The magnitudes
estimated are similar to those from the hospital-level regression. There is a sharp decrease
in inpatient beds and inpatient days in counties that experience hospital conversions. These
results suggest that total inpatient days at the county level also decrease at the time of a
hospital conversion. Depending on the degree to which patients are able to substitute to
hospitals outside of the county, this can be indicative of a real reduction in care.
Figure 1-7 shows the estimated effects for Medicare and Medicaid days and shares. Again,
these results are similar to the hospital-level findings. Medicare inpatient days initially go
down, but they recover over time such that by the end of the period they are close to the
initial level. In contrast, Medicaid inpatient days decline steadily throughout the analysis
window. The mean-shift results reported in Table 1.9 do not capture the rich dynamics.
The average decrease in Medicare days over the post-conversion period is 16.4 percent for
Medicare days and 13.7 percent for Medicaid days in counties with 100% conversion rates.
There are no statistically significant effects on Medicare and Medicaid shares in Table 1.9.
Figure 1-8 shows the estimated effects for services offered where the outcome is whether
any hospitals in the county provide the service of interest: obstetrics, intensive care, outpa-
tient surgery and inpatient surgery, respectively. All four services show flat pre-trends up
to one to two years before the date of conversion. There is a sharp break in trend around
this time. Counties with hospital conversions are less likely to have any hospitals that offer
inpatient surgery, intensive care units and obstetrics. The estimates are slightly noisier for
outpatient surgery, but show the same general pattern as the other three outcomes.
Table 1.10 summarizes the results of these figures by estimating equation 1.6. All results
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and represent meaningful reductions in
services. Estimates in Table 1.10 show that after conversion counties where 100 percent of
hospitals converts are 7.1 percentage points less likely to have any hospitals with OB services,
8.5 percentage points less likely to have intensive care, 2.6 percentage points less likely
to perform outpatient surgeries and 4.9 percentage points less likely to perform inpatient
surgeries. The effects are similar if instead I use the share of hospitals in a given county that
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offer the service on the left hand side.
The results suggest that hospital conversion to critical access status caused a net decline in
the amount of care that people living in the local area received and access to more specialized
hospital services. This does not rule out the possibility that patients in the county travelled
outside of the county to receive care, or that the reduction in care did not have any negative
impact on their health outcomes. In order to examine this, in the next section I will analyze
the effect of hospital conversions on neonatal mortality at the county level.
1.6 Effect of Conversion on Neonatal Mortality
The analysis of birth outcomes uses the linked birth/infant death data for 1995 to 2007. For
this part of the analysis I will use the same analysis framework as described in Section 1.5.
The question is how hospital conversion to CAH affects neonatal mortality for babies born
to mother's residing in that county. In addition to the controls from equation 1.5, I also
control for demographic characteristics of the mother, such as age, marriage status, race and
education.
For this analysis I look at the effects separately for overall neonatal mortality and for
a smaller sample of higher risk births, birth weights below 1500 grams. Ex ante, it is not
clear how conversion would affect neonatal mortality. Closure of local obstetrics units can
improve mortality if, after the closure of local obstetrics units, high-risk babies are born in
larger hospitals which have more specialized NICU units. On the other hand, closure of local
units could increase mortality if high-risk births are not properly monitored and necessary
care is delayed due to the longer travel distances.
Figures 1-9 and 1-10 plot the coefficients from estimating equation 1.5. The mortality
rates are measured as deaths per 1000 births. The estimates are very imprecise, but suggest
an increase in mortality 3 or more years after the date of conversion for very low birth
weight births. Mortality rates for all births show a similar trend, but the estimates are not
statistically significant in any of the periods.
Table 1.11 shows the estimates for the effect of conversion on neonatal mortality for all
births. I report several specifications in this graph to explore the stability of the result
to various controls. The estimates are always positive, but only significant in one of the
specifications. This estimate would imply an increase of about 4.5 percent in neonatal
mortality and is the highest estimate across the eight specifications.
Table 1.12 shows the estimates for the effect of conversion on neonatal mortality for very
high risk births. The effects are large and positive in all of the specifications and significant
in all but two of them. The smallest estimate suggests an increase of 13.5 (per 1000) deaths
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off of a baseline of 210.2 (per 1000), if all hospitals in a county convert to CAH status. This
represents an increase of 6.4 percent in neonatal mortality among high-risk births.
To shed more light on changes that take place in the process of delivery after closure
of obstetrics units, I explore the effect of closures on other outcome variables from the
Vital Statistics data which relate to the treatment of deliveries. The variables of interest
analyzed here are whether the delivery was through a cesarean section, whether induction or
stimulation was used, whether the mother received no prenatal care16, whether the delivery
was in a hospital, whether it was attended by a doctor, whether it was a very low birth
weight baby, and whether the delivery occurred outside of the county of residence.
Table 1.13 shows these estimates. All these regressions are estimated on the entire sample
of births and weighted by the number of births in each county-year cell. The means of the
outcome variables are reported at the bottom of the table.
The likelihood of having a cesarean section after conversion decreases by about 1 per-
centage point. However, there is no change in the likelihood of being induced, of not having
any prenatal care or of delivering outside of a hospital. There is a small decrease in the
likelihood that the birth is attended by a physician and an increase in the likelihood that
the birth will be delivered outside of the county. There is no change in the likelihood of a
birth being very low birth weight.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper documents the existence of spillovers of the Medicare Flex Program on non-
Medicare patients. Due to the eligibility requirements of the program, converting hospitals
decreased their size by about one third on average in order to satisfy the bed requirement.
Total volume of care at these hospitals, as measured by total inpatient days, decreases by
almost 20 percent. There is a significant reduction in services such as ICUs and inpatient
surgery, which are highly dependent on specialized inpatient beds. In addition, hospitals
increase their Medicare share of patients and drop services that are more Medicaid-intensive.
In particular, hospitals are almost 10 percentage points less likely to provide obstetric services
after conversion compared to similar hospitals that do not convert.
I find that, after conversion, the share of births delivered outside the county of residence
increases significantly. There are no clear effects of conversion on neonatal mortality among
all births. I find suggestive evidence for large effects of conversion on neonatal mortality for
16 This is not a very sensitive measure as only 1.2 percent of all births have not received any prenatal
care. However, due to a change in coding in 2003 I cannot track the month when the prenatal care began
consistently over time.
33
high-risk babies. If all hospitals in a county convert, neonatal mortality among very low birth
weight babies increases by about 6 percent. The estimates are imprecise, but stable across
various specifications. Future work will use more detailed models of demand substitution
across hospitals to separate the effect of the delay in care due to longer distances from the
change in quality at the new hospital.
Due to the fragmented nature of the multipayer health care system in the United States,
spillovers from changes in one insurer's policies on the patients of other insurers are poten-
tially important. In recent policy debates over the expansion of health insurance, proponents
of the Affordable Care Act have often emphasized that nothing would change for the cur-
rently insured. However, as this paper documents, any large changes in the insurance system
can have equilibrium effects on those not directly targeted by the legislation.
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Figure 1-1: Distribution of Hospital Beds for Rural Hospitals, 1997 and 2007
Notes: This graph shows the size distribution for rural hospitals with fewer than 150 beds in 1997 and
2007. Approximately 55% of these hospitals convert to Critical Access Hospital status by 2009.
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Figure 1-2: Hospital Conversions to CAH Status by Year
Notes: This graph shows the number of hospitals that convert to critical access status by year. The red
line corresponds to 1997 when the legislation was passed. There are 18 conversions before 1997. These hos-
pitals were part of the Medical Assistance Facility (MAF) Demonstration project in Montana and the Rural
Primary Care Hospital (RPCH) Project and were automatically granted CAH status after the introduction of
the Flex Program. After 2005 states could no longer waive the distance requirement by designating hospitals
"necessary providers".
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Figure 1-3: Effect of CAH Conversion on Hospital Outcomes
Notes: The figure plots the 3, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression (1.1) for the dependent variable given above each graph. The event
window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The dashed lines show the 95 percent
confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include hospital fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. In addition, regressions include controls for total county population and
female population ages 15 to 49 (logs), and a separate linear trend for rural hospitals. An observation is a
hospital-year, for years 1994 to 2009.
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Figure 1-4: Effect of CAH Conversion on Hospital Medicare and Medicaid Days
Notes: The figure plots the 3, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression (1.1) for the dependent variable given above each graph. The event
window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The dashed lines show the 95 percent
confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include hospital fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. In addition, regressions include controls for total county population and
female population ages 15 to 49 (logs), and a separate linear trend for rural hospitals. An observation is a
hospital-year, for years 1994 to 2009.
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Figure 1-5: Effect of CAH Conversion on Hospital Services
Notes: The figure plots the #, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression (1.1) for the dependent variable given above each graph. The event
window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The dashed lines show the 95 percent
confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include hospital fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. In addition, regressions include controls for total county population and
female population ages 15 to 49 (logs), and a separate linear trend for rural hospitals. An observation is a
hospital-year, for years 1994 to 2009.
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Figure 1-6: The Effect of Hospital Conversion on County-Level Hospital Outcomes
Notes: The figure plots the #, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression 1.5 for the dependent variable given above each graph. The magnitude
of the coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted to
CAH status. The dependent variable is an aggregate across all short-term general non-federal hospitals in
the county. The event window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The dashed lines
show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include county fixed effects
and year fixed effects. In addition, the regressions include controls for total county population and female
population aged 15-49 (in logs), a separate linear time trend for rural counties. An observation is a county-
year, 1994-2009.
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Figure 1-7: The Effect of CAH Conversion on County-Level Medicare and Medicaid Days
Notes: The figure plots the #, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression 1.5 for the dependent variable given above each graph. The magnitude
of the coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted
to CAH status. The dependent variables are the total number of Medicare days and Medicaid days at all
short-term general non-federal hospitals in the county, and the share of Medicare days and Medicaid days in
the county. The event window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The dashed lines
show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include county fixed effects
and year fixed effects. In addition, the regressions include controls for total county population and female
population aged 15-49 (in logs), a separate linear time trend for rural counties. An observation is a county-
year, 1994-2009.
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Figure 1-8: Effect of CAH Conversion on County Level Hospital Services
Notes: The figure plots the #, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression 1.5 for the dependent variable given above each graph. The magnitude
of the coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted to
CAH status. The dependent variables are listed above each graph and are equal to 1 if any hospitals in the
county offer the service. The event window is 9 years before and 9 years after the conversion to CAH. The
dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include county fixed effects
and year fixed effects. In addition, the regressions include controls for total county population and female
population aged 15-49 (in logs), a separate linear time trend for rural counties. An observation is a county-
year, 1994-2009.
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Figure 1-9: Effect of CAH Hospital Conversion on County Neonatal Mortality (All Births)
Notes: The figures plot the #, regression coefficients on the dummies for years relative to the time of
conversion from estimating regression 1.5 for the dependent variable given above each graph. The top figure
shows the results for the sample of all births. The lower figure shows the results for the sample of very low
birth weight births (<1500 grams). The left-hand side variable is 28-day (neonatal) mortality measured as
the number of deaths per 1000 births. The event window is 8 years before and 8 years after the conversion
to CAH. The LBID data covers the years from 1995 to 2007.
Year -1 is the last fiscal year that ends before the date of conversion, when cost-based reimbursement
under Medicare started. The coefficients are normalized relative to year -1 which is set to 0. The period
between year -3 and year -1 represents the transition period. All the regressions include state-specific linear
time trends, county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a separate linear time trend for counties with at
least one conversion. Controls are also included for the total county population and the county population
of females 15 to 49 years old, as well as demographic characteristics of the births in the sample: teenager
status, race and marital status of the mother. An observation is a county-year, regressions are weighted by
the number of births in that county-year cell. Note that the sample here is different from the sample in
the county-level hospital outcomes regressions because it includes counties that have non-zero births, but no
hospitals.
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Figure 1-10: Effect of CAH Hospital Conversion on County Neonatal Mortality (Very-Low
Birthweight Births)
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Table 1.1: Hospital-Level Summary Statistics
Baseline (1997) 2007
All Converters Non-converters All Converters Non-converters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hospital Characteristics
No of beds 171.22 46.81 72.59 166.35 36.27 79.24
For profit 0.15 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.22
Rural 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.49 0.54
Not for-profit 0.50 0.96 0.66 0.51 0.96 0.66
Member of a hosp system 0.48 0.35 0.50 0.54 0.37 0.54
Hospital Utilization
Total admissions 6368.67 741.33 2819.73 6590.72 599.37 3059.05
Medicare share 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.53
Services Offerred
ICU 0.83 0.56 0.85 0.78 0.41 0.84
Inpatient Surgery 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.79 0.95
Outpatient Surgery 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.87 0.95
Obstetrics 0.75 0.58 0.75 0.70 0.43 0.70
Birthing rooms 0.72 0.56 0.70 0.68 0.42 0.68
MRI 0.48 0.18 0.43 0.69 0.36 0.72
CT 0.86 0.64 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.96
Expenditures per day ($) 1629.00 1558.90 1826.77 3833.12 4080.51 3751.99
Sample Size 4831 1177 1130 4626 1177 1130
Notes: The table above reports the annual means for some variables of interest for different hospital
samples. All hospital variables are from the American Hospital Association survey. Columns (1) and (4)
have the entire sample of short-term general, non-federal hospitals used in the regression. Columns (2) and
(5) show the sample of converters with fewer than 120 beds in 1997, while columns (3) and (6) show the
sample of non-converters with fewer than 120 beds in 1997 - this is chosen to be comparable to the sample
of converters and is only used for illustrative purposes. The first three columns show the summary statistics
for 1997, and the last three for 2007. The sample only includes general non-federal hospitals in the AHA
data.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics at the County Level 1997
Counties with CAH Counties with no CAH No Hospitals
(1) (2) (3)
Number of counties 1053 1357 718
Number of births per county 596.36 2016.88 176.15
Number of hospitals per county 1.61 2.21 0.00
Mean County-Level Hospital Characteristics
Hospital beds 140.42 484.34 n/a
Hospitals with OB 0.62 0.84 n/a
Hospitals with ICU 0.54 0.80 n/a
Hospitals with inpatient surgery 0.92 0.99 n/a
Expenditures per patient day ($) 1412.90 1554.60 n/a
Neonatal Mortality (per 1,000 live births)
Overall 3.99 4.87 4.63
Very low birth weight (<1,500 gr) 207.28 222.69 227.44
Mean Medical Service Utilization
% no prenatal care 0.009 0.013 0.009
% born in hospital 0.988 0.991 0.988
% doctor present at birth 0.927 0.923 0.926
% cesarean section 0.207 0.205 0.209
% induction 0.176 0.183 0.210
Mean Infant Health
% very low birth weight (<1500g) 0.012 0.015 0.013
Mean Maternal Demographics
% black 0.073 0.174 0.116
% married 0.674 0.677 0.701
% teenager 0.086 0.082 0.097
Population 45838 153865 15237
Female Population 15-49 11520 40181 3724
Notes: The table above reports the annual means for some variables of interest for different county
samples. The first column has the sample of counties which have at least one hospital that converts by the
end of the sample period. Column (2) has all the counties with at least one hospital but no conversions.
The last column has the sample of counties with no hospitals but with a non-zero number of births. The
hospital characteristics are computed at the county level and unweighted means are reported in the table.
The characteristics for births are weighted by the number of births in that county-year cell.
The data for hospitals in the county are from the American Hospital Association Survey. Neonatal
mortality rates, medical services utilization, infant health and maternal demographics are from the linked
birth/infant death 1997 file from the Vital Statistics. County-level population is from SEER.
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Table 1.3: Hospital Outcomes - Estimates for Figure 1-3
Inpatient Beds (log) Inpatient Days (log) Total Expenditures (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-CAH -0.190*** -0.179*** -0.172*** -0.175*** -0.066*** -0.060***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
Post-CAH trend 0.007** -0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
CAH trend -0.004** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.003 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
CAH Conv. at t+1 -0.042*** -0.023** -0.067*** -0.072*** -0.056*** -0.046***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
CAH Conv. at t+2 -0.020** -0.005 -0.022 -0.026* -0.019** -0.011*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
5-year Effect -0.142*** -0.183*** -0.042**
(0.026) (0.043) (0.021)
N 74474 74474 74408 74408 74474 74474
Mean of Dep. Var. 169.0 169.0 39725.7 39725.7 86.17 86.17
R-squared 0.955 0.955 0.945 0.945 0.978 0.978
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating regression
1.2 in columns (1), (3) and (5) on the dependent variable reported at the top: hospital beds (log), inpatient
days (log) and total hospital expenditures (log). Columns (2), (4), (6) show the results from estimating
regression 1.3 which allows for a break in trend at the time of conversion. At the bottom of each column is
listed the estimated effect 5 years after conversion b[post-cah]+5*b[post-cah trend] and the standard error.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the
10% level.
All the regressions include hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects, a separate time trend for rural
hospitals, and controls for the total county population and the population of females ages 15 to 49 (in logs).
The regressions also control for a linear trend in event time for the hospitals that ever convert. The regression
also includes two indicators for the year before conversion and two years prior to conversion to control for
changes that happen during the transition to CAH. The explanatory variables of interest are an indicator
for whether the hospital has converted to CAH and the break in trend at the time of conversion.
An observation is a hospital-year, the number of observations is reported at the bottom of each column.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The outcome variables are from the American Hospital
Association Survey Data. The CAH status of a hospital is coded using data on the date when hospitals
became eligible for cost-based reimbursement from Medicare. The mean of the outcome variable is reported
at the bottom of each column. For variables that are used in logs, the mean of the actual outcome is reported.
The total expenditure is reported in millions of dollars.
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Table 1.4: Medicare and Medicaid Hospital Days - Estimates for Figure 1-4
Medicare Days (log) Medicaid Days (log) Medicare Share Medicaid Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-CAH -0.241*** -0.213*** -0.125*** -0.163*** -0.017** -0.008 0.014** 0.006
(0.023) (0.024) (0.046) (0.049) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Post-CAH trend 0.018*** -0.024** 0.005*** -0.004***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001)
CAH trend 0.013*** 0.003 -0.018*** -0.006 0.005*** 0.002** -0.003*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CAH Conv. at t+1 -0.146*** -0.102*** 0.036 -0.024 -0.023*** -0.009 0.019*** 0.008
(0.021) (0.020) (0.039) (0.041) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
CAH Conv. at t+2 -0.077*** -0.042** 0.077** 0.029 -0.020*** -0.009* 0.019*** 0.010**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.034) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
5-year Effect -0.125** -0.284** 0.020* -0.016
(0.041) (0.089) (0.012) (0.010)
N 74209 74209 73881 73881 74407 74407 74407 74407
Mean of Dep. Var. 17849.8 17849.8 8256.7 8256.7 0.493 0.493 0.186 0.186
R-squared 0.918 0.918 0.853 0.853 0.676 0.676 0.688 0.689
Notes: See notes for Table 1.3. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses)
from estimating regression 1.2 in columns (1), (3) and (5) on the dependent variable reported at the top:
Medicare days (log), Medicaid days (log), Medicare share and Medicaid share. Columns (2), (4), (6) show
the results from estimating regression 1.3 which allows for a break in trend at the time of conversion. At
the bottom of each column is listed the estimated effect 5 years after conversion b[post-cah]+5*b[post-cah
trend] and the standard error. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5%
level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.5: Hospital Services - Estimates for Figure 1-5
Obstetrics Intensive Care Units Outpatient Surgery Inpatient Surgery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-CAH -0.050*** -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.077*** -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.061***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Post-CAH trend -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
CAH trend -0.006*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.001 0.001 0.004*** -0.002** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CAH Conv. at t+1 -0.011 -0.039*** -0.015 -0.046*** -0.008 -0.026*** 0.001 -0.035***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
CAH Conv. at t+2 0.001 -0.022** -0.001 -0.026** 0.004 -0.011* 0.010 -0.018**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
5-year Effect -0.127 -0.143 -0.075 -0.132
(0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.013)*** (0.016)***
N 63922 63922 63924 63924 74771 74771 74771 74771
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.722 0.722 0.804 0.804 0.961 0.961 0.945 0.945
R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.770 0.770 0.557 0.558 0.569 0.570
Notes: See notes for Table 1.3. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses)
from estimating regression 1.2 in columns (1), (3) and (5) on the dependent variable reported at the top.
The dependent variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if the hospital offers the service listed at the top:
obstetrics, intensive care, outpatient surgery and inpatient surgery, respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) show
the results from estimating regression 1.3 which allows for a break in trend at the time of conversion. At
the bottom of each column is listed the estimated effect 5 years after conversion b[post-cah]+5*b[post-cah
trend] and the standard error. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5%
level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.6: Effect of CAH Conversion on Hospitals Above and Below the Threshold
Beds Days Expenditures Medicare days Medicaid days Obstetrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beds <= 25 * CAH -0.050* -0.146*** 0.061*** -0.080** -0.198** -0.087***
(0.026) (0.042) (0.022) (0.038) (0.087) (0.025)
Beds > 25 * CAH -0.291*** -0.260*** 0.001 -0.170*** -0.287*** -0.088***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.042) (0.014)
Difference -0.241 -0.115 -0.060 -0.090 -0.089 -0.001
p-val 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.020 0.317 0.977
N 71471 71407 71471 71226 71406 61427
Mean 168.49 39607.39 85.46 17762.42 8218.16 0.73
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating regression
1.4 on the dependent variable reported at the top. Column (1) reports the results for log hospital beds,
column (2) for log total inpatient days, column (3) for log total hospital expenditures, column (4) for log of
Medicare inpatient days, column (5) for log of Medicaid days, and column (6) for an indicator for whether
the hospital offers obstetric services. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the
5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
In addition to the previous controls, the regressions include separate linear time trends by quintile of
hospital size (as of 1997).
The explanatory variables of interest are an indicator for whether the hospital has converted to CAH
interacted with a dummy for whether the hospital is above or below the 25 bed threshold. At the bottom of
the table I report the difference between the two estimates and the p-value for the test against the null that
the coefficients are the same. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.7: Robustness of Hospital Conversion Results
Beds Inpatient Expenditures Medicare Medicaid Medicare Medicaid OB ICU Outpatient Inpatient
Days Days Days Share Share Surgery Surgery
Baseline -0.14 -0.18 -0.04 -0.12 -0.28 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.13
p-val (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.003) (0.002) (0.091) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
obs 74474 74408 74474 74209 73881 74407 74407 63922 63924 74771 74771
State-linear trend -0.17 -0.20 -0.05 -0.15 -0.33 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 -0.13
p-val (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
obs 74474 74408 74474 74209 73881 74407 74407 63922 63924 74771 74771
State-by-year FE -0.16 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 -0.34 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.13 -0.08 -0.14
p-val (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.005) (0.000) (0.037) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
obs 74474 74408 74474 74209 73881 74407 74407 63922 63924 74771 74771
Only Converters -0.16 -0.16 -0.04 -0.18 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04
p-val (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.367) (0.478) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001)
obs 19838 19809 19838 19748 19626 19808 19808 17151 17150 19844 19844
Only Rural -0.09 -0.16 0.02 -0.09 -0.27 0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 -0.12
p-val (0.002) (0.000) (0.509) (0.039) (0.005) (0.020) (0.249) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
obs 37905 37858 37905 37762 37614 37857 37857 33009 33007 37989 37989
No conv after 2005 -0.12 -0.19 -0.05 -0.12 -0.28 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.08 -0.14
p-val (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.008) (0.002) (0.058) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0,000) (0.000)
obs 73740 73676 73740 73478 73151 73675 73675 63294 63296 74037 74037
Notes: This table reports the 5-year effects and p-values (in parentheses) from estimating different variations on regression 1.3 on the dependent
variable reported at the top. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Row (1) reports the baseline results from the previous tables.
Row (2) includes state-by-year linear trends in the baseline specification.
Row (3) includes state-by-year fixed effects in the baseline specification.
Row (4) estimates the specification only on the sample of converters. In this specification the year dummies for the later periods when most of the
hospitals have already converted will capture some of the effect. Therefore here I include a separate dummy for 5 years after conversion and report
the coefficient on that.
Row (5) estimates the baseline on the sample of rural hospitals.
Row (6) excludes from the sample hospitals that converted after 2005.
Table 1.8: County-Level Hospital Outcomes - Estimates for Figure 1-6
County Inpatient Beds (log) County Inpatient Days (log) County Total Exp
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction CAH Beds at t -0.164*** -0.152*** -0.026*
(0.023) (0.025) (0.015)
Fraction Beds -0.023* -0.051** -0.035***
Converting at t+1 (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
Fraction Beds -0.007 -0.002 -0.006
Converting at t+2 (0.010) (0.017) (0.008)
Any CAH Trend -0.005*** -0.003 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
N 38631 38601 38631
Mean of Dep. Var. 324.066 76189.164 165.5
R-squared 0.972 0.958 0.987
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating regression
1.6 on the dependent variable reported at the top of each column. The outcomes of interest are hospital-level
outcomes aggregated to the county level. Column (1) reports the results for log hospital beds at the county-
level, column (2) log total inpatient days, and column (3) total expenditures (in millions). The magnitude
of the coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted
to CAH status. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes
significance at the 10% level.
All the regressions include county and year fixed effects, a separate linear trend for rural counties and
controls for the total county population and the population of females ages 15 to 49 (in logs). In addition,
to relax the parallel trends assumption, I include a separate linear trend for counties with at least one
conversion. The explanatory variable of interest is the fraction of beds in the county, measured as of 1997,
that is in CAH hospitals at time t. That is the fraction of beds that has already converted to CAH. The
regression also includes two lead terms for the incremental fraction of beds that will convert at times t+1
and t+2.
An observation is a county-year, the number of observations is reported at the bottom of each column.
The mean of the dependent variable is reported at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered
by state.
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Table 1.9: County-Level Hospital Days - Estimates for Figure 1-7
Medicare Days Medicaid Days Medicare Share Medicaid Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction CAH Beds at t -0.164*** -0.137*** -0.003 0.004
(0.026) (0.047) (0.008) (0.005)
Fraction Beds -0.089*** 0.017 -0.017*** 0.011*
Converting at t+1 (0.024) (0.049) (0.006) (0.006)
Fraction Beds -0.029 0.013 -0.010* 0.007
Converting at t+2 (0.023) (0.044) (0.006) (0.006)
Any CAH Trend 0.004 -0.013*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
N 38556 38479 38601 38601
Mean of Dep. Var. 34205.919 15741.843 0.494 0.199
R-squared 0.948 0.887 0.694 0.708
Notes: See notes for Table 1.8. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses)
from estimating regression 1.6 on the dependent variable reported at the top of each column. The outcomes
of interest are hospital-level outcomes aggregated to the county level. Column (1) reports the results for log
Medicare days at the county-level, column (2) log Medicaid days, column (3) the share of Medicare days and
column (4) the share of Medicaid days. The magnitude of the coefficients represents the effect on an event
of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted to CAH status. *** denotes significance at the 1%
level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.10: County-Level Hospital Services - Estimates for Figure 1-8
Any OB Any ICU Any Outpt Any Inpt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction CAH Beds at t -0.071*** -0.085*** -0.026** -0.049***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)
Fraction Beds -0.013 -0.030* -0.009 -0.004
Converting at t+1 (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)
Fraction Beds -0.006 -0.023* 0.005 0.013
Converting at t+2 (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011)
Any CAH Trend -0.003** -0.003** -0.000 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 35398 38632 38632 38632
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.768 0.716 0.963 0.942
R-squared 0.766 0.668 0.661 0.633
Notes: See notes for Table 1.8. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses)
from estimating regression 1.6 on the dependent variable reported at the top of each column. The left hand
side variable is equal to 1 if at least one hospital in the county offers that service. The magnitude of the
coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted to CAH
status. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 1.11: Effect of CAH Conversion on Neonatal (28-Day) Mortality for All Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction CAH Beds at t 0.059 0.037 0.210* 0.159 0.048 0.117 0.061 0.123
(0.122) (0.125) (0.123) (0.122) (0.140) (0.136) (0.146) (0.142)
Demograpic no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Trends no no yes yes no yes no yes
Sample All All All w/o 1999 and converters converters conv before conv before
2000 conv 2006 2006
N 40737 40737 40737 37513 13721 13721 13292 13292
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.598 4.598 4.598 4.599 4.096 4.096 4.085 4.085
R-squared 0.276 0.279 0.281 0.296 0.101 0.103 0.102 0.104
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating regression 1.6, where the dependent variable is
neonatal (28-day) mortality. The magnitude of the coefficients represents the effect on an event of size 1, that is if all hospitals in a county converted
to CAH status. All the regressions include county and year fixed effects, a separate linear trend for counties with at least one conversion and controls
for total county population and female population ages 15 to 49 (in logs).
Column (1) does not include any other controls.
Column (2) includes demographic controls for characteristics of the mother: marital status, race, and teenager.
Column (3) also includes state-specific linear trends.
Column (4) is the same as Column (3) with counties where the first conversion occurs in 1999 or 2000 excluded.
Column (5) is the same as Column (2) on the sample of only converters. Column (6) is Column (5) with state-specific linear trends.
Column (7) is the same as Column (2) and includes only converters before 2006. Column (8) has state-specific linear trends.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level in all specifications. All regressions are weighted by the total number of births in that county-year
cell. The sample includes counties with no hospitals that have a non-zero number of births. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes
significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 1.12: Effect of CAH Conversion on Neonatal (28-Day) Mortality for Very Low Birthweight Births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction CAH Beds at t 13.590*
(7.925)
13.940*
(7.873)
21.132**
(7.965)
14.182*
(8.139)
15.418*
(7.871)
13.503
(8.751)
17.344**
(8.039)
14.267
(9.098)
Demograpic
State Trends
no yes yes
no no yes
Sample
N
Mean of Dep. Var.
R-squared
All All
33984
215.766
0.120
33984
215.766
0.121
All w/o 1999 and
33984
215.766
0.124
2000 conv
31788
215.806
0.130
converters converters conv before
2006
10551 10551 10194
210.208 210.208 209.761
0.069 0.073 0.070
conv before
2006
10194
209.761
0.074
Notes: See notes for Table 1.11. This table reports the results from the same specifications as Table 1.11 for the sample of very
babies. Very low birth weight (VLBW) is a medical definition for babies with fewer than 1500g.
low birth weight
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
Table 1.13: Effect of CAH Conversion on Treatment of Deliveries
C-Section Induction No Prenatal Care In Hospital Attended by MD VLBWT Not in county
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fraction CAH Beds at t -0.010*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.010** 0.000 0.024***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006)
N 40737 40737 40737 40737 40737 40737 40737
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.253 0.201 0.012 0.991 0.918 0.015 0.256
R-squared 0.896 0.796 0.647 0.891 0.862 0.541 0.983
Notes: This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from estimating regression
1.6 on the dependent variable reported at the top of each column. This regression also includes controls for
mother's characteristics and state-specific linear trends.
The outcomes are from the Linked-Birth Infant Death data set and are measured for all births in the
"all birth" sample.
Column (1) reports the results for the cesarean section rate, column (2) for the fraction of births that
were induced, column (3) the fraction of births with no prenatal care, column (4) the share of births delivered
in a hospital, column (5) the share of births attended by an MD, column (6) the share of VLBW births and
column (7) the share of births delivered outside of the county.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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1.A Appendix: Legislation Details
Four major laws have been enacted that affect the Critical Access Hospital Program: Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 (BBA); Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999; Medicare, Medicaid and
SCHIP Benefit Improvement and Protection Act of 2000; and the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
The BBA of 1997 established the Flex Program. Its intent was to protect access to health
care in rural communities. The program, available to all 50 states, sought to stabilize rural health
care by providing funding for the creation of limited service facilities that could operate under less
restrictive requirements.
According to the BBA of 1997, a Critical Access Hospital must:
" be a nonprofit or public hospital
" be located in a rural county and more than a 35-mile drive (or in the case of mountainous
terrain or areas with only secondary roads, a 15-mile drive) from another hospital, or
" be certified by the state as a "necessary provider" of health care services to residents in the
area. "Necessary provider" certification is based on individual state criteria.
" provide 24-hours emergency care services and nursing services, but need not meet all the
staffing and service requirements that apply to other hospitals.
" operate no more than 25 available beds
" use 15 or less at any one time for acute care inpatient services. Swing beds are permitted
but limited to 10.
" have a length of stay of less than 96 hours per patient. Hospitals must document weather
or other emergency conditions to support any violation of the 96-hour limit, or obtain a
case-specific waiver from a peer review organization.
" participate in a rural health network.
The BBRA of 1999 eased the criteria for conversion to Critical Access, as well as increased the
financial incentives for conversion. The BBRA expanded eligibility for Critical Access designation
by removing the "nonprofit" or "public" criteria. The rural area requirement was broadened to
include not only rural counties as defined by the OMB, but also rural census tracts as defined by
the "Goldsmith Modification", or defined as rural by state law or regulation.
CAHs no longer have to maintain documentation regarding weather or other emergency condi-
tions, or to obtain a case specific waiver, for individuals stays longer than 96 hours. While a CAH
still may provide acute inpatient care for no more than 96 hours per patient, the hospital's length
of stay is determined on an annual average basis.
The BIPA brought further enhancements and participation incentives to the CAH program.
This new law expanded the categories of services for which CAHs are reimbursed on a reasonable
cost basis.
The MMA eased restrictions on CAH size and service, and increased payments for CAH services
to 101% of reasonable costs. The MMA increased the limit on the number of beds operated by a
CAH from 15 to 25. It eliminated the requirement that 10 of the 25 beds be designated as swing
beds for skilled nursing facility care. As of January 1, 2006, states no longer had the authority
to waive the CAH location relative to other facilities requirement, and thus, are not permitted to
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designate a facility as a necessary provider CAH. Hospitals designated as necessary providers prior
to January 1, 2006, will be grandfathered but any new CAH designations must meet the mileage
requirement.
The most important legislative changes are summarized in Table Al.
Table Al
Legislation Key aspects of CAH legislation and regulations
BBA (1997) - CAH program is enacted.
- Hospitals are limited to 15 acute patients and 25 total patients (including swing beds, excluding
observation beds)
- All patients' length of stay is limited to 4 days
- CAHs must be 35 miles by primary road or 15 miles by secondary road from another provider.
- States can declare rural hospitals "necessary providers", and waive the distance requirement.
BBRA (1999) - Length-of-stay restriction is changed to an average of 4 days.
- States can declare hospitals "rura," allowing CAHs to exist in MSAs.
- Extended CAH eligibility to for-profit hospitals.
BIPA (2000) - Cost-based rei mburesement for on-call physicians.
- Cost-based reimbursement for Medicare post-acute patients in swing beds.
MMA (2003) - Inpatient limit is expanded from 15 to 25 acute patients.
- Allows CAHs to establish psychiatric and rehabilitation distinct part units.
- Beds in these units are excluded from the total bed count.
- Payments increased to 101 percent of costs.
- Starting in 2006, states can no longer waive the distance requirement.
Source: MedPAC, 2005
1.B Appendix: Details of the Regression Specification
1.B.1 Hospital-Level Analysis
All the regressions below include ah=hospital fixed effects and yt=year fixed effects, ignoring other
controls. The hospital-level specification used for the graphs is the following:
Yht = ah + 7t + 1: 0,CAHh,t__ ± eht
where CAHh,t_, is an indicator equal to 1 if the hospital converts to CAH status in year t - T.
This indicator is equal to zero in other years and for non-converting hospitals.
The graphs included in the paper plot #, against T. The estimates for r = -2, -1 show the
effect on the outcome of interest during the conversion period (before CAH status was granted).
The estimates for r < -3 show any pre-conversion differential changes between converters and
non-converters. The estimates for r > 0 measure post-conversion effects of the conversion to CAH
status.
The model is fully saturated with pre-post dummies, but only -9 to 9 are plotted on the graphs.
The effects are all normalized relative to T = -1 which is set to 0.
I'm estimating the following more parsimonious regression for the tables (the regression in the
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paper has more covariates that will be omitted here):
Yht = 31 [Post CAH]ht - /-ICAHh,t+1 + /- 2 CAHh,t+2 - oh + --t + eht
This specification pools across all the post-conversion periods and estimates a single coefficient
for all of those periods, #. The indicator 1 [Post CAH]ht is equal to 1 if the hospital has CAH
status in year t. We can write 1 [Post CAH]ht = E>o CAHh,t_,, that is, the indicator is equal to
1 for all hospitals that have converted before year t. This is a "post"-conversion dummy variable.
I am including separate dummies for the two conversion years, -2 and -1. Therefore, all the
estimates are measured relative to 3 or more years before conversion.
1.B.2 County-Level Analysis
Moving on to the county-level analysis, the main conceptual differences compared to the event-
study analysis at the hospital level are multiple conversions (more than one hospital in a county
can convert to CAH status) and event size (the impact on county-level outcomes differs based on
the size and number of hospitals in the county).
Sandler and Sandler (2012) show that in instances when multiple events are experienced, allow-
ing multiple event-time dummies to be turned on at once generally produces unbiased estimates.
They also show how events of different sizes can be built into the specification. Common prac-
tices, such as ignoring subsequent events or duplicating observations to have one observation per
individual-event-time can create trends in the outcome variable before and after an event that can
obscure the effect.
I will build both of these differences into the county-level model in two steps. To make the
assumptions involved in the regression explicit, in this derivation, I start with a specification that
estimates a separate series of coefficients for the first, second, third, etc. conversion in each county.
I then parameterize the effect of the conversions by the fraction of county beds in the converting
hospital (measured pre-BBA). Then, assuming the effects are the same for the first, second, etc.
conversions, I can pool across the different events and estimate a single series of coefficients. This
final specification is the one used in the paper.
Start with the following model, where we estimate a separate series of event-time coefficients
for each conversion in the county:
Yt = ' 0x CAH't, + 3' x CAHec
where CAHet_, is an indicator equal to 1 if the nth conversion in county c was in year t - T. All
of these coefficients are identified given variation across counties in the spacing between events.
Next, to allow for conversions of different size to impact outcomes differentially, I parameterize
the effect of each conversion in a linear fashion. Define FrBeds, FrBeds , and so on as the
fraction of 1997 beds that converts at the nth conversion. With some abuse of notation (I keep the
same notation for the coefficients as above), we have the following model:
Yt = E 4 x FrBeds x CAH'tT+ S x FrBeds x 2 + - + Sc + _Yt + Ect
T T
Finally, assuming that the effect of each conversion will is the same, i.e. that 31 = 4
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... , we can pool across the different conversions. We get the following model:
Y x [FrBeds x CAHiT+ FrBeds2 x CAH2t_ ... ] + 6c + '+Ect
The term [FrBeds x CAH t_, + FrBeds2 x CAH2t_, +...] is just the total fraction of beds
that converts at t - T, which then gives us the specification in the text:
Yct = #3 x FrBedsc,t-, + 6 c + -yt + Ect
The graphs included in the paper plot #, from the regression above against T.An "event", for
purpose of the county-level plot, should be thought of as "an event of size 1", that is, all hospitals
in a given county convert to CAH status, and the measured effects should be scaled down for events
of different sizes.
For the regression tables, I am using a specification similar to the one used for the hospital-level
analysis. I am pooling over all the conversions with r > 0, and estimating the T = -2, and r = -1
terms separately:
Yt = # E FrBedsc,t-, + #_1 x FrBedsc,t+1 + #-2 x FrBedsc,t+2 + 5c + Yt + ect
r>O
where the term E O FrBedse,t_, is the total fraction of beds that have converted up to time t.
One can think of this term as a stock variable, while the two terms FrBedsc,t+1 and FrBedsc,t+2
are flow variables. Because I am including the two pre-conversion terms, all the estimates are
relative to 3 or more years before conversion.
Alternatively one can use a specification that includes only stock variables:
Yet =3' 5 FrBedst + 5 edsc,t- +# 2  FrBedse,t, + 6c + y + ect
7->O T-1 ->-2
where all the terms are stock variables, that is "total fraction of beds that have converted to CAH
status by year t, t + 1 and t + 2, respectively". I am using #' to distinguish these estimates from
the ones in the previous specification.
It is straightforward to get the correspondence between the coefficients #, #_1 and #-2 and
/3', _1 and #'-2. We can re-write the last equation as:
Yt =(/ + /_1 + /-2) E FrBedsc,t-± (/_ 1 + /-2) FrBedsc,t+1+-1+ 2 FrBedsc,t+2+6c+ -yt+ect
-r>O
and we have a mapping between the coefficients in these two regressions:
#-2 = '
/- = 0'_1+_2
the specification used in the paper estimates the cumulative effect. To get the net effect we can
compute # - #_1. I prefer this specification because I consider the transition period to also be an
effect of the CAH conversion.
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Chapter 2
How General are Risk Preferences?
Choices under Uncertainty in
Different Domains1
2.1 Introduction
Standard models in many fields of economics - most notably macroeconomics, finance, pub-
lic finance, and labor economics - generally use a canonical model for decisions under un-
certainty, in which individuals (or households) have a single, concave utility function over
wealth, which gives rise to context-invariant risk preferences. Guided by this assumption,
standard practice in these literatures is to use external estimates of risk aversion parame-
ters, drawn from a variety of specific contexts, to calibrate their models. At the other end
of the spectrum, there is a large literature in psychology and behavioral economics arguing
that there is little, if any, commonality in how the same individual makes decisions across
different contexts. Where does reality lie relative to these two extremes? Our aim in this
paper is to provide new empirical evidence that informs this issue by using unique data on
thousands of individuals and analyzing actual decisions that each of them make regarding
financial lotteries in different domains.
Specifically, we examine the workplace-based benefit choices that Alcoa employees make
concerning their 401(k) asset allocations, their short-term disability insurance, their long-
term disability insurance, and their insurance choices regarding health, drug, and dental
expenditures. Using these data, we investigate the stability in ranking across contexts of an
individual's willingness to bear risk relative to his peers. In other words, we investigate how
'Co-authored with Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein and Mark Cullen.
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well an individual's willingness to bear risk (relative to his peers) in one context predicts his
willingness to bear risk (relative to his peers) in other contexts.
There are several attractive features of our setting for this purpose. First, all the decisions
are solely over the extent of exposure to purely financial risk; this reduces concerns about
other possible domain-specific components of preferences, such as an individual's monetary
valuation of health or idiosyncratic preferences for a given physician. Second, and relatedly,
the nature of the contract options makes the different choices within each domain vertically
rankable in terms of risk exposure. As a result, we can use these data to investigate the
extent to which an individual's risk aversion relative to his peers in one domain can inform
us about his risk aversion relative to those same peers in other contexts. Third, as we shall
see, the risk exposure involved in these choices is non-trivial, so that the decisions we observe
are economically meaningful. Finally, many of the domains involve expected risks of similar
magnitudes, making decisions across contexts more comparable.
Our focus is on quantifying the empirical importance of any individual-specific, domain-
general component of preferences rather than on testing the extreme nulls of complete con-
sistency or no consistency in preferences across domains. Neither extreme null strikes us
as particularly compelling in practice; reality almost surely lies in between. Perhaps more
importantly, as we discuss in more detail below, while it seems possible to plausibly test the
null hypothesis that there is no domain-general component to preferences (and we will do
so), we argue that it is considerably more challenging (perhaps even impossible) to robustly
test the other extreme hypothesis that individuals' decisions are completely consistent across
domains. Tests of the latter hypothesis would inevitably consist of a joint test of the null hy-
pothesis of domain-general preferences as well as a set of additional difficult-to-test modeling
assumptions.
A key challenge that we face in developing an approach to quantifying the extent of
domain generality of preferences, is that in our interest to examine the stability of preferences
across contexts, we would like to avoid context-specific modeling assumptions that could
push us toward one finding or another. A natural way to evaluate the stability of risk
preferences across domains would be to write down a model of consumer behavior, use
the data and the model to obtain estimates for risk aversion for each individual in each
domain, and then compare these estimates. Cohen and Einav (2007) provide a framework
for inferring risk aversion from insurance choices, which could be adapted to our various
contexts. However, their framework also illustrates that estimating the distribution of risk
aversion from individuals' insurance choices involves a number of domain-specific modeling
assumptions regarding the nature of ex-ante information, expectation formation, the risk
realization process, the nature of heterogeneity in risk and risk preferences, the possibility of
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moral hazard, and the class of utility functions. While these assumptions are not a problem
per se, in assessing the extent of domain generalizability of preferences, one would naturally
worry greatly about the role of domain-specific modeling assumptions. Given this challenge,
in this paper we shy away from specifying a complete model of primitives for each domain.
Instead, we pursue two other complementary strategies that allow us to make progress in
investigating the motivating question while trying to minimize the need for domain-specific
modeling assumptions.
Our first strategy takes a "model free," statistical perspective. We avoid any economic
modeling of primitives and instead focus on the within-person correlation in the ordinal
ranking of the riskiness of the choice an individual makes across different domains. In other
words, we ask whether individuals who appear to be more willing to bear risk than their peers
in one context are also more willing to bear risk in another context. Our results reject the null
hypothesis that there is no domain-general component of preferences: individuals' choices
across domains are positively correlated. More interestingly, in our view, we develop several
benchmarks that help us assess the extent of this domain-general component of preferences,
and we find it to be quantitatively quite important. For example, we find that one's choices
in other insurance domains have about four times more predictive power for one's choice in
a given insurance domain than do a rich set of demographics. However, we find that the
riskiness of one's 401(k) portfolio choice has statistically significant but quantitatively much
smaller predictive power for one's insurance choices. Interestingly, we also find that the
predictive power of one's 401(k) portfolio choice for one's insurance choices is systematically
greater for individuals who are older, have more experience within the firm, have higher
income, or who appear to be more financially sophisticated (as measured by external proxies
in the data). This suggests that such individuals may fit better the canonical model.
The advantage of this "model free" approach is that it allows us to make inferences that
are much more robust to various assumptions. In particular, the approach only requires
us to assume that any unobserved individual- and domain-specific components in a given
domain are rank preserving; it does not require us, for example, to take a stand on the
nature of the utility function or on the way in which individuals form expectations, weight
probabilities, and so on. The drawback of a "model free" approach is that the results cannot
be directly mapped to underlying economic primitives. While we attempt to develop several
benchmarks that may help in assessing whether the correlations we find point to a greater or
lesser importance of the domain-general component of preferences, one can reasonably argue
that such benchmarks are somewhat ad hoc.
Indeed, our second empirical approach attempts to link our results to underlying economic
primitives. In particular, we estimate the fraction of our sample that makes choices across
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domains that can potentially be rationalized with a common risk aversion parameter. We
write down a stylized model, which allows us to use the same (stylized) model across the
different domains. This strategy trades off the need for a model-based framework with the
concern mentioned above regarding too many domain-specific modeling assumptions. The
key decision in this respect is - as in our first strategy - to focus on comparing the ranking
of risk aversion rather than the levels. We do so in our second approach by allowing for a
domain-specific (but constant across individuals) parameter, which essentially frees up the
level of risk aversion in any context. While this minimizes the number of domain specific
assumptions, it still requires us to make some assumptions that were not needed for our first,
"model free" approach.
Our baseline results suggest that, subject to a domain-specific (but not individual specific)
free parameter, just over 30 percent of our sample make decisions that could be rationalized
across all six domains. This result appears robust to a number of variations to our baseline
specification. In addition, we once again find evidence suggesting that preferences are less
consistent across "less close" domains, particularly between the 401(k) asset allocation and
the other five, insurance domains.
Overall, we view our findings from the two complementary approaches as generally sup-
portive of a fair amount of domain generality in decision making under uncertainty. We
should recall, however, our decision to focus on the stability across contexts in the relative
ranking of individuals' risk preferences, rather than the stability of the absolute level of risk
aversion. While appealing in reducing the necessary assumptions we need to make, this
decision also makes it a more modest test of the canonical model. For example, our find-
ings of a reasonable degree of consistency in individuals' relative ranking of risk preferences
across domains does not preclude a rank preserving difference in the entire distribution of
willingness to bear risk across domains. In addition, our findings of higher correlation in risk
preferences across "closer" contexts suggests that our findings of quantitatively meaningful
domain generality may not persist if we looked at more disparate contexts than those studied
in this paper. We return to this briefly in the conclusion.
Our study is not alone in its interest in the relative generality of risk preferences across
different contexts. Not surprisingly, given its importance, the stability of risk preferences
across domains has received considerable attention in the economics literature.2 Several
studies have addressed the stability of risk preferences by investigating individual responses
2Naturally, there is also an important related literature in psychology. Although we do not cover it in
detail, many of its features are quite similar to the economics literature we do cover. See, for example, Slovic
(1962, 1972a, 1972b) for earlier reviews of this literature and Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) for a recent
paper. See also Schoemaker (1993), who provides an interesting discussion of the contrasting conceptual
frameworks by which economists and psychologists address the issue.
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to financial lotteries across different types of lotteries and over time. Choi et al. (2007)
analyze data from a lab experiment in which each subject was confronted with dozens of
portfolio choice problems, allowing them to investigate the within-subject consistency of
these multiple choices. Andersen et al. (2008a) use survey methods to elicit risk preferences
from a random sample of the Danish population, and then repeat the exercise with the
same people about a year later, thus allowing them to investigate whether the implied risk
preferences have changed. Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009) use similar methods to elicit
risk preferences in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in order to investigate the
correlation in risk preferences among family members (parent and child, and among siblings).
Cutler and Glaeser (2005) try to address a similar question using data on self-reported
behaviors, such as smoking and drinking, rather than answers to hypothetical lotteries. The
influential paper by Barsky et al. (1997) has combined the two approaches; they analyzed
similar hypothetical questions as well as validated the responses to some of these questions
by investigating whether they are correlated with self-reported behaviors.3 A recent study by
Dohmen et al. (2011) is probably the closest of this literature to our first approach; somewhat
similar to Barsky et al. (1997), Dohmen et al. (2011) use a large data set of survey responses
to hypothetical financial lottery questions and validate these responses using self-reported
behaviors of a subset of the respondents. Like us, they find an important component of
domain-general risk preferences and conclude that although its absolute explanatory power
is small, it performs pretty well when compared to other predictors of risk taking.
Our paper differs from this existing literature in several respects. Perhaps most im-
portantly, our study is based on actual market choices. By contrast, many of the existing
studies rely on individual responses to hypothetical questions (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997) or
to self-reported behaviors (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser 2005). A possible concern with such
measures for assessing the domain-generality of an individual's risk preferences is that there
may be important individual-specific elements that affect the mapping from self reported or
elicited preferences to actual preferences, which may appear as domain-general preferences.
An approach that circumvents many of these concerns is the use of lab experiments with real
consequences associated with the choices (e.g., Choi et al. 2007) or field experiments with
a representative sample of a population, again involving choices with real (and non trivial)
payoffs (e.g., Andersen et al. 2008a). Nonetheless, as Harrison, List, and Towe (2007) nicely
show, mapping choices made in the lab to choices made in naturally occurring settings is
not at all straightforward. This distinction makes it important to combine data from inside
and outside the lab, either within the same paper as in Andersen et al. (2008b) or across
3See also Chabris et al. (2008) for a similar exercise that focuses on discount rate (rather than on risk
preferences).
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papers, to which the current study contributes.
We are aware of only one other study of the stability of risk preferences across con-
texts that uses actual market outcomes. Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) and
Barseghyan et al. (2011) have recently used data on three similar deductible choices made
in the context of auto and homeowner insurance to estimate an individual's risk aversion
in each domain, to test whether they can reject the null that risk aversion is completely
general across domains, and to explain the deviations they find using a non-expected utility
framework. Our second approach is quite similar to theirs. It differs primarily in its scope
- we look at a much broader, and less similar, range of domains - and, relatedly, in its
focus and empirical approach. Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (2011) focus on testing
whether the level of risk aversion displayed in different contexts is completely stable across
contexts; they reject the null of fully domain-general risk aversion. By contrast, we focus
on quantifying (rather than testing) the extent of domain generality in risk preferences after
allowing for a domain-specific free component of risk preferences. Their approach is a more
ambitious one but relies on commensurately greater context-specific modeling assumptions,
which are less troublesome in their more closely related domains. We therefore view the
papers (and their results) as highly complementary.
Another contribution of our paper - which also applies to the papers by Chabris et al.
(2008) and Dohmen et al. (2011) - is our attempt to quantify the magnitude of any domain-
general component of preferences by benchmarking it against plausible alternatives. Most
of the studies we have discussed generally find some common element in risk taking within
an individual across decisions (or behaviors), although for the most part they tend to argue
- on mostly subjective grounds - that this common element is "small." One of our findings
is that the ostensibly "small" R2s that many prior papers have found may not in fact be as
small when compared to relevant benchmarks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes our institutional setting
and data. Section 2.3 presents our "model free" approach and correlation results concerning
the stability in individuals' relative ranking of risk preferences across contexts. Section
2.4 presents estimates from our second, model-based approach regarding the fraction of
individuals whose choices may be rationalized across domains. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Setting and Data
We analyze the employee benefit choices from 2004 for the U.S.-based workers at Alcoa,
Inc., a large multinational producer of aluminum and aluminum-related products. In 2004
Alcoa had approximately 45,000 active U.S. employees working at about 300 different plants
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located in 39 states.
We focus primarily on choices made in 2004, because Alcoa introduced a new set of
benefit options in 2004, requiring workers to make new, "active" choices in many of the
domains we study. As a result, the problems of inferring preferences from "stale" choices is
minimized; this could be particularly concerning if individuals might have made their choices
about different benefits at different points in time.
We examine employee choices in six different contexts. These include five insurance cov-
erage decisions (health, prescription drugs, dental, and short-term and long-term disability)
and one decision regarding the asset allocation of the employee's 401(k) contributions. All
insurance choices are made during the "open enrollment" period in November and apply
to the subsequent calendar year. The 401(k) contributions are made automatically every
pay-period according to a pre-specified choice of investment allocations, which in principle
could be adjusted at any given time (although in practice only about one quarter of the
employees in our sample change the allocation of their contributions during a given year).
For each choice we observe the menu of options the employee faces (including prices) and the
employee's choice from the menu. We also observe detailed demographic information on the
employees and detailed information on the realization of risks during the coverage period.
Prices for the benefit options vary across employees for two reasons. First, for the health,
drug, and dental domains, employees have a choice of coverage tier; that is, whether to cover
themselves only, or to include their spouse, their children, or the entire family. Throughout
this paper we take the coverage tier as given, assuming that it is primarily driven by family
structure; we show below that our results are not sensitive to controlling for coverage tier.
There is also important cross-sectional variation in the prices associated with each of the
insurance options as well as in employer match rates for 401(k) contributions, which we will
control for in our analysis. 4
2.2.1 Baseline sample.
Our baseline sample makes a number of restrictions that bring the original 2004 sample
of approximately 45,000 active employees down to just under 13,000 employees. First, we
'Specifically, the prices faced by the employee are determined by which section of the company the
employee is in. Alcoa has about 40 different sections ("business units"). In 2004, each section's head could
select from among the offered "menus" of benefit prices set by Alcoa headquarters (see Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen (2010) for a much more detailed description). In our sample, there are 20 different possible
benefit menus which we control for in the analysis using benefit menu fixed effects. For health, drug, and
dental the menus vary in the employee premiums. For short-term and long-term disability they vary in the
replacement rate associated with the (fixed) premium, although the incremental coverage is almost always
the same across menus. In the 401(k) domain employees face one of four different possible employer match
rates (0, 50%, 75%, or 100%).
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restrict our sample to those who were offered the new benefits in 2004; this includes approxi-
mately all salaried employees but only about one-half of hourly employees, since the benefits
provided to union employees (who are all hourly employees) can only change when the union
contract expires (so most union employees experienced the change in benefits only in sub-
sequent years). This brings our sample size down to about 26,000 employees. We further
restrict the sample to those for which we observe full data on the options they are offered, the
choices made, and (for insurance choices) the ex-post realized risk (claims). This precludes,
for example, about 8% of the individuals who chose to opt out from Alcoa-provided health
and drug insurance coverage and about 11% of employees who chose Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) coverage.' We also drop about 22% of the remaining employees who
(because of a choice made by their section manager) are not offered long-term disability
insurance, as well as the approximately 20% of employees who do not contribute to their
401(k) account.6 In some of our robustness analyses we add back some of these excluded
individuals.
Our final baseline sample contains 12,752 employees. Panel A of Table 2.1 provides
demographic characteristics for this sample. The sample is almost three quarters male and
85 percent white, with an average age of 44, an average job tenure (within Alcoa) of 13
years, and an average annual salary of $58,400. Only about one-third of the sample is hourly
employees and virtually none are unionized (due to our requirement that they face the new
benefit options in 2004). The average number of covered individuals per employee is 2.9.
Panel B of Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on the annual payouts for each of the six
domains. We now describe the options in each domain in more detail.
2.2.2 Description of coverage options.
As mentioned, we investigate employees' choices over six different domains. Table 2.2 sum-
marizes the key features of each domain, with the options enumerated within each domain
(as presented in the Alcoa brochures) from the lowest level of coverage (option 1) to the
option that offers the most coverage. Appendix Tables Al and A2 provide more detailed
information on each benefit option.
The first domain is health insurance, where employees can choose from among five Pre-
5As is typical in data sets like ours, we do not observe medical expenditures for employees covered by
an HMO or who opted out of employer-provided coverage. It is also difficult to analyze the choice of either
of these two options since the prices are not known, nor is it entirely clear how to define the "good" being
purchased (or to rank it in terms of risk exposure).
6 Note that the lowest priced option for dental, short-term disability, and long-term disability is free, so
that effectively there is no "opt out" option for these domains.
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ferred Provider Organization (PPO) options.7 These options only vary in their financial
coverage, and (with the exception of option 1) are vertically rankable, 8 with the deductible
level being the key difference.9 Option 1 stipulates a high annual deductible of 3,000 dollars
(for non-single coverage), while option 5 stipulates no deductible. Slightly over half of the
employees choose the safest option (option 5), about one quarter choose the second safest
option, and about 17 percent choose the least safe option (option 1).
The second domain covers prescription drug coverage, and employees are offered three
options that vary in their cost sharing for branded drugs, from 30 percent to 50 percent cost
sharing for retail branded drugs (deductible and coverage of generics are the same across
options). Almost two thirds choose the safest option and one-quarter choose the least safe
option.
The third domain is dental coverage, which offers two options that primarily vary in their
annual maximum benefit, of 1,000 vs. 2,000 dollars. About 70 percent of employees choose
the safest option.
The fourth and fifth domains are short-term and long-term disability insurance. Short-
term disability insurance covers disability-related lost earnings of durations up to six months,
while long-term disability insurance covers (less frequent) longer durations. Employees are
given a choice of 3 options for each disability insurance coverage, with the replacement rate
varying across options. Unlike the first three domains, the pricing and benefits associated
with disability insurance are not given in absolute dollars, but rather are proportional to the
employee's annual wage. Thus, the up-front premiums each employee faces vary based on
his or her wage, and the benefits are given as "(wage) replacement rates" that are typically
60% and 50% (for short- and long-term coverage, respectively) for the least coverage option
'Employees could also choose an HMO or to opt out from health and drug coverage entirely, but those
employees who chose these options are excluded from our baseline sample, for reasons described earlier.
8 The exception is the cheapest health insurance option (option 1), which is set up as a Health Reimburse-
ment Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes each year $1,250 in tax free money that the employee can
use to fund eligible out-of-pocket health care expenses. Any balance remaining at the end of the year can be
rolled over to pay for future out-of-pocket costs (as long at the employee remains enrolled in this plan). At
retirement (or severance) remaining balances can be used to pay for Alcoa-sponsored retiree health care plan
premiums. Since the financial tax benefits associated with an HRA vary across individuals (based on their
marginal tax rates, their expectation regarding future employment with Alcoa, and so on), this introduces
a non-vertical component to the health insurance choice. In the robustness analysis below we verify that
results are qualitatively similar when we omit the set of individuals who chose this option, but since this
set is quite large our preferred specification and analysis simply ignores the tax benefits associated with the
HRA.
9While there is additional variation across plans in the out-of-pocket maximum and corresponding cover-
age details of out-of-network expenditure, individuals rarely (less than one percent) reach this out-of-pocket
maximum, and only infrequently (less than five percent) use out-of-network services. The out-of-pocket
maximum also allows us to abstract from tail risk, which is covered by all options similarly, up to the very
similar out-of-pocket maximum across options.
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and 100% and 70% (respectively) for the options that offer most coverage. About two thirds
of the employees choose the highest replacement rate for each option. In each domain,
the remaining employees are roughly equally split between the two lower replacement rate
options.
The sixth and final domain is the 401(k) asset allocation. As is common in many firms,
Alcoa employees are encouraged to contribute every pay-period to their 401(k) account,
with Alcoa matching such contributions up to 6%. In our analysis we abstract from the
employees' decisions as to whether and how much to contribute, but rather focus on how
contributing employees choose to allocate their contributions across assets. All employees
can allocate their contributions and balances among 13 different funds that are available to
them, and in principle are allowed to continuously adjust these allocations (although they
infrequently do so; for example, only one-quarter of our sample changes its asset allocation
during 2004). The funds vary in their riskiness (see Appendix Table A2). To simplify the
analysis, we focus on the employees' decisions as to what fraction of their contributions they
allocate to the two risk-free funds during 2004.10 About two fifths of employees allocate none
of these contributions to the risk-free funds, and about 17% of employees allocate all of their
contributions to the risk free funds.
Although describing the options and outcomes in each domain is useful, our understand-
ing of the choices is perhaps best guided by the incremental trade-offs associated with each
choice. Columns (2) through (4) of Table 2.2 provide two (rough) attempts to quantify the
relative risk exposure associated with the different choices within a domain. Column (2)
does this by reporting the average incremental premium saving in the sample from choosing
a given option relative to the least risk exposure option. Columns (3) and (4) report, respec-
tively, the expected and standard deviation of the incremental costs that the employee would
face (counterfactually for most of the sample) with the option shown relative to the safest
option, if he were to be randomly drawn from our baseline sample. These incremental costs
are calculated based on the coverage details and the distribution of realized claims." The
most interesting point we take away from Table 2.2 is that the incremental decisions across
'
0 These two funds are not totally risk free, but they are marketed to employees as the least risky funds,
and the standard deviation of their (monthly) returns (0.02 and 0.83) is much smaller than that of the other
investment options (which range from 1.36 to 6.71). The results remain similar if we define only the fund
with the lowest standard deviation as the risk free allocation, which is not surprising given that the lowest
standard deviation fund receives 25% of 401(k) asset allocations, compared to only 4% for the second lowest
standard deviation fund. See Appendix Table A2 for more detail.
"In our data, expected incremental costs (column (3)) are sometimes higher than incremental premiums
(column (2)) suggesting (contrary to fact) that all weakly risk averse individuals will buy the safest option.
This is at least partially due to our (unrealistic) simplifying assumption (for the construction of this table)
that all individuals are drawn from the same risk distribution. As long as an individual believes there is a
sufficiently low probability of the relevant claim, he may not prefer the safest option.
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each domain are quite comparable in their expected magnitude, with incremental (annual)
premiums (and associated benefits) ranging from several hundred to a few thousand dollars.
Of course, the overall magnitudes of the underlying risks can vary vastly (e.g., between long-
term disability and dental), but the incremental coverage - which is the key for the coverage
choice - is of a much more similar magnitude across domains.
2.2.3 Attractions of our setting.
The data and setting offer several key attractive features for investigating the extent to
which individuals display a common ranking in their risk aversion relative to their peers
across domains. First, within all domains, the differences across different choices are purely
in the amount of financial risk exposure. They do not involve, for example, differences in
access restrictions to health care providers or different service quality by asset fund managers.
Such differences would have introduced additional domain-specific elements of the choices
that would make interpretation of the results more difficult. Relatedly, since the choices
within a domain differ only in the amount of financial risk exposure, they can each be
collapsed to a unidimensional vertical ranking of the amount of financial risk one is exposed
to in different choices. This makes it relatively straightforward to assess how much more
likely it is for individuals who assume more vs. less risk compared to their peers in one
domain to assume more vs. less risk in another domain compared to their peers.
Second, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2, all of the domains are plausibly
valuable and sensible insurance from an economic standpoint. That is, they all represent
potentially large expenditures with real ex ante uncertainty to the individual. For example,
the coefficient of variation of incremental costs (computed based on columns (3) and (4)) is
always greater than one third, and mostly greater than one. This is a much more appealing
setting for studying the extent to which choices across domains display a common risk
aversion component than looking at settings in which it is unclear why individuals are buying
insurance in the first instance, such as insurance for internal wiring protection (as in, e.g.,
Cicchetti and Dubin 1994) and other types of "insurance" products that cover against very
small losses, which Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue is where people are perhaps most likely
to depart from the canonical model of decision under uncertainty.
Third, as discussed earlier (and shown in Table 2.2, columns (2) and (3)), the choices
within a domain are over similarly sized risks.
Fourth, many of the benefit options are entirely new in 2004, and the old options were no
longer available. This means that for these benefit options we are looking at decisions made
at the same time period and do not have to worry about "stale" decisions in some domains
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reflecting a combination of inertia and outdated risk preferences." Specifically, the health,
drug and dental options were all completely new - the old options were no longer available
in these domains - while the disability options remained the same but their prices changed;
the 401(k) options did not change.' 3 As a further check against the possibility of "stale"
decisions (particularly for 401(k) allocations and potentially disability choices), we show in
our robustness analysis that results look similar when restricted to a sample of new hires,
for whom decisions in all six domains had to be made recently.
Fifth, and relatedly, with the exception of the 401(k) asset allocation decisions, the nature
of the employee benefit selections eliminates many potential domain-specific elements of the
choice; all the insurance benefits are presented in the same format (all on the same benefit
worksheet) and must be chosen during the same open enrollment period. Thus, we do
not have to worry, for example, about time-varying events, differential effort or ability of
insurance agents, etc.
Sixth, there is some interesting variation across the six domains in the "closeness" of
the domains. In particular, it seems that some domains (such as short-term and long-term
disability insurance) are quite similar while others (such as health insurance and 401(k)
decisions) are more different. Therefore, it is interesting to see if the extent of correlation in
choices within an individual across domains varies by their relative "closeness." Of course,
the range spanned by our choices is much narrower than the full set of decisions under
uncertainty that individuals make; in the end of the paper we discuss some of the challenges
in extending the study to a broader range of domains.
Finally, but very importantly, the data are extremely clean and complete. We observe
all the details of the choice set, the choice made, the setting in which the choice is made, a
measure of risk occurrence, and relatively rich demographic information.
12Given the substantial evidence on inertia in insurance choices (see Handel (2010) for a recent example)
we would worry greatly about examining choices that may have been made a long time earlier (when an
individual's characteristics may be different from what we currently observe) and/or at different times for
different products.
"We also know the default options for each domain which are: health insurance option 4, drug insurance
option 3 single coverage, and for dental, short- and long-term disability the default is one's prior year's
choice if he or she was previously employed (or no coverage, lowest option, and middle option respectively
if they are a new hire). Of course, people in these allocations may also have chosen them actively. In our
robustness analysis we explore sensitivity to excluding people who, based on their allocations, may not be
active choosers.
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2.3 A "Model Free" Approach
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Given our interest in the extent to which individuals' ranking in their risk aversion relative
to their peers displays a common component across domains, a natural empirical approach
is to examine the rank correlation in individual's choices from among the (vertically ranked)
options in each domain. We thus begin by reporting pairwise Spearman rank correlations
across domains. A disadvantage to this approach, however, is that it does not readily lend
itself to controlling for potentially important covariates, nor does it lend itself as easily to a
construction of comparative benchmarks with which to gauge the relative importance of the
domain-general component of risk preferences that we detect.
We therefore also examine the correlation structure of the error terms from a system of
six equations of the form:
choiceyealth ~ Health Health
choice "rug ,Drug Drug
choicePental Dental Dental
choiceSTD STD 6 STD
choiceJTD ,LTD 6 TD
choice 4 01(k) p401(k) 01(k)
where xi is a vector of control variables (which is the same in all equations in the system
of equations), # is a vector of domain-specific coefficients, and the main object of interest is
the correlation matrix of the residuals.
We estimate this system in two separate ways. We first treat each equation as an ordered
probit specification (except the 401(k) equation, which is treated as a regular equation with
a continuous dependent variable) - that is, we assume that the six residuals are drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution, and that the dependent variable is a latent domain-specific
variable that maps a one-dimensional index into a discrete ordered coverage choice.' 4 This
specification treats properly the ordinal nature of the choices, but has the disadvantage that
it does not lend itself to a natural R 2 measure, which we use later to compare the predictive
power of different variables. We therefore also estimate the system of equations above using
multivariate least squares, by enumerating the choices from 1 to n in each domain (as in
Table 2.2), and assigning them a cardinal interpretation despite their ordinal nature. This
4 We estimate this model using maximum likelihood. The estimation is performed using the emp user-
provided package in STATA. See http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456882.html and Roodman (2009).
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specification does not require us to assume that the errors are distributed normally and, more
importantly, makes it natural to use R 2 to compare results across different specifications. As
we report below, the correlation results that we obtain from the three specifications - the
rank correlation, the system of ordered probits, and the multivariate regression analysis -
are all very similar.
Because standard theory models insurance choices as driven by risk and risk aversion, it is
essential to control for risk if one wants to make inferences about risk aversion. The baseline
set of control variables (xi) we include in the ordered probit and multivariate least squares
specifications are dummy variables for the menu of benefits the employee faced (described
above). We also explore the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of additional controls
(in all six equations) that proxy for individual risk in each of the five insurance domains. We
attempt to control for two components of risk; the first is risk that can be predicted using
observables, and the second is an individual-specific risk component, which is idiosyncratic
to the individual.
To proxy for the predictable component of risk, we use two measures. The first measure is
based on a statistical model of realized risk in each domain on a flexible functional form of our
observables; we generate and then use as controls the model predictions." A second measure
of predictable (health) risk is based on software that predicts future medical spending on the
basis of previous years' detailed medical diagnoses and claims, as well as demographics.16
To proxy for the idiosyncratic component of risk we use the realization of that risk in the
subsequent coverage period. That is, if individual risk is realized from an individual-specific
distribution, conditional on observable risk, the realization of risk can be used as a (noisy)
proxy for the underlying ex-ante individual-specific risk type. The identification arguments
in Cohen and Einav (2007) and in Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010) use a similar idea.
Finally, to allow for correlation in both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in risk across
domains, we include controls for all our proxies in all the insurance domains. That is, each
"The results are not at all sensitive to the precise way we predict risk. For the results we report below, risk
is predicted from a linear regression of realized risk (dollar spending for health, drug, and dental insurance;
and days of disability for either disability insurance) on: (i) cubic splines for age, wage, and job tenure;
(ii) dummy variables for gender, race, employee type (hourly or salary), union status, single coverage for
health benefits, family size, and state fixed effects; and (iii) interaction variables between age and the gender,
employee type, and single coverage dummy variables.
16This is a relatively sophisticated way of predicting medical spending as it takes into account the dif-
ferential persistence of different types of medical claims (e.g., diabetes vs. car accident) in addition to
overall utilization, demographics, and a rich set of interactions among these measures. The particular soft-
ware we use is a risk adjustment tool called DXCG risk solution which was developed by Verisk Health
(http://www.veriskhealth.com/) and is used, e.g., by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services in
determining reimbursement rates. See Carlin and Town (2010) and Handel (2010) for other examples of
academic uses of this type of predictive diagnostic software.
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equation includes eleven control variables, containing predicted and realized risk in each of
the five insurance domains, as well as the software-generated prediction of health risk.
2.3.2 Results
Table 2.3 presents the baseline correlation results, when we do not use additional control
variables (except for benefit menu fixed effects in Panels B and C). Panel A shows the full
set of Spearman rank correlation coefficients between each pair of domains. It also reports
(at the bottom) the simple average of the fifteen correlations, as a single summary measure.
Panel B shows the estimated correlation from the system of ordered probit specifications
(and a single 401(k) linear equation), and Panel C shows the correlations from the baseline
multivariate regression described above. In general, we can (easily) reject the null hypothesis
of a correlation of zero.
By rejecting the null hypothesis of a correlation of zero, we can reject the null of no
domain-general component of choice. Viewed alternatively, we find that one's coverage
choice in every other domain has some predictive power for his or her choice in a given
domain. Although the finding that risk preferences are correlated across domains may be
viewed as hardly surprising, from the perspective of the canonical model, it is encouraging
to find this positive correlation so robustly across a broad range of contexts.
This test of the admittedly not very compelling null of no domain-general component of
choices is subject to the important caveat that non-preference factors may introduce corre-
lations across domains. In the case of insurance, a natural suspect is potential correlation
in underlying (unpriced) risk across the insurance domains. Such an issue does not arise in
the context of the correlation between 401(k) portfolio allocation and choices in an insur-
ance domain, making this perhaps the most compelling context to test the null of complete
domain specificity.
To try to address the concern about underlying risk correlations across insurance domains,
Table 2.4 reports the analogous results after we add control variables (as explained earlier) for
both predicted and realized risk in all domains in each equation. Panel A reports results from
the specification of a system of ordered probits and Panel B for the multivariate regression.1 7
The results, again, are very similar across the two specifications, and quite remarkably the
magnitude of the correlations generally remains almost the same as in Table 2.3, with only
a slight decline (the decline is to be expected, given that the risks are positively correlated
across domains). While predicted and realized risk do not control perfectly for one's ex ante
7 Table 3(b) does not report the Spearman rank correlations, for which it is less obvious how to add
controls.
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risk expectations, the small effect that these controls have on the correlation pattern suggests
that these correlations are more likely to capture correlation in underlying risk preferences.
This is also consistent with recent results - in the context of fully specified economic models
- that heterogeneity in risk preferences plays a much greater role than heterogeneity in
risks in explaining the heterogeneity in insurance coverage choices (Cohen and Einav 2007;
Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum 2011).
Across all panels of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 we see that the average pairwise correlation is
0.16 to 0.26. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a pronounced pattern of substantially higher
correlation coefficients between pairs that are more "similar." For example, in panel B of
Table 2.3, the correlation between drug and health coverage choices is 0.55 and the correlation
between long-term and short-term disability insurance choices is 0.77. By contrast, health
insurance and short-term disability insurance show only a 0.29 correlation and the lowest
pairwise correlations are between the share of risk free assets in one's 401(k) portfolio and
any of the insurance coverage choices (all of which are 0.07 or less). Of course, it is not clear
how informative this finding is since comparisons of correlations between different pairs are
difficult to interpret due, for example, to differences in the discreteness and pricing of the
relative options in each domain.
We also examine how the correlation in choices varies across different identifiable groups.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the main results for the ordered probit and multivariate spec-
ifications, respectively. Specifically, the results show selected correlations for different pairs
of groups of employees. While many pairwise correlations seem to be quite similar across
groups, the most striking pattern in Table 2.5 is in column (5), which shows a consistent
pattern that individuals whom one might ex ante classify as likely to make better finan-
cial decisions tend to have noticeably higher correlations between health insurance choices
and 401(k) decisions. This is true for older individuals relative to younger individuals, for
individuals with longer tenure with Alcoa (who perhaps understand the "system" better),
individuals with higher wages, and individuals who tend to avoid what economists often
view as unsophisticated financial behavior, such as not rebalancing the portfolio regularly.
A similar pattern is observed across these groups in the correlations between other insurance
choices and the 401(k) decisions (not shown in the table in the interest of space).
One way to interpret these findings is that while the correlation between insurance and
401(k) investment choices is low in the overall sample, we find a greater degree of domain-
general risk aversion once we focus on individuals who exhibit more "financial literacy," or
at least seem to pay more attention to their investment decisions. An alternative, plausible
interpretation is that these results suggest less error in risk perceptions or in the map-
ping from "true" underlying risk preferences to choices, for individuals who appear to be
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more "financially literate"; such an interpretation could suggest that the correlation results
underestimate the importance of the domain-general component of risk preferences in the
full sample. This latter interpretation is consistent with a growing body of empirical work
suggesting that the propensity to succumb to psychological biases or to make mistakes in
financial planning is higher for individuals of lower cognitive ability (Benjamin, Brown, and
Shapiro 2006) and for individuals of lower financial literacy or planning propensity (Ameriks,
Caplin, and Leahy 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). Either interpretation suggests that one
might want to exercise more caution in using specific revealed preference estimates to cal-
ibrate risk aversion levels in economic models, when they are applied to less sophisticated
populations.
2.3.3 Robustness
We explored the robustness of our main correlation results (Table 2.3, Panels B and C) to
various alternative specifications and samples. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 summarize the results of
these analyses. As in Table 2.5, in the interest of space, we do not report every pairwise
correlation, but instead report the average correlation and the correlations of three selected
pairs. We explore two main types of sensitivity analysis: alternative specifications and
alternative samples. Unless otherwise specified, each row represents a single change relative
to the baseline specification. Overall, the results seem to be quite robust to the alternative
exercises we explore.
Alternative specifications and sample definitions.
Table 2.3 already showed that the Spearman rank correlations, the correlations estimates
that are based on the system of ordered probits, and the linear multivariate regression all
lead to similar results. Table 2.4 has also shown that the results are not affected much by
the inclusion of a large set of controls for risk. Row 1 of the two panels of Table 2.7 replicates
the baseline results (Table 2.3, panels B and C, respectively), and the rest of the rows in the
table examine additional plausible concerns.
Row 2 examines a concern that perhaps the reason that the 401(k) choice is less correlated
with all other insurance choices is driven by the fact that all insurance choices are discrete
and ordinal, while the 401(k) choice is continuous and has a cardinal interpretation. To
investigate this further, we discretize the 401(k) asset allocation decision and turn it into an
ordinal measure, so it is more similar in nature to the other choices. We do so by taking
the (continuous) measure of the percentage of employee contributions allocated to the safe
funds, and convert it to a discrete integer between 1 to 3, with 1 corresponding to investing
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nothing in the safe funds, 2 corresponding to investing something but not everything in the
safe funds, and 3 corresponding to investing everything in the safe funds.
In row 3 we investigate the sensitivity of our results to including indicator variables for
the (four) coverage tiers (single coverage, employee plus spouse, employee plus children, and
family coverage), and in row 4 we investigate concerns about whether our benefit menu fixed
effects fully capture differences in choices due to prices by limiting the sample to those who
faced the prices in the single largest benefit menu (about 60 percent of our baseline sample).
The rest of the rows in Table 2.7 explore the sensitivity of our baseline specification to
alternative sample definitions. In rows 5 through 7 we add back in various employees who
were excluded from the baseline sample. In row 5 we include those employees who opted out
of the health insurance and drug insurance plans, or who chose an HMO for these plans. In
row 6 we include employees who did not contribute to their 401(k) plan in 2004, and in row
7 we include those employees who were not offered long-term disability insurance. In each
case, we omit from the analysis the affected domains (health and drug in row 5, 401(k) in
row 6, and long-term disability in row 7). As a result, comparison of the average correlation
to that in the baseline may be misleading, but the pairwise ones are still informative, and
we also report the comparable average correlation in the baseline specification.
In row 8 we exclude from our analysis individuals who chose health insurance option
1, the lowest coverage option. As mentioned in Section 2.2, this option is bundled with
a Health Retirement Account component, so it is not fully vertically rankable. In row 9
we limit the sample to the slightly under 10 percent of the sample who were new hires
in 2004. As discussed earlier, a primary motivation for this analysis is to see if 401(k)
contribution allocations are more correlated with insurance choices when the 401(k) choice
(like the insurance choice) must be a new and "active" decision. In practice, there is no
evidence that differences in timing of the decision is driving down the correlation between
401(k) asset allocation and insurance coverage. Finally, in row 10 we exclude the roughly
11 percent of the individuals who might have been "passive" choosers, given that all their
coverage decisions in the insurance domains were consistent with the default options.
Outside insurance and investment choices.
A fundamental feature of our analysis is that while we have good data on individuals' deci-
sions and outcomes within Alcoa, naturally we have very little information about any other
of the individuals' insurance and investment portfolios, which are external to Alcoa. Thus,
we may be missing important pieces of the overall insurance coverage for a particular risk,
or the overall wealth portfolio. On the insurance front we are relatively sanguine. Given the
generosity of Alcoa benefits relative to anything a spousal employer might provide, as well
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as the well-known problems with private markets (that are not employer-provided) for these
insurance products, we think it is a reasonable approximation to assume that there is little
non-Alcoa insurance purchase. However, non-Alcoa investments are a potentially important
concern. To try to shed light on how important this may be for our results, we undertake
two types of exercises.
First, to try to proxy for outside investments, we construct measures of the individual
employee's housing wealth and then repeat our analysis by stratifying on housing wealth,
so that we are comparing choices among individuals with relatively similar outside housing
wealth. Of course, this strategy does not address other financial and non-financial wealth in
the employee's portfolio. In practice, however, the retirement component is large relative to
other financial assets for individuals with retirement financial wealth, and housing wealth is
a very large share of non-financial wealth for such individuals (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore
2006). Therefore, controlling for housing wealth is likely a first order improvement in trying
to address the non-Alcoa portfolio composition. To obtain data on housing, we matched the
home addresses of our Alcoa employees to public records containing information on their
home value and their equity stake in their house; we were able to link about one-third of our
sample. 18
The results are shown in Table 2.8. Once again we report estimates for the average
correlation, the health-drug correlation, the health-short term disability correlation and the
health-401 (k) correlation. However, because this exercise may be particularly relevant for the
sensitivity of the relationship between 401(k) choices and insurance choices, we also report
each of the 401(k)-insurance product correlations. The first row shows results for the full
sample, while the second row shows results for the sample for whom we were able to link in
housing data ("housing subsample"). Rows 3-5 show results stratified (in roughly equally
sized bins) by housing equity: less than $50,000, $50,000 to $150,000, and above $150,000.
The results are not overly sensitive to this stratification. In particular, the basic pattern of
much larger correlations among insurance choices than correlation between 401(k) portfolio
allocation and insurance choices remains. The correlations are also extremely similar across
employees with different equity levels or equity shares. For example, the health insurance-
401(k) correlation is always lower than 0.07 for all across equity levels, while the correlation
between health and drug coverage choices is always above 0.4. There does not seem to be any
18The data were provided by a real estate data vendor DataQuick, which compiles data on real estate
from public records such as county recordings of ownerships and transactions, and county tax assessors. See
http://www.dataquick.com/sharedata.asp for more information. The employees for whom we were able to
match housing data are unlikely to be a random sample of our employees; for example, we were unable to
match employees with P.O. Boxes as addresses, and we likely have less success for counties without electronic
records.
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consistent pattern of a monotone relationship between housing equity and the magnitude of
the various correlation coefficients.
Second, we tried to define a sample of employees who are less likely to have substantial
non-401(k) financial investments by restricting the sample to employees who do not max
out their possible 401(k) contributions; because of the favorable tax treatment of 401(k)
investments, it seems plausible that individuals who are not saving as much as possible in
tax preferred vehicles may have less outside savings than those who are. We therefore divide
the sample into the approximately 14 percent who have contributed the maximum allowable
amount to their 401(k) and the remainder who have not maxed out their allowable 401(k)
contributions. The bottom two rows of Table 2.8 show that the results are broadly similar
for the two groups. For example, the correlation between 401(k) portfolio allocation and
insurance choice is slightly higher for those who have maxed out their 401(k) contributions
for health insurance but slightly lower for the other four types of insurance. The general
pattern of much larger correlations among insurance choices than between 401(k) portfolio
allocation and insurance choices remains for both groups.
While of course these tests are limited in their nature, it is nonetheless reassuring to find
that the results suggest that our inability to control for the entire wealth portfolio is unlikely
to be having a large impact on the correlations we examine.
2.3.4 Benchmarks
As noted at the outset, our primary interest is in developing reasonable benchmarks against
which one can try to assess whether the correlation in the ordinal ranking of the riskiness of
one's choices across domains suggests a quantitatively large or small domain-general compo-
nent of risk preferences. Comparing the estimated correlations to the benchmark correlation
of one does not provide a meaningful assessment of the extent of domain generality of pref-
erences, or a test of the null of complete domain generality of preferences. We would not
expect a rank correlation of one even if preferences were fully domain general.
For example, even if risk preferences are fully domain general, any discreteness and
non-linearity in the function that maps risk aversion to choices would make the correlation
estimates lower, potentially by a substantial amount. To illustrate this with a concrete
example, suppose we observe N individuals making choices in two domains (j and k), each
of which offers two discrete choices, with choice 1 exposing the individual to more risk than
choice 2. Even if preferences are fully domain general, it is possible that due to the different
pricing of options in the two domains, in domain j the lowest risk aversion individual chooses
option 1 while all N - 1 other individuals choose option 2, while in domain k the highest risk
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aversion individual chooses option 2 and all N - 1 other individuals choose option 1. While
this allocation is consistent with an underlying model of fully domain general preferences,
the correlation of choices across the two domains will approach zero as N gets sufficiently
large.
In addition, in a fully domain general model with a single utility function over wealth,
insurance decisions are inter-related, and one essentially chooses a portfolio of insurance
positions. In other words, risk exposure in one domain may affect (with ex ante ambiguous
sign) one's willingness to bear risk in another (even independent) domain (Gollier and Pratt
1996; Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1996). This "background risk" problem introduces yet
another reason why fully domain general preferences need not produce a rank correlation of
one across domains.
Our first exercise that may allow us to start assessing whether the correlation estimates
we report are large or small is to compare the predictive power of choices in other domains
to the predictive power of demographic covariates. Table 2.9 reports these results. For
each domain, it reports the adjusted R 2 from a multivariate regression of the (ordinal)
coverage choice in this domain on different subsets of covariates. All regressions are done
on the residual coverage choice (after partialing out the menu fixed effects). As one can
see, the explanatory power (measured by the adjusted R 2 ) of the choices in other domains
(row 1) is much greater for predicting one's insurance choice in a different domain than the
predictive power of one's risk type (row 2), or one's detailed demographics (row 3). For
example, the predictive power of choices in other domains is at least four times greater than
the predictive power of demographics in predicting the choice in a given insurance domain.
Even when we limit the choices in other domains to exclude the most related coverage choice
(row 4), the predictive power of the remaining choices is at least 1.5 times higher than that
of demographics for the choice in a given insurance domain. The case of 401(k) is a noted
exception to this pattern. The explanatory power of the insurance choices (row 1) is an order
of magnitude lower than that of demographics. This is not a particularly surprising pattern,
given the relative "distance" between 401(k) and all the other choices, as well as potential
differences in the timing (or framing) of the decision, and potential age-based preferences
for the (longer horizon) 401(k) investments, which may make age a particularly important
factor in 401(k) decisions.
A second exercise is to compare the correlation within person in choices across domains
at a point in time to the correlation within person in choices in a given domain over time.
Here again we can take advantage of the new benefit design that Alcoa introduced in 2004,
and compute the correlation for health insurance choices between 2003 and 2004. In the
"old" benefit design (of 2003), individuals could choose from among three different coverage
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options (compared to five in the new design), with variation in out-of-pocket maximum
being binding and important. These three options were also vertically rankable from least
to most coverage, just like other domains in 2004, thus providing a similar structure, and
a comparable benchmark. In the multivariate regression, the correlation we find between
health insurance choices (of the same employee) in 2003 and 2004 is 0.198. This is similar to
(or smaller than) the multivariate correlation estimates across insurance domains reported
in Table 2.3, panel C, which range from 0.16 to 0.60.19
Our general conclusion from these benchmarks is that, contrary to our prior expectations,
the reported average correlations of 0.16-0.26 are in fact quite high, and suggestive of an
important domain-general component of risk preferences. To more specifically quantify the
extent of domain generality of preferences requires that we link our results to underlying
economic primitives. This in turn requires to move from a statistical model to an economic
model, which is the focus of the next section.
2.4 A (Stylized) Model-Based Approach
We considered two (related) approaches to try to relate the statistical correlation in individ-
ual's choices across domains to underlying economic primitives, namely coefficients of risk
aversion. One approach would be to start with a fully specified model of coverage choice,
assume a benefit menu similar to the one observed in the data, and assume full domain
generality by imposing a common risk aversion parameter within an individual across do-
mains. We could then simulate what the correlation coefficient between the implied coverage
choices in different domains would be under this assumption of full domain generality, and
compare it to what we have observed. This would allow us to obtain some benchmarks for
the correlation coefficients between choices generated by a model with fully domain-general
risk preferences, but subject to the non-linearities and discreteness that arise because of the
structure of the insurance options and the decision process. We report in the appendix such
an exercise, which is applied to two of the domains: short-term and long-term disability
insurance.
One concern with this exercise is that it makes many (strong) assumptions about the
form of the utility function, about the expectations individuals have regarding their risks,
and about the calibrated values of additional parameters such as the discount rate, the (com-
1One could also investigate correlation in choices over time without any change in benefit design. The
concern about such an exercise is that inertic behavior would be driving much of the results, which is precisely
the reason that made us use the new benefit design for the baseline exercise. Indeed, when we examine such
correlations (looking at years 2004 and 2005), we obtain correlation coefficients of 0.85-0.9, presumably due
to inertia.
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mon) distribution of risk aversion across individuals, and the nature of the risk realization
processes. A second, more important concern is that the exercise reported in the appen-
dix uses only two specific domains. Although, in principle, such an exercise could also be
extended to additional domains, it is no coincidence that we chose two of the most similar
domains for this exercise, so that the models for coverage choice were also quite similar
To extend the exercise to other domains and investigate robustness, we choose instead
to pursue a second approach, which is in some sense the mirror-image of what we have
just described. Instead of starting with a fully domain general model and asking what it
would imply for the data, we start instead with the data and ask, in the context of a given,
stylized model of coverage choice, what fraction of our sample's choices can be rationalized
with a single (individual-specific) risk aversion coefficient. Our modeling approach is guided
by a desire to reduce - although we cannot of course eliminate - domain-specific modeling
assumptions. We therefore write down a stylized model of coverage choice that is stripped of
many domain-specific details. This framework allows us to estimate the same generic model
of primitives across the different contexts, which are quite different from each other. As
we shall see, a key decision in this respect is to follow the spirit of our first "model free"
approach by focusing on the (narrower) question of comparing the consistency of individual's
ranking of risk aversion relative to their peers across contexts, rather than the consistency
of individual's level of risk aversion across contexts.
2.4.1 A Model
Consider a domain d and an individual i. We assume that choices are generated by expected
utility maximizers who have a domain-invariant vNM utility function over wealth, ui(w).
Faced with a set of coverage options Jd in each domain, individuals then evaluate their
expected utility from each option j E Jd, denoted by v-, by
d
v= E [ui (wi -Adoop () - pj), (2.2)
where expectations are taken over the cost realization F. In addition, wi is a measure of
income or wealth, oopj (2) captures the out-of-pocket expenditure that is associated with a
cost realization of J under coverage j, and p3 denotes the premium associated with coverage
option j. The parameter Ad, which varies across domains but not across individuals, captures
context-specific beliefs (or other biases). That is, Ad = 1 can be thought of as correct
expectations, while Ad < 1 (Ad > 1) implies biased expectations about risk, which are too
optimistic (pessimistic). In the context of the model, Ad enters as biased beliefs, which could
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be driven by framing effects or probability weighting. More generally, however, one can think
of Ad as a "reduced form" way by which we capture a variety of potential domain-specific
effects. That is, all else equal, higher (lower) values of Ad require lower (higher) levels of risk
aversion to rationalize a given choice, thus providing a free parameter in each domain that
captures the level of risk aversion.
To evaluate the expectations for each individual, we make a strong simplifying assump-
tion and abstract from unobservables that may affect ex ante risk (we explore observable
differences later)," and assume that individuals' risk realization is drawn randomly from the
risk realizations of other individuals who are associated with the same group (e.g., based
on demographics)." That is, if individual i is associated with group N so that i E N, we
evaluate individual i's expectations by
Ea [ui (wi - Adoop (C) - p)] =NE u (wi - Adoop3 (ck) - p). (2.3)
Equipped with this model, we can then assume a specific parametric utility function ui(-)
for each individual, such as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility function, and map each choice into an interval of coefficients of
risk aversion that would rationalize this choice. To see this, note that the set of coverage
options in all our domains are vertically ordered (see our discussion in Section 2.2), so the
willingness to pay for incremental coverage is monotone in risk aversion. Conditional on risk
expectations, each (discrete) coverage choice can be mapped into an interval of risk aversion
parameters that would rationalize the choice. Observing choices of the same individual
across different domains, we can now ask whether the intervals associated with these choices
overlap. If the answer is positive, it means that there exists a range of domain-general risk
aversion coefficients that could generate this individual's choices across the different domains.
We can then ask what fraction of individuals have a range of risk aversion coefficients that
are consistent across a given set of contexts.
The conceptual approach is similar to the test proposed by Barseghyan, Prince, and
Teitelbaum (2011), although our use of the Ad's parameters allow us to remain consistent
with our "model free" exercise and focus on the consistency of the relative risk preferences
20 The key reason that we abstract from unobserved heterogeneity in risk is that, absent a very long
panel data, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity would most likely require domain-specific parametric
assumptions, which is precisely the feature we would like to avoid. For example, in our previous work we
identified unobserved heterogeneity by assuming a Poisson risk for auto insurance claims (Cohen and Einav
2007) or a mortality rate that follows a Gompertz distribution (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2010).
21We note that in order to obtain reasonable risk expectations, the group definition should lead to relatively
large groups, so that the tails of the distribution would be accounted for in each individual's decision problem.
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of individuals across contexts rather than on the consistency of their absolute levels. This
focus likely makes the results less sensitive to modeling assumptions by removing the need
to make assumptions (e.g. about the level of risk aversion or the nature of beliefs) as we did
in the calibration exercise described above. While our results could speak to the broader
question about the consistency of an individual's level of risk aversion across contexts (and,
indeed, we mention some such results below), one would naturally worry that in order to infer
the level of risk preferences, a richer domain-specific model of risk realization, expectation
formation, and coverage choice would be preferred.
2.4.2 Implementation and main results
Using this framework, our empirical exercise attempts to maximize the fraction of the in-
dividuals in the sample for whom the implied intervals of risk aversion overlap across two
or more domains. We allow the vector of Ad's to be free parameters and search for the
set of Ad's that maximize the overlap. Our results have a simple economic interpretation.
They represent the fraction of individuals for whom the choices across domains could be
rationalized with a single risk aversion parameter, subject to domain-specific effects (that do
not vary across individuals). The estimated Ad's (and, in particular, how far they are from
1) can then be interpreted as a measure of how much domain-specific effects is required to
rationalize a single risk aversion.
Appendix B provides additional implementation details. To summarize, in our baseline
specification we assume a CARA utility for the three domains associated with absolute
(dollar) risk (health insurance, prescription drug insurance, and dental insurance) and a
CRRA utility for the three domains associated with relative (to wage) risk (short- and long-
term disability insurance, and 401(k) allocation). We use -Y -wi as a multiplicative factor
that converts each individual's coefficient of relative risk aversion to absolute risk aversion,
where wi is (in the baseline specification) individual i's observed annual income, and -y is
an additional free parameter (constant across individuals), which maps annual income to
wealth. Other than for this conversion, wi drops out of the analysis. We search over this
additional parameter -y, in addition to the vector of Ad's, when we search for the maximum
overlap. In the appendix (see Table A3) we verify that the results remain qualitatively
similar when we repeat the procedure in a reverse order, by first converting absolute risk to
relative risk (or vice versa), and then applying the same CRRA (or CARA) utility function
to all domains.
Table 2.10 presents the results. Column (2) reports overlap results for all six domains.
Column (3) reports overlap results for the five insurance domains. Columns (4) and (5) report
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results separately for, respectively, the three domains associated with absolute (dollar) risk
(health, dental, and drug insurance) and the three domains associated with relative (to
income) risk (short- and long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) asset allocation).
Before presenting our baseline results of the maximum fraction of individuals whose
implied risk aversion intervals overlap, row 1 presents, as a starting point, the minimum
fraction of individuals whose implied risk aversion intervals overlap. This can be found
by taking the maximum of the fraction of individuals who choose the least risky options
and the fraction of individuals who choose the most risky option; with appropriate Ad's,
the choices of individuals who always choose the least risky options across domains (or
the choices of individuals who always choose the most risky options across domains) can
always be rationalized. In our case, the minimum fraction of individuals whose implied risk
aversion intervals overlap is given by the fraction of individuals who choose the least risky
option in each domain. The first row indicates that, by this metric, at least five percent of the
sample can be "mechanically" viewed as consistent across all domains. This number increases
substantially, to 26 percent, once we limit the analysis to the five insurance domains.
Row 2 reports the maximum overlap results for our baseline sample. It indicates that,
across all six domains, 30 percent of the individuals have implied risk aversion intervals that
overlap, once we allow for the domain-specific free parameters (the Ad's). Interestingly, the
Ad's required to achieve this overlap are generally well below 1,22 which is consistent with
individuals under-estimating event probabilities. When we only search for overlap across
the five insurance domains, we find it to be 38 percent, and it is much higher when we only
search for overlap separately across the domains associated with absolute risk (56 percent)
and relative risk (70 percent). Naturally, some of this increase in overlap is mechanical, since
removing domains (weakly) increases our ability to rationalize the smaller number of choices.
As noted, our introduction of the domain-specific parameter Ad moves the spirit of the
analysis away from investigating consistency in an individual's implied level of risk aversion
across domains toward an analysis of the consistency in an individuals' ranking (relative to
their peers) of risk aversion across domains. To investigate the importance of these domain-
specific "free parameters" for the results, row 3 shows the overlap of risk aversion intervals
when we restrict all Ad's (as well as -y) to be equal to 1. We now find that only 5.3 percent of
the sample exhibits choices that overlap in their implied risk aversion intervals. This suggests
that the implied levels of risk aversion exhibited may be very different across domains, or
22Specifically, the resultant A's for health and drug insurance are 0.52 and 0.55, respectively, and for short-
and long-term insurance they are 0.42 and 0.43. Dental insurance is an exception, where the resultant A is
1.49. The A for 401(k) is much higher, but we suggest caution in interpretating this disparity due to the
additional free parameter -y.
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that other effects, such as framing or probability weighting, are particularly important in
these contexts and different across domains.
Consistent with the "model free" correlation results, our analysis also suggests that the
401(k) domain is the most different. One way to see this is in row 4, where we continue to
restrict all five insurance-domains' Ad's (as well as -y) to be equal to 1, but free up the A401(k)
parameter and search for the value that maximizes the overlap. The results illustrate the
importance of having a free A401(k) parameter, effectively allowing for very different levels of
risk aversion (or beliefs) in this domain. We now obtain a maximum overlap of 28 percent,
which is quite different from the overlap of 5 percent when all six Ad's are restricted to be
equal to 1, and quite close to the unconstrained maximum overlap of 30 percent (row 2). In
other words, allowing a free parameter on A401(k) gets us almost all of the benefit of allowing
all six domains-specific free parameters.
In rows 5-10 we investigate how the results vary by demographics, in a spirit similar
to our analysis in the end of Section 2.3.2 (see also Tables 2.5 and 2.6). Variation across
demographic groups can be driven by different risks, different domain-specific effects, or
simply different consistency in choices. As Table 2.10 shows, the results are not dramatically
different across groups. We find little gender differences, and a somewhat greater overlap for
older workers relative to younger, or for lower income employees relative to higher income
employees. This last result is somewhat different than what we found in the model-free
correlations in Section 2.3.
2.4.3 Robustness
Somewhat parallel to our robustness analysis in Section 2.3, we explore the robustness of
our model-based results to a number of modeling choices. The results are reported in the
subsequent rows of Table 2.10 (rows 11-19). Overall, the results are reasonably stable across
alternative specifications and subsamples.
As noted at the outset, our modeling choices - particularly the introduction of the domain
specific free parameters Ad's- was aimed to capture, in a somewhat reduced form way, a wide
range of potential domain-specific factors. These include not only domain-specific biases in
beliefs or probability weighting functions but other potentially domain specific influences such
as the appropriate discount rate, the planning horizon, or framing. As a result, an attractive
feature of our modeling approach is that there is a more limited number of domain-specific
modeling assumptions with respect to which sensitivity analysis need be evaluated.
However, one domain-specific factor that might contribute to the apparent difference of
the 401(k) domain is that the 401(k) choice is continuous, rather than discrete. Reassuringly,
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row 11 shows that this is unlikely to be important. In particular, we discretize the 401(k)
asset allocation decision into three choices (with roughly 40 percent, 16 percent, and 44
percent respectively): contribute nothing to the risk-free funds, contribute everything to the
risk-free funds, and contribute in between. For people in this last group, we assign the
average contribution share to the risk-free funds among people in this group, which is about
35 percent. The results are indistinguishable from the baseline.
A potentially important modeling choice is the use of CARA utility for three domains
and CRRA for the other three, and the free parameter -y that is used to convert between
them. For this reason, in all rows we have shown results separately for the CARA and
CRRA domains (in columns (4) and (5)). We also explored the importance of the free
parameter -y in our conversion between coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion.
Row 12 shows that constraining this -y parameter to be 1 has little effect on the results. Row
13 uses an alternative definition of wi when we use y -wi to convert between each individual's
coefficient of relative and absolute risk aversion. Specifically, instead of defining wi as annual
income, in row 8 we take account of the individual's 401(k) assets (and the implicit income
they generate) by defining wi as annual income plus five percent of the individual's 401(k)
balance. Once again this does not affect the results.
Finally, as noted in our discussion of the "model free" correlation results in the previous
section, an important concern with our analysis - particularly for the 401(k) asset allocation
decision - is that we do not observe the individual's non-401(k) assets. We therefore subject
our model results to the same two types of robustness exercises we performed in Section 2.3
(see Table 2.8 in particular). Specifically, we first try to proxy for (and stratify on) housing
wealth. For the one third of the sample we were able to obtain housing equity data for, row
14 shows that we estimate a maximum overlap of 29 percent, which is virtually identical to
our baseline estimate of 30 percent. This overlap decreases slightly with housing equity (rows
15 to 17); for example, for all domains (column (2)) the maximum overlap declines from 32
percent for those with less than $50,000 in housing equity to 25 percent for those with more
than $150,000 in housing equity. Overall, however, the correlations for strata of individuals
with similar housing wealth look very much like the results for the full sample; we interpret
these results as suggesting that our estimates are not that sensitive to our lack of data on
housing investments. In rows 18 and 19 we compare the overlap across the subsample of
employees who do not max out their 401(k) contributions - and therefore are less likely to
have outside savings - and the subsample who does. Once again results by strata are very
similar to the baseline results.
More generally, across all our various robustness analyses in rows 11 through 19 the
maximum fraction of individuals whose implied risk aversion intervals overlap is quite stable,
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ranging from 25 to 36 percent. The key decision quantitatively appears to be to allow for a
domain-specific level of risk aversion in the 401(k) asset allocation (see row 3 and 4); without
this the overlap falls considerably.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the extent to which individuals display a stable ranking in their
risk preferences relative to their peers in making market choices over five health-related
employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and their 401(k) asset allocation decisions.
Our setting has the attraction that the decisions are all over purely financial risk, the choices
within each domain are easily vertically rankable in terms of risk exposure, and the domains
involve risks of similar and non-trivial magnitudes.
An important portion of the paper has tried to develop useful benchmarks which would
allow us to gauge the magnitude of any domain-general component of preferences. The most
natural and informative benchmark involved greater modeling assumptions, but the results
appear to be quite robust. This in part reflects our strategy of investigating the stability
of willingness to take risks relative to one's peers across different domains, rather than the
extent to which risk aversion levels are stable across domains. Of course, this choice is not
without costs, as it sets a lower hurdle for "domain-generality" of preferences; in a canonical
domain-general model of risk aversion, an individual's level of risk aversion would presumably
also be constant across contexts.
We reject the null hypothesis that there is no domain general component to preferences
and, more interestingly, we find that the extent of the domain-general component appears
to be substantively important. For example, we find that one's choices in other insurance
domains have about four times more predictive power for one's choice in a given insurance
domain than do a rich set of demographic variables. The results from our stylized cover-
age choice model suggest that up to 30 percent of our sample makes choices that may be
consistent across all six domains.
On the other hand, we also find evidence of non-trivial context specificity. In partic-
ular, we find that the riskiness of one's 401(k) asset allocation decisions has considerably
less predictive power for one's insurance choices than do other insurance choices (or demo-
graphics). Results from the stylized coverage choice model also suggest that choices in the
401(k) domain are the most difficult to reconcile with any of the others. More generally,
even within the insurance domains we find a higher correlation in choices that are "closer"
in context (such as health insurance and drug insurance, or short-term and long-term dis-
ability insurance) than ones that are further apart (such as health insurance and disability
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insurance).
These findings suggest that the extent of domain generality may vary greatly across
domains that are more or less "similar" to each other. It would be of great interest in
future work to examine the extent of domain generality in more disparate domains than
those we currently examine which consisted of five health-related insurance domains and
one retirement investment domain. Beyond the data hurdles, however, there is an inherent
tension in such an exercise. The more different the domains, the more difficult it is to model
and compare consumer choices in a domain-general way. We hope that the approaches
outlined here will prove useful in this regard as future work expands to consider a greater
set of possibly more disparate domains.
In the meantime, our results may have some implications for current calibration exercises.
Calibration work is ubiquitous in the fields of insurance, public finance, and macroeconomics.
The vast majority of this work (including our own past work) attempts to calibrate models
using "consensus" parameter estimates (or ranges of estimates) from the literature at large
rather than estimates from more similar contexts. The results presented here may suggest
that when calibrating models of economic behavior - insurance demand, savings, labor sup-
ply, and so on - one might want to consider using preference estimates taken from similar
contexts.
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Table 2.1: Employee characteristics in baseline sample
Mean Std. Dev. 5th pctile 95th pctile
Panel A: Demographics
Age 43.9 9.2 28 58
Annual wage (000$) 58.4 71.7 25.6 114
Job tenure with Alcoa (years) 13.2 9.6 1 30
Female 0.23
White 0.85
Hourly (non-salary) employee 0.32
Unionized employee 0.02
Single coverage tiera 0.19
Number of covered individuals per employeea 2.92 1.46 1 5
Panel B: Annual Payouts by domain
Health insurance claims ($) 5,221.4 10,606.8 60.3 18,091.7
Prescription drug insurance claims ($) 1,491.8 2,162.2 0.0 5,507.3
Dental insurance claims ($) 781.3 837.3 0.0 2,443.0
Short-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)b 0.061
Long-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)' 0.002
Annual 401(k) contribution ($) 4,616.2 3,199.5 709.6 11,225.8
The table is based on the 12,752 employees who constitute our baseline sample.
a The coverage tier and covered individuals are based on the medical coverage
reasonable proxies for family size and structure.
choices; we view them as
b Conditional on having a short-term disability claim, the average claim length is 51 days.
c Conditional on having a long-term disability claim, the average claim length in our data is 345. However,
the long-term claim data is truncated at about two years, so 345 should be viewed as a lower bound.
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Table 2.2: Summary of benefit options
Share Premium saving Expected Std. Dev. Of
relative to safest incremental cost incremental cost
option
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Insurance
Option 1 17.3% 1,016.6 1,415.6 1,052.4
Option 2 1.3% 747.7 880.0 559.7
Option 3 2.7% 545.3 645.6 380.8
Option 4 26.3% 325.0 350.8 173.4
Option 5 52.4%
Prescription Drug Insurance
Option 1 23.8% 181.2 248.6 385.0
Option 2 9.7% 109.6 124.3 192.5
Option 3 66.4%
Dental Insurance
Option 1 30.0% 95.7 45.2 112.9
Option 2 70.0%
Short-Term Disability Insurancea
Option 1 15.5% 165.1 140.2 825.7
Option 2 17.9% 63.5 70.3 413.4
Option 3 66.6%
Long-Term Disability Insurancea
Option 1 16.3% 152.4 17.0 395.7
Option 2 14.9% 63.5 8.5 197.9
Option 3 68.8%
401(k) allocationb
Risk-free 0% 40.6% - -421.7 514.0
Risk-free 0-25% 19.9% -
Risk-free 25-50% 12.8% -
Risk-free 50-75% 6.5% - -210.8 257.0
Risk-free 75-100% 3.4% -
Risk-free 100% 16.8% -
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible
exception of health insurance option 1; see text and Appendix Tables Al and A2 for details). Column (1)
shows the fraction who chose each option in our baseline sample. Column (2) shows the average (in the
baseline sample) premium savings from choosing a given option relative to choosing the safest (least risk
exposure) option; these vary across employees based on benefit menu, coverage tier (for health, drug and
dental), and wages (for short- and long-term disability). Columns (3) and (4) show, respectively, the average
and standard deviation of the incremental cost that the insurer would face (counterfactually for most of the
sample) in covering our baseline sample of employees, given the realized spending and coverage tier choices,
with the safest option (i.e., the highest numbered option) relative to the option shown.
a Short-term and long-term disability benefits (columns (3), and (4)) and premiums (column (2)) are pro-
portional to the employee's wage.
b For 401(k), columns (3) and (4) report expected incremental dollar payout (and associated standard
deviation) for 0% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (first row) and 50% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (second row)
assuming the average annual employee contribution in our baseline sample of $4,616. For the risky investment
portfolio, we assumed the allocation across different risky funds observed in the baseline sample, and similarly
for the risk free part of the investment portfolio (see Table A2).
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Table 2.3: Correlation estimates, without controls
Panel A: Spearman rank correlations
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.400
Dental 0.242 0.275
STD 0.226 0.210 0.179
LTD 0.180 0.199 0.173 0.593
401(k) 0.057 0.061 0.036 0.029 0.028
(0.002) (0.002)
Average correlation is 0.192
Panel B: Correlation estimates from a system of ordered probits
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.550
Dental 0.339 0.410
STD 0.292 0.303 0.271
LTD 0.243 0.298 0.266 0.768
401(k) 0.055 0.071 0.046 0.032 0.020
(0.004) (0.069)
Average correlation is 0.264
Panel C: Correlation estimates from a multivariate regression
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.452
Dental 0.238 0.267
STD 0.188 0.197 0.169
LTD 0.155 0.191 0.165 0.600
401(k) 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.029 0.018
(0.001) (0.042)
Average correlation is 0.188
The table reports results for our baseline sample of 12,752 employees. Unless reported otherwise in paren-
theses, the p-values associated with whether the correlation coefficient is different from zero are all less than
0.001. Each cell reports a pairwise correlation. The average correlation is simply the average of the fifteen
pairwise correlations shown, and is provided only as a single summary number. Panel A reports Spearman
rank correlations. Panel B shows results from a system of five ordered probits and one linear regression for
the 401(k) domain (see text for more details). Panel C reports the correlation structure from the multivariate
regression shown in equation (1). Both Panel B and Panel C include control (indicator) variables for the
benefit menu the employee faces; for Panel B, we exclude all menus that were offered to fewer than 100
people, reducing the sample size by 86 employees.
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Table 2.4: Correlation estimates, controlling for predictors of risks
Panel A: Correlation estimates from a system of ordered probits
Health Drug Dental STD
Drug
Dental
STD
LTD
401(k)
0.494
0.302
0.249
0.210
0.036
0.409
0.245
0.250
0.043
0.258
0.255
0.037
0.764
-0.005
(0.64)
LTD
-0.006
(0.72)
Average correlation is 0.234
Panel B: Correlation estimates from a multivariate regression
Health Drug Dental STD
Drug
Dental
STD
LTD
401(k)
0.411
0.208
0.155
0.130
0.038
0.250
0.156
0.157
0.032
0.156
0.153
0.026
0.593
0.002
(0.32)
LTD
-0.002
(0.56)
Average correlation is 0.164
The table reports results for our baseline sample of 12,752 employees. Panels A and B are analogous to
Panels B and C in Table 2.3, respectively. The results reported in this table include additional eleven control
variables for predicted and realized risk in each equation. These attempt to control for heterogeneous risk
expectations across individuals, which may be correlated across domains. See the text (Section 2.3.1) for
additional details. As in Table 2.3, both panels include also control (indicator) variables for the benefit
menu the employee faces; for Panel A, we exclude all menus that were offered to fewer than 100 people,
reducing the sample size by 86 employees. Because some of the regressors in these regressions are estimated
in a previous stage, we use bootstrap to compute standard errors. The reported (non-zero) p-values are the
fraction of the estimates that are negative for each correlation parameter (using 25 bootstrap samples)
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Table 2.5: Summary correlations by groups, ordered probit specification
Obs. Average Health-Drug Health-STD Health-401(k)
correlation correlation correlation correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single coverage 2420 0.309 0.643 0.379 0.082
(1) Non single 10246 0.251 0.517 0.267 0.052
More tenured 11641 0.262 0.547 0.287 0.058
(2) Newly hired 1025 0.269 0.569 0.289 0.012
Higher wage 3145 0.240 0.524 0.198 0.078
(3) Lower wage 3126 0.246 0.534 0.336 0.029
(4) Don't allocate to Alcoa Stock 7241 0.272 0.548 0.300 0.066
Allocate to Alcoa stock 5245 0.252 0.552 0.277 0.036
(5) Rebalance 401(k) portfolio 3610 0.261 0.551 0.264 0.080Don't rebalance 9056 0.266 0.551 0.302 0.047
Over 55 years old 1690 0.248 0.595 0.251 0.062
(6) Under 35 years old 2550 0.276 0.539 0.326 0.032
Salaried employees 8594 0.256 0.541 0.256 0.068
Hourly employees 4072 0.247 0.542 0.326 0.014
The table reports the correlation coefficients for the subsamples specified in the row headers. The
estimates all use Panel B of Table 2.3 as a baseline. That is, we report the correlation structure of the
residuals from estimating the system of ordered probit equations (with a single linear equation for 401(k)
choice), with covariates for benefit menu fixed effects. The average correlation in column (2) is the simple
average across the fifteen possible pairs of correlations (as in the bottom of each panel of Tables 2.3 and
2.4), while the other columns report the pairwise correlations for the selected pairs shown in the column
headings. Row 1 divides the sample by single coverage tier for health and drug vs. all other (non-single)
coverage tiers. Row 2 separates out newly hired employees (defined as less than 2 years of tenure) from
higher tenured employees. Row 3 separately examines employees with greater than $72,000 annual wages
and less than $36,000 annual wages (approximately the top and bottom quartiles of wages). Row 4 separates
employees who did and did not allocate their own 401(k) contributions to Alcoa stock. Row 5 separates
employees who did (at least once) and did not rebalance their 401(k) portfolio during the year.
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Table 2.6: Summary correlations by groups, multivariate regression
Obs. Average Health-Drug Health-STD Health-401(k)
correlation correlation correlation correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Single coverage 2441 0.224 0.532 0.252 0.074Non single 10311 0.176 0.421 0.167 0.055
More tenured 11708 0.185 0.448 0.184 0.059
(2) Newly hired 1044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
(3) Higher wage 3151 0.178 0.425 0.146 0.072Lower wage 3173 0.162 0.439 0.174 0.026
Don't allocate to Alcoa Stock 7468 0.193 0.448 0.195 0.073
(4) Allocate to Alcoa stock 5284 0.180 0.456 0.176 0.033
(5) Rebalance 401(k) portfolio 3626 0.186 0.430 0.178 0.079Don't rebalance 9126 0.188 0.460 0.190 0.049
(6) Over 55 years old 1700 0.167 0.446 0.147 0.061Under 35 years old 2568 0.199 0.447 0.209 0.031
( Salaried employees 8644 0.187 0.442 0.175 0.069Hourly employees 4108 0.157 0.453 0.170 0.016
The table fully parallels Table 2.5, except that it uses the residuals from estimating the multivariate regression
specification (Panel C of Table 2.3), as shown in equation (1), as a baseline.
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Table 2.7: Robustness I: Alternative specifications and samples definitions
Obs. Average Health-Drug Health-STD Health-401(k)
correlation correlation correlation correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. A system of ordered probits
1 Baseline specification 12,666 0.264 0.55 0.292 0.055
2 Discretizing the 401(k) choice 12,666 0.260 0.550 0.292 0.050
3 Control for coverage tier 12,666 0.264 0.546 0.292 0.056
4 Use only the largest pricing menu 7,722 0.268 0.552 0.277 0.067
5 Include those in opt-out and HMO 15,399 0.230a -
6 Include employees who did not 15,344 0.368b 0.540 0.295
contribute to 401(k)
7 Include those not offered LTD 15,570 0.230c 0.540 0.292 0.052
coverage
8 Exclude those in Health Option 1 10,473 0.223 0.317 0.280 0.009
(due to HRA component)
9 Include only new hires 1,025 0.269 0.569 0.289 0.012
10 Exclude individuals who may have 11,243 0.279 0.627 0.328 0.067
chosen default options
Panel B. Multivariate regressions
1 Baseline specification 12,752 0.188 0.452 0.188 0.057
2 Discretizing the 401(k) choice 12,752 0.184 0.452 0.188 0.045
3 Control for coverage tier 12,752 0.186 0.447 0.187 0.058
4 Use only the largest pricing menu 7,722 0.195 0.452 0.191 0.069
5 Include those in opt-out and HMO 15,409 0.165" - -
6 Include employees who did not 15,402 0.2 57  0.446 0.184 -
contribute to 401(k)
7 Include those not offered LTD 15,675 0.162c 0.442 0.183 0.052
coverage
8 Exclude those in Health Option 1 10,547 0.147 0.226 0.175 0.009
(due to HRA component)
9 Include only new hires 1,044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
10 Exclude individuals who may have 11,323 0.191 0.460 0.197 0.059
chosen default options
This table reports correlation results for variants of the baseline specification.
Panels B and C respectively, Panel A uses the system of ordered probits and
Analogously to Table 2.3,
Panel B uses multivariate
regressions. Column (2) shows the simple average of the 15 pairwise correlations, and columns (3) through
(5) report correlations for specific pairs. For ease of comparison, row 1 replicates the baseline specification
from Table 2.3. Each row shows a single deviation from the baseline specification. Row 2 replaces the
continuous 401(k) measure with a discretized ordinal measure ranging from 1 to 3, row 3 includes coverage
tier (based on health coverage) fixed effects, and row 4 reports results using the largest (modal) benefit menu
(and therefore does not require menu fixed effects). Rows 5-10 report results from alternative samples. In
rows 5, 6, and 7 we include employees that were excluded from the baseline sample, and in these cases we
omit the domain that had disqualified these employees from the baseline sample. Therefore, the average
correlations in these cases are not directly comparable to the baseline specification, although the individual
pairs are. In row 9 we limit the sample to new hires (defined as job tenure at Alcoa of less than two years).
In row 10 we exclude the approximately 10% of the employees whose choices are fully consistent with the
default options in all insurance domains, and are therefore potentially "passive" choosers.
a The comparable average correlation (that is, over the 6 pairs that do not include health and drug coverage)
in the baseline specification is 0.234 (Panel A) and 0.169 (Panel B).
b The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include 401(k) choices) in the
baseline specification is 0.374 (Panel A) and 0.262 (Panel B).
c The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include long-term disability
coverage) in the baseline specification is 0.237 (Panel A) and 0.169 (Panel B).
99
Table 2.8: Robustness II: Non-Alcoa investments
Obs. Average Health-Drug Health-STD Health-401(k) Drug-401(k) Dental-401(k) STD-401(k) LTD-401(k)
correlation correlation correlation correlation correlation correlation correlation correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. A system of ordered probits
1 Baseline specification 12,666 0.264 0.55 0.292 0.055 0.071 0.046 0.032 0.02
2 Housing Subsample 4,278 0.271 0.541 0.298 0.049 0.088 0.055 0.009 0.007
3 House Equity < $50,000 1,362 0.282 0.502 0.343 0.027 0.087 0.091 0.005 0.015
4 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,523 0.282 0.592 0.306 0.058 0.074 0.001 0.018 0.014
5 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,355 0.253 0.514 0.239 0.065 0.104 0.081 0.019 -0.004
6 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 1,731 0.288 0.608 0.305 0.114 0.071 0.036 0.011 0.004
7 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 10,935 0.258 0.539 0.285 0.044 0.070 0.046 0.032 0.023
Panel B. Multivariate regressions
1 Baseline specification 12,752 0.188 0.452 0.188 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.029 0.018
2 Housing Subsample 4,309 0.195 0.441 0.203 0.051 0.070 0.041 0.016 0.012
3 House Equity < $50,000 1,399 0.202 0.410 0.229 0.042 0.075 0.072 0.016 0.017
4 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,544 0.199 0.488 0.211 0.049 0.052 0.000 0.013 0.014
5 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,366 0.184 0.417 0.167 0.066 0.083 0.061 0.022 0.003
6 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 1,740 0.212 0.499 0.225 0.089 0.049 0.030 0.016 0.004
7 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 11,012 0.181 0.441 0.176 0.050 0.056 0.034 0.029 0.020
This table reports correlation results for various subsamples. Analogously to Table 2.3, Panels B and C respectively, Panel A uses the system of
ordered probits and Panel B uses multivariate regressions. Column (2) shows the simple average of the 15 pairwise correlations, and columns (3)
through (9) report correlations for specific pairs. For ease of comparison, row 1 replicates the baseline specification from Table 2.3. Row 2 presents
the results for approximately one-third of the sample for which we were able to match data on their housing equity. Rows 3 through 5 present results
for various subsamples of this "housing subsample," as indicated. Rows 6 and 7 present results separately for individuals who have maxed out their
possible 401(k) contributions and those who have not.
Table 2.9: Predictive power of different variables
Regressors Dependent variable
Health Drug Dental STD LTD 401(k)
Choices in other domains 0.227 0.243 0.102 0.374 0.368 0.004
Predicted and realized risk 0.070 0.107 0.056 0.043 0.023 0.024
Demographics 0.037 0.044 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.043
Choices in less related domains 0.082 0.102 0.077 0.063 0.054 0.004
All of the above 0.247 0.292 0.144 0.394 0.378 0.046
Each entry in the table reports the adjusted R2 from a separate OLS regression of the dependent variable
shown in the column heading. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the enumerated coverage choice
in the domain given by the column header, after partialing out benefit menu fixed effects. The regressors
are given by the row header. "Choices in other domains" contain the vector of the enumerated choices in all
five other domains. "Predicted and realized risk" refers to a vector of both predicted and realized risks in all
domains (see Section 2.3.1 for more details). "Choices in less related domains" omits the other choice which
is most correlated with the dependent variable (Drug in Health and Health in Drug, Drug in Dental, LTD
in STD and STD in LTD, Health in 401(k)). Demographics consist of age, age squared, dummy variables
for gender, race, and employee type (hourly or salary), job tenure in Alcoa, annual wage, and a dummy for
single coverage tier (as a proxy for family composition).
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Table 2.10: Model-based results
Obs. All domains All insurance Three CARA Three CRRA
domains domains domains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Minimum overlap 11,898 5% 26% 35% 10%
2 Baseline specification 11,898 31% 38% 56% 69%
3 Restricted: A = y = 1 11,898 8% 31% 44% 61%
4 Restricted: flexible A only on 401(k); -y = 1 11,898 28% - - 61%
Results for different demographics groups:
5 Females 2,666 30% 35% 48% 71%
6 Males 9,232 31% 37% 55% 69%
7 Over 55 years old 1,533 35% 45% 60% 70%
8 Under 35 years old 2,356 28% 34% 52% 64%
9 Higher wage 3,074 21% 28% 48% 64%
10 Lower wage 2,848 40% 47% 61% 76%
Alternative specifications:
11 Discretize 401(k) 11,898 30% - - 70%
12 Restricted: I = 1 11,898 30% 36% - -
13 Alternative definition of income 11,898 30% 38% - -
Alternative samples:
14 Housing Subsample 4,054 30% 38% 56% 68%
15 House Equity < $50,000 1,305 33% 40% 57% 70%
16 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,453 32% 40% 57% 69%
17 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,296 26% 34% 54% 64%
18 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 9,394 30% 37% 55% 69%
19 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 2,504 36% 44% 63% 71%
This table reports results from the exercise described in Section 2.4 (and in additional detail in Appendix
2.B). Each entry in columns (2) through (5) represents our estimate of the fraction of individuals whose entire
vector of choices (as given by the column header) could be rationalized given the analogous specification (as
given by the row header). Specifically, column (2) reports the fraction of individuals whose estimated ranges
of risk aversion in each domain overlap across all six domains; column (3) reports the fraction with overlap
across the five insurance domains (that is, not including 401(k) allocation), column (4) reports the fraction
with overlap across the three domains associated with absolute risk (health, drug, and dental), and column
(5) reports the fraction with overlap across the three relative risk domains (short- and long-term disability,
and 401(k) allocation).
Each row reports a different specification. The first row report the minimum fraction of individuals with
overlap in their risk aversion ranges; this is the fraction of individuals who always choose the least risky
option in each domain. The second row reports our baseline specification, as described in the text. All other
rows report variants of the baseline, each with a single deviation from the baseline as described. In row
3 we constrain all six Ad's and -y to be 1. In row 4 we restrict -y and five of the Ad's to be 1 but free up
the A401(k) parameter. Rows 5-10 repeat the analysis for different demographics groups, where old (young)
individuals are defined as older than 55 (younger than 35), and high (low) income are defined as greater than
$72,000 (less than $36,000) annual wages (approximately the top and bottom quartiles of wages). In row
11 we discretize the 401(k) asset allocation decision into three choices: invest nothing in the risk-free asset,
invest all in the risk-free asset, or "in between", which we parameterize based on the average risk free share
(35 percent) of those in this category. In row 12 we restrict y to be 1. In row 13 we define income (used
to convert between each individual's coefficient of relative and absolute risk aversion) as annual income plus
5 percent of 401(k) balances, instead of as annual income as in the baseline specification. Rows 14 through
19 reports results from the baseline specification using various subsamples of our population. Specifically, in
row 14 we limit the results to the sample for whom we were able to link in data on housing wealth. Rows 15
through 17 show results stratified by housing equity level. Rows 18 and 19 split the sample between those
who have contributed the maximum possible amount to their 401(k) and those who have not maxed out
their possible 401(k) contributions.
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2.A Appendix: A calibrated model of short-term and
long-term disability insurance choices
In this appendix we describe the details of the calibration exercise that we mention in the beginning
of Section 2.4. The objective of the calibration exercise is to illustrate how one could produce a
benchmark for the correlation coefficients that would be produced if the data were generated by
a model with completely domain-general risk preferences, but were subject to the non-linearities
and discreteness transformations that arise from the ordinal coverage choice data. We focus on
short- and long-term disability, which are the domains that are most similar to each other in their
structure of choices and risks. This allows us to rely on a single choice model for both domains,
rather than on a domain-specific model. We estimate the correlation in the simulated choices
between the modal short-term disability menu (of 60%, 80%, and 100% replacement rates) and the
modal long-term disability menu (of 50%, 60%, and 70% replacement rates), using the observed
prices.
Our calibration exercise assumes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) per-period utility
function, whereby the expected utility from a given disability insurance contract j (which specifies
a given wage replacement rate and is associated with a given annual premium) is
Eu(c)=Ej[ 1-d+RRj*d-pj)1
where d is the (ex-ante random) fraction of days in a year the employee claims (due to disability),
RR is the wage replacement rate associated with coverage j, the premium pj is measured per dollar
of (annual) wage, and y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The individual is maximizing
expected utility over the duration under consideration, which we assume to be one-year for short-
term disability and four years for long-term disability (as after about four years, our claim data is
truncated, although only few disability claims in the data remain active that long). We assume an
annual discount factor of .95 for long-term disability.
We assume the distribution of -y in the population to be lognormal with parameters y and -.
The parameters y and a are chosen to produce an average relative risk aversion coefficient of 3
or 0.7 (depending on the specification) and a coefficient of variation of risk aversion of 10. The
coefficient of variation (of 10) matches the estimates reported by Cohen and Einav (2007). Cohen
and Einav (2007) mention higher numbers of relative risk aversion, but they essentially estimate
absolute risk aversion, so mapping it to this lower levels of relative risk aversion amounts to simply
assuming lower relevant wealth (the simulated correlation remain about the same when we instead
use an average coefficient of risk aversion of 30, and maintain the same coefficient of variation). To
calibrate the distribution of risk (missed days), we use the risk realization of short- and long-term
disability in the data to define eight risk groups based on demographics (using all combinations of
gender, race, and employment status indicators), which produces a fairly large heterogeneity in ex-
ante risk across individuals. We assume a sample size identical to our baseline sample (12,752) and
for each individual in the calibrated sample we draw a risk aversion coefficient from the distribution
of y, assume that he or she knows the distribution of risks for his or her risk group, and compute
the optimal coverage choice from the offered menus of short- and long-term disability coverage.
Using this model we simulated choices from the modal short- and long-term disability menus
offered in the data, and correlated these choices with each other. When we calibrate the average
coefficient of relative risk aversion in the sample to 3, we find that the correlation between short-
and long-term disability insurance ranges from 0.18 to 0.55, depending on the extent of correlation
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in risks we allow across domains. The range is somewhat larger (0.07 to 0.53) when we calibrate
the average coefficient of relative risk aversion to 0.7. These reported ranges are just below the
empirical correlation of about 0.6 for these two domains, as reported in Table 2.3.
2.B Appendix: Implementation details for the model-
based approach of Section 2.4
This appendix provides additional details that underlie the baseline exercise reported in Section
2.4 (and Table 2.8).
Health, Dental, and Drug coverage. The risks in these three domains are measured in dollars.
Therefore, for our baseline estimates, we assume a CARA utility function in these domains. That is,
we use equation (3) to compute individual i's expected utility from option j by substituting ui (x) =
- exp (-rix), incorporating the plan details (regarding deductible and out-of-pocket maximum)
to compute oopj (c), and grouping individuals into risk categories by their coverage tier (single
coverage, employee plus spouse, employee plus children, and family coverage) and randomly drawing
from individuals' realization of total medical expenditure c.
Short-term and Long-term disability coverage. The risks (and premiums) in these domains are
all proportional to the employee's (annual) wage. It is therefore natural to assume a CRRA utility
function for these two domains. Again, we use equation (3) to compute individual i's expected utility
from option j by substituting ui (x) = x 1 --Y, assuming all individuals are grouped at the same risk,
drawing the claimed disability days for each individual, and computing oopj (d) = (1 - RRj) d
where RRj is the wage replacement rate associated with coverage j. A minor complication arises in
the case of long-term disability coverage, where the data on realized risks is slightly censored (for
long spells of disability absence), so we impute the full predicted absence based on the observed
propensity to remain on (long-term) disability over the first four years. Because the coverage
horizon is much longer and could span more than a year, we also discount subsequent benefits at
an annual rate of 0.95.
Determining cutoffs and defining intervals. Given a value of Ad for domain d with J options,
we partition [0, oo] into J intervals:
[ri (Ad) = 0, r 2 (Ad)], . . ., [rk (Ad) , rk+1 (Ad)], ... , [rj (Ad) , rJ+1 (Ad) = oo], such that an individual
with a given distribution of risk and a risk aversion parameter in interval [rk (Ad) , rk+1 (Ad)] will
choose option k. For a given Ad, a menu of options and distribution of risk, we first find the level
of risk aversion rk,k+1 (Ad) such that an individual is indifferent between choices k and k + 1, where
option k + 1 has the higher premium and higher coverage. There are a couple of cases to bear in
mind:
" If a risk neutral individual prefers option k + 1 over option k, then option k is dominated
and choice k + 1 cannot be rationalized. In such a case, some of the intervals will be empty.
" For lower values of lambda, the risk might be small enough that option k should never be
chosen. In the limit, if A = 0, then only the lowest coverage option can be rationalized and,
again, some of the intervals are empty.
" For all other cases, we can find a cutoff value rkk+1 such that an individual faced with options
k and k + 1 will choose option k for r < rkk+1 and option k + 1 for r > rk,k+1.
Using the procedure described above, we compute J (J - 1) /2 cutoff values for each pair of
options, which define the relevant intervals of risk aversion implied by each coverage choice in the
data.
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401(k) choice. Here, because the decision is continuous, we slightly deviate from the description
provided in the paper, and instead rely on the same exercise performed in the seminal paper of
Friend and Blume (1975). As they show, one can convert one's share invested in a risky asset
ac to one's coefficient of relative risk aversion 7;, by applying gi = _E(rr-rf ). Our inclusion
ai U2
of domain-specific adjustment A401(k) simply implies that A401(k) multiplies the right-hand side,
illustrating how this manipulation frees up the level of risk aversion. We use the average return
of the safe funds to compute the (monthly) risk-free return E (rf) = 0.0036. We aggregate all the
funds in out sample invested in the risky funds to compute an estimate of the expected (monthly)
return of the "risky" asset and its standard deviation, which are given by E (rm) = 0.0103 and
-m = 0.0285. Taken together, this implies that E(rm-rf) = 8.35. We further assume that people
who invest all their 401(k) contributions in the risky fund are at a corner solution, implying that
for such individuals we obtain that 7y; E 0, A401(k) E(rmrU2)
Conversion between absolute and relative risk aversion. For each individual we have three
intervals for their value of absolute risk aversion, based on their health, dental, and drug coverage
choice, and three intervals (or a point in some cases for 401(k)) for the value of their relative
risk aversion from short-term and long-term disability coverage and their 401(k) allocation. To
evaluate the consistency of choices across all six domains, we need to convert the absolute risk
aversion intervals into relative-risk aversion. We use another free parameter y (which could be
interpreted as converting annual income to wealth), as well as the data on the individual's annual
income, such that RRA = ARA x wage x y, where RRA and ARA are the coefficients of relative
and absolute risk aversion, respectively. In Appendix Tables A3(a) and A3(b) we report results
from analogous specifications where we use CRRA and CARA, respectively, for all domains, and
use the observed data on annual income to convert absolute risk to relative risk and vice-versa.
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Appendix Table Al: Coverage Details for Insurance Plans
Summary of Key Coverage Details
(1)
Additional details
(2)
Health Insurancea
Option 1 b
Option 2
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Prescription Drug Insurance
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Dental Insurance
Option 1
Option 2
Short-Term Disability Insurance'
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Long-Term Disability Insurance'
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Deductible
(In-network / out-of-network)
3,000/ 6,000
1,500 / 3,000
1,000/ 2,000
500/ 1,000
0/ 500
Cost sharing for branded drugs
(retail / mail order)
50% / 40%
40% / 30%
30%/20%
Per person Deductible /
Maximum annual benefit
50 / 1000
25 / 2000
Wage replacement rate
mostly 60% (sometimes 40%)
mostly 80% (sometimes 60%)
mostly 100% (sometimes 80%)
Replacement rate
mostly 50%
mostly 60%
mostly 70%
After satisfying the annual deductible, cost sharing is 10% in-network and 30% out-of-
network for all options. All options also specify in-network and out-of-network out-of-
pocket maximums, but these are rarely binding. Preventive care is covered in full under
all coverage options.
All options have cost-sharing of 10% for generic (non-branded) mail order drugs and
20% for generic retail drugs. All options have a $50 deductible ($100 for family) and a
$50 ($100 for mail-order) maximum per prescription.
The family deductible is double the per-person amount. Both plans fully cover
preventative care, provide identical coverage for other special treatments. Oral surgery is
covered at 50% under option 1 and 100% under option 2. Orthodontia is not covered
under option 1 and is covered at 50% under option 2.
Salary workers have 100% replacement rate for first two weeks of disability under all
options; all options provide up to 26 weeks of benefits.
All long-term disability coverage is payable after 26 weeks of disability (when the shirt-
term disability coverage is capped).
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible
exception of health insurance option 1; see note b and text for details). Column (1) summarizes key features
of each option. Column (2) provides additional details.
a Health insurance: deductibles are shown for the non-single coverage tier; deductibles for single coverage
are half what is shown.
b Option 1 includes a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes $1,250 in tax-free
money each year that the employee can use to fund eligible out of pocket health care expenses. Any balance
remaining at the end of the year can be rolled over to pay for future out of pocket costs. See text for more
details.
C Short-term and Long-term disability benefits (column (1)) are proportional to the employee's wage.
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Appendix Table A2: List of funds available for 401(k) allocation
Fund name (Asset Class) Monthly return
Sharea Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Classified (by us) as "Risk Free":
GIC/Stable Value (Fixed Income) 24.47% 0.35 0.02 0.31 0.37
Vanguard Total Bond 3.95% 0.42 0.83 -1.09 1.92
All other classified as risky:
American Balanced (Balanced Equity) 10.58% 0.65 1.36 -2.34 2.89
Inv. Co. of America (Large Cap US Equity) 9.62% 0.83 1.84 -3.82 3.86
AMCAP (Large US Equity) 6.77% 0.66 2.06 -4.19 4.01
Vanguard Institutional Index (Large Cap US Equity) 9.42% 0.79 2.21 -4.18 4.43
MSDW International Equity 4.09% 1.25 2.32 -3.30 4.92
New Perspective (International Equity) 5.34% 1.49 2.72 -4.13 6.32
Putnam OTC (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.23% 1.01 3.40 -6.35 7.45
Small Cap Core (Small Cap US Equity) 0.30% 0.29 3.44 -6.95 7.90
Putnam Vista (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.71% 0.56 3.55 -8.58 6.75
MSDW Emerging Markets 2.62% 3.13 5.83 -11.69 15.03
Company (Alcoa) Stock Fund 15.90% 1.30 6.71 -8.85 16.79
Benchmarks during the same period:
Risk freeb -- 0.37 0.05 0.26 0.43
S&P 500 - 0.63 2.21 -4.40 4.33
Employee contributions to their 401(k) accounts can be made with either pre- or after-tax dollars. Employees
can contribute 1-16% of eligible pay with some additional restrictions for some highly paid employees. In
our sample, Alcoa usually matches 100% of pre-tax contributions, up to 6% of eligible pay. Employer
(Alcoa) contributions are always invested in the company stock and can only be moved to a different fund
after two years. In the 2004 data that we are using, the above 13 funds are available for contributions
(sorted by the standard deviation of monthly returns). In the analysis we use as a measure of riskiness of
the portfolio the share of employee contributions invested in those (two) funds that are presented as least
risky. Indeed, as apparent from the table, these two funds exhibit less volatility (and mostly lower expected
return). Employees also have the option to invest in a personal choice retirement account in which they
have access to other funds besides the 13 funds just described. Direct contributions to this fund are not
possible, only transfers, and we do not have detailed data on the composition of investments in these funds.
For our analysis, we use only direct employee contributions. In 2004 only about 28 percent of the sample
rebalances and 24 percent of the sample changes the allocation of their contributions. The average employee
contribution in the baseline sample (which restricts attention to non-zero contributions) is around $4,600.
About 40 percent of the sample has no contributions to the risk free funds, and about 17 percent invest all
their contributions in the risk free funds. Just over 40 percent of the sample has some employee contributions
invested in company stock.
The series of returns is based on monthly returns over the 29 month period from August 2005 to December
2007, which was the longest time period for which we have consistent returns data for all the funds. Returns
data are from the Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP) when available, or from Hewitt (when
CRSP data are not available, for the few funds that are not publicly traded).
a We compute the share of dollars contributed to each fund out of total 401(k) contributions made by all
employees in our baseline sample.
b For the risk-free benchmark we use the CRSP three-month Fama Risk Free Rates series, which is derived
from average lending and borrowing rates.
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Appendix Table A3(a): Model-based results using a CRRA-utility function in all domains
Obs. All domains All insurance Three CARA Three CRRAdomains domains domains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Minimum overlap 11,898 5% 26% 35% 10%
2 Baseline specification 11,898 31% 37% 54% 68%
3 Restricted: X = y = 1 11,898 9% 31% 44% 61%
4 Restricted: flexible X only on 40 1(k); y 1 11,898 28% -- -- 61%
Results for different demographics groups:
5 Females 2,666 32% 40% 56% 70%
6 Males 9,232 30% 36% 53% 69%
7 Over 55 years old 1,533 35% 43% 61% 69%
8 Under 35 years old 2,356 28% 34% 56% 64%
9 Higher wage 3,074 22% 27% 49% 64%
10 Lower wage 2,848 40% 47% 61% 76%
Alternative specifications:
11 Discretize 401(k) 11,898 31% -- -- 68%
12 Restricted: y = 1 11,898 -- -- -- --
13 Alternative definition of income 11,898 31% 36% 54% 68%
Alternative samples:
14 Housing Subsample 4,054 29% 35% 53% 67%
15 House Equity < $50,000 1,305 32% 37% 55% 69%
16 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,453 30% 36% 53% 68%
17 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,296 26% 31% 50% 64%
18 Maxed out 40 1(k) contributions 9,394 29% 35% 53% 68%
19 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 2,504 35% 42% 58% 70%
This table replicates Table 2.10 in the paper, but instead of using different
domains and then mapping between absolute and relative aversion, here we
utility functions for different
use a CRRA utility function
for all domains by using the observed annual income to map the absolute (dollar) risks in Health, Drug,
and Dental insurance to relative risks. Everything else parallels Table 2.10; see Table 2.10's notes for more
details.
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Appendix Table A3(b): Model-based results using a CARA-utility function in all domains
Obs. All domains All insurance Three CARA Three CRRAdomains domains domains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Minimum overlap 11,898 5% 26% 35% 10%
2 Baseline specification 11,898 26% 37% 55% 57%
3 Restricted: X = y = 1 11,898 8% 31% 44% 57%
4 Restricted: flexible k only on 401(k); y = 1 11,898 26% -- - 57%
Results for different demographics groups:
5 Females 2,666 27% 35% 48% 61%
6 Males 9,232 26% 34% 53% 57%
7 Over 55 years old 1,533 31% 42% 60% 61%
8 Under 35 years old 2,356 22% 32% 54% 50%
9 Higher wage 3,074 17% 28% 48% 46%
10 Lower wage 2,848 36% 47% 63% 70%
Alternative specifications:
11 Discretize 401(k) 11,898 26% -- - 57%
12 Restricted: y = 1 11,898 - -- - -
13 Alternative definition of income 11,898 26% 35% 52% 57%
Alternative samples:
14 Housing Subsample 4,054 25% 35% 54% 55%
15 House Equity < $50,000 1,305 28% 38% 55% 57%
16 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,453 26% 37% 55% 58%
17 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,296 21% 31% 51% 50%
18 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 9,394 25% 34% 52% 56%
19 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 2,504 31% 42% 61% 63%
This table replicates Table 2.10 in the paper, but instead of using different utility functions for different
domains and then mapping between absolute and relative risk aversion, here we use a CARA-utility function
for all domains by using the observed annual income to map the relative risk (in short- and long-term
disability insurance and in 401(k)) to dollars. Everything else parallels Table 2.10; see Table 2.10's notes for
more details.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Hospital Regulation on
Input Mix: Evidence from the
Nurse-Ratio Legislation in California
3.1 Introduction
The growth rate of health care costs has been a policy issue for decades. Despite this, we still
know little about what the main drivers of cost growth are and how to bend the cost curve.
According to a recent report released by the American Hospital Association (March, 2011)
as much 35 percent of the overall growth in hospital costs can be attributed to an increase
in labor costs. This paper examines the effect of a minimum nurse staffing legislation in
California on hospital labor input mix and costs.
The Medicare switch to prospective payment in 1983 created strong incentives for hos-
pitals to substitute away from labor towards more capital inputs (Acemoglu, Finkelstein
2008). The trend continued through the 1990s with the increase in managed-care insurance.
This spurred a strong movement towards nurse unionization and the adoption of staffing
legislation. As of December 2012, 13 states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation
to address nurse staffing and a federal legislation, the Registered Nurse Safe Staffing Act,
is under consideration.' California is currently the only state to have enacted minimum
staffing requirements that mandate nurse to patient ratios. Given the increased interest in
minimum staffing requirements, it is important to understand the costs and benefits of such
legislation. 2
'Seven of these states require hospitals to have staffing committees responsible for plans and staffing
policy. Five states require some form of disclosure or public reporting.
2For more details on the legislations see:
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A large literature on the effect of nurse staffing on patient outcomes finds strong evidence
of nurse ratios improving patient outcomes (Aiken et. al., 2002). However, results are
generally cross-sectional and do not deal with the endogeneity of nurse staffing. A more
recent paper by Cook et. al. looks at the effect of the California legislation on various patient
outcomes that are considered more nurse-intensive, such as failure to rescue and pressure
ulcers. They find no effect of the increase in nurse staffing on these patient outcomes.
Input-based regulation restricts a firm's input choices and moves the firm away from an
efficient production level. Holding input prices constant, regulation raises the production cost
for a given unit of output. To the extent that regulation also affects input prices by increasing
demand for a particular input, the increase in costs can be amplified.3 As mentioned above,
the existing research on staffing legislation focuses on the effect of nurse staffing on patient
outcomes. There is very little discussion of the effect of this legislation on costs. Labor
costs are typically a hospital's largest expense; for reimbursement purposes, CMS estimates
that around 70 percent of a hospital's total expenses comprise of labor-related cost elements
(MedPAC, March 2003). In addition, nurses are the largest share of hospital employment.
Given the shortage of nurses in some of parts of the country, increasing demand through
nurse staffing legislation can put an upward pressure on wages that can increase total costs
by even more than the direct effect of hiring more nurses.
In this paper, I will examine the effect of the legislation on the patient-to-nurse staffing
ratio, licensed nurse hours and aides hours, licensed nurse skill ratio, operating costs, and
closures. Using variation in the pre-legislation number of patients per nurse, I estimate the
effect of the legislation for hospitals that were relatively more or less constrained. I examine
whether hospitals with different ratios experienced differential changes in their outcomes in
the years leading up to the implementation of the legislation, and how the trends change
around the time of the implementation.
I find that the legislation did have the desired effect in decreasing the patient-to-nurse
ratio, despite concerns about lack of enforcement. Units decreased their number of patients
per nurse by increasing their licensed-nurse hours, with no decrease in total patient days or
length of stay. Approximately 25 percent of all units close during my sample period; units
with higher baseline ratios are relatively less likely to close. However, I find no change in
these trends around the time of the implementation of the nurse-staffing mandate for units
with different baseline ratios. I find a significant decrease in nurse aides per patient day.
Nurse-aide inputs decline by approximately 5 percent in units at the 75 th percentile of the
http://www.safestaffingsaveslives.org/WhatisANADoing/StateLegislation/default.aspx (accessed Decem-
ber 10, 2012).
3Between 2004 and 2007, wages for RNs and LVNs increased by 15 to 20%.
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baseline ratio compared to units at the 2 5th percentile. In addition, the registered nurse
share of total licensed nurses declines slightly, as hospitals employ more LVNs in order to
comply with the requirement. I find that total operating costs increase by approximately
5.4 percent for units at the 75th percentile relative to units at the 2 5th percentile.
Because of the large sample attrition during this period, I also conduct the analysis on
a balanced panel of units in the robustness checks. The estimated effects are similar to the
main specification. An additional concern for the estimation is the existence of pre-trends
for some of the outcomes. Due to the identification strategy, which uses variation in the
ratio as of 2000, instrumented for with year 1997, I restrict my sample of analysis to years
1999 to 2007. Therefore, I only have three years of pre-implementation data to test for
pre-trends and there are concerns about mean reversion. To address these concerns, I also
estimate a specification that controls for a linear trend interacted with the baseline ratio. The
estimates are slightly smaller and no longer significant for the labor substitution outcomes
and operating costs. In addition, I estimate the baseline specification on a sample of units
that were not subject to the current legislation. These are intensive-care and coronary-care
units, which already had a staffing mandate in place, and skilled nursing units which were
not subject to a staffing mandate. I find much smaller effects for these units.
Most of the literature on nurse staffing focuses on the effect of staffing on patient out-
comes. Much of this literature takes a partial equilibrium approach and ignores other inputs
in the hospital that relevant for patient care. At the same time, much of this literature does
not take into account the additional costs imposed by such legislation on hospitals. This
paper adds to this literature by providing some evidence on both of these outcomes.
Other papers have looked at the impact of the California nurse staffing legislation. Aiken
et. al. (2010) use a survey questionnaire sent to nurses in California and two other states
to compare the work environment and changes after the introduction of the ratio mandate.
One-third of the nurses in their survey reported a decrease in the use of unlicensed personnel
to provide direct patient care. McHugh et. al. (2011) find that hospitals primarily used
more highly skilled registered nurses to meet the staffing mandate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides important
background information on the nurse staffing legislation in California. Section 3.3 presents
a simple neoclassical model of input-mix regulation and the implications of the regulation
on input choices and costs. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.4.1 provides some
descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 3.6 shows
the main results. Section 3.7 provides some robustness analysis and section 3.8 concludes.
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3.2 Legislative Background
In October 1999 the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 394. This legislation directed
the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) to develop "minimum, specific, and
numerical licensed nurse-to-patient ratios by licensed nurse classification and by hospital
unit" for general acute care hospitals, but did not give a recommendation for what these ratios
should be. The California Nurses' Association (CNA), the California Hospital Association
(CHA) and other industry groups made proposals for the final ratios. For general medical
and surgical units, the CNA proposed a ratio of one nurse to three patients, compared to
a ratio of one nurse to ten patients proposed by the CHA. Given the uncertainty over the
specifics of the ratio requirements, it is unlikely that hospitals would have responded at this
time by changing their nurse staffing.
In response to these very different proposals, the CDHS decided to conduct its own
research, which postponed the implementation of the legislation by a couple of years. The
proposed ratios were announced in January 2002, to be implemented starting in July 2003.
The final ratios were announced in mid-2002 and phased in starting in 2004 until 2008.
The governor attempted to halt the process in November 2004, but the Sacramento County
Superior Court invalidated the suspension in March 2005. Therefore, the timeline for the
implementation of the legislation does not have a clear post period. Hospitals might be
reacting to the legislation as early as 2002, when the draft ratios were first announced. Since
the initial proposals were so different, it is unlikely that hospitals implemented the more
stringent staffing ratios before 2002. In my analysis I will use a flexible specification that
allows me to see when hospitals start responding.
The final ratios differed by type of unit. For example, the final ratio for medical and
surgical units was set at one nurse for five patients, phased in at one nurse for six patients
until 2005. Pediatric acute units had a ratio requirement of one nurse for four patients.
Psychiatric acute units had a ratio requirement of one nurse for six patients. Intensive care
units, neonatal intensive care and coronary care had mandated ratios of 1 nurse for two
patients since late 1970s; these were not affected by the legislation. No ratios were set for
sub-acute care, skilled nursing care and other long-term care units. This raises concerns
that hospitals could substitute nurses away from these types of units to comply with the
requirement in the regulated units. I will test for spillover effects in these units and also use
them to run a falsification check of my specification.
According to the final formulation of the regulation, the mandated ratio represents the
maximum number of patients that could be assigned to a licensed nurse at any one point:
Licensed nurse-to-patient ratios represent the maximum number of patients
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that shall be assigned to one licensed nurse at any one time. [...] There shall be
no averaging [...] during any one shift nor over any period of time.
This means that the hospital cannot average over a week, a day, or across different units
of the same type within a hospital. This is important for two reasons. First, this means
that even hospitals that were complying with the mandated ratio on average before the
legislation was implemented might have to increase their staffing to comply with the ratio
at all times. The fact that the ratio had to be met at all times imposed additional burden
on hospitals. There were reports of hospitals hiring an extra floating nurse that could cover
rotating lunch breaks. In my analysis I can only construct a measure of the annual average of
the number of patients per licensed nurse. Therefore my analysis will not be able to capture
these micro-level distortions cause by the legislation.
In California, licensed nurses can be either registered nurses (RNs) or licensed vocational
nurses (LVNs). In addition, some hospitals hire contracted temporary nurses, either RNs
or LVNs, to meet periods of high demand. RNs have more years of education and are the
most expensive4 type of nurse. LVNs generally have one year of nurse schooling. They are
supposed to be supervised by RNs, and can only provide basic services such as taking vital
signs and performing laboratory tests; they are not allowed to administer intravenous drugs.
They cannot represent more than half of total staffing, and, under some interpretations of the
legislation, the ratio had to be met entirely with RNs. This means that although hospitals
might have an incentive to substitute towards LVNs, the cheaper type of licensed nurses,
there are some restrictions in place that could have prevented hospitals from doing that. For
the purpose of this analysis I will consider the two types of nurses together and also look at
how the mix of RNs and LVNs changes after the legislation.
The enforcement mechanisms in place are relatively weak. The CDHS has the authority
to fine hospitals, but since the late 1970s, when nurse ratios for intensive care units had been
introduced, no hospitals had ever been fined. Complaints and self-reported violations are
investigated within 2 days if there is evidence of immediate danger for patients, and within
70 days otherwise. If a hospital is found in violation of the regulation they have to file a
plan for remedy. In the first quarter there were 49 complaints, two of which required a plan
for remedy, and 68 self-reported violations (Spetz, 2005).
There are other implicit enforcement mechanisms in place. Medicare and Medicaid re-
quire compliance with state laws and regulations; payments can be revoked retroactively for
failing to comply. California's malpractice cap, which is set at $250,000, does not apply in
4in 2001, the average hourly wage for an RN working in a medical-surgical acute unit was approximately
$29/hour, for an LVN $18/hour and for a nurse aide $12/hour. By 2007, the wages increased to $42/hour
for an RN, $24/hour for an LVN and $16 for a nurse aide.
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cases of negligence; willfully violating regulations constitutes negligence. Probably the most
important factor in monitoring compliance with the law was nurse unions. Although the
enforcement mechanisms seem to be weak, looking at Figure 3-1 showing the distribution of
the number of patients per nurse for medical and surgical acute units in 2000 and 2007, it is
clear that there was a sharp drop in the number of patients per nurse.
3.3 Neoclassical Model of Inpatient Care
In this section, I sketch a neoclassical model of a hospital's input choices for inpatient care
in order to analyze the effects of an input-mix regulation. Throughout, I assume hospitals
are price takers with respect to the labor market for nursing services, their reimbursement
from private and public payers, and the market for materials and supplies necessary for
inpatient stays. Additionally, and critically, hospitals minimize costs. The assumption of
cost minimization is probably a better assumption for certain types of medical care than
others. Following the 1982 Balanced Budget Amendment, which introduced prospective
Medicare payments for inpatient care, hospitals indeed have monetary incentives to reduce
the costs of inpatient stays.
Production of patient discharges is subject to a minimum quality threshold, which here
remains unmodeled. Meeting the minimum quality threshold requires recovery time (which
I denote by D for patient days) and nursing services (N). A patient who receives few
nursing services will require a longer stay, and therefore nursing services and patient days
are substitutes. Patient discharges exhibit constant returns to scale in nursing services
and days: production of P patient discharges can therefore be interpreted as P times the
production of a single patient discharge. Denote this production function by P = P (N, D)
Hospitals have heterogeneous production technologies. Either because of differences in
managerial or organizational factors or differences in complementary technologies, the im-
portance of nursing services in the production of patient discharges differs across hospitals.'
Let 0 be a measure of the relative importance of nurses. A hospital with a higher value of 9
has relatively less nurse-intensive production process. For simplicity, I use a Cobb-Douglas
production function P (N, D; 9) = N1+0 D1+o .
Initially, suppose there is a single type of nurse input. Registered nurses supply NR units
of nurse services at a market wage WRNR. Additionally, suppose the hospital must pay non-
nurse operating costs of WDD in order to provide D days of hospital stay for a single patient.
5For example, some hospitals may have figured out how to break up tasks in a way that allows them to
make better use of aide services, allowing a single nurse to be effective over a larger number of patients.
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The cost-minimizing way to treat P patients for a hospital of type 0 is then
C (P; 0) = min {WNNR + WDD: P (N, D; 0) P}. (1)
NR,D
Given nurse wages, WN, and non-nurse operating costs, WD, a hospital will therefore
optimally choose a patient-day-to-nurse ratio of
-*- = --- . (2)
N* WD
A hospital with a higher value of 0 will therefore have a higher pre-regulation patient-
to-nurse ratio.
3.3.1 Input-Mix Regulation
The California nurse-ratio mandate introduced a constraint on the mix of inputs that can
be used to treat patients by mandating a cap on the patient-to-nurse ratio. Formally, we
can view this type of regulation as a constraint of the form
D < KNR. (3)
Operating under a constraint of this form, a hospital then chooses patient days and
nurse inputs to treat P patients at minimal cost:
C (P, K; 0) = min {wNNR + wDD: P (N,D;0) P,D < KNR. (4)
NR,D
Figure 1 below shows the firm's problem graphically. Absent the regulation, a firm wants to
choose the lowest iso-cost line consistent with P (N, D; 0) P. This corresponds to point
A, where the D = 'ONR ray intersects the iso-patient line. The regulation requires that
the input mix must lie to the southeast of the D = INR curve. The cost-minimizing point
satisfying this constraint is therefore point B, which yields a cost of C (P, ri; 0) that is greater
than C (P; 0).
Tightening the regulation by reducing K corresponds to a clockwise rotation of the D =
KNR line, which causes the firm's choice to move farther to the right along the iso-quant,
yielding higher costs. Additionally, the resulting increase in costs is greater the farther the
hospital is from its ideal point of production: hospitals with higher values of 0 will incur a
greater increase in costs per patient from a decrease in K. These results give the following
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empirical prediction.
D
NR
Figure 1: The unregulated cost-minimizing choice is A, while the regulated cost-minimizing choice is at point
B.
Proposition 1 Let C (P, K; 9) be the solution to (4). Tighter input-mix restrictions (a reduc-
tion in K) result in higher costs per patient: C, < 0. This cost increase is higher for hospitals
with higher values of 9: Cao < 0. Finally, in moving from the unconstrained problem to the
constrained problem, hospitals with higher values of 9 experience a sharper reduction in their
patient-to-nurse ratio: Duc - is increasing in 0.
3.3.2 Regulation with Substitution
I now consider a richer production allowing certain nursing services to be performed by nurse
aides who do not contribute to the mandated patient-to-nurse ratio. Formally, define N to
be a nurse-service index that depends on both the number of registered nurses (NR) and
the number of aides (NA) the hospital employs: N = # (NR, NA), which I assume to exhibit
constant returns to scale but allow for a flexible CES substitution pattern:
#(NR, NA) = (RNfa + aANA) (5)
Absent the regulation, given a desired nurse input of N and given wR, WA, the wage rates
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for RNs and aides respectively, the cost-minimizing composition of nursing staff solves
WN(N) = min{wRNR + wANA : $(NR,NA) > N}. (6)
The solution to (6) will be linear in N: WN (N) = Nw* , where w* , the effective cost
per unit of nurse services, depends on WR, WA, aR, a, and a. Absent input-mix regulation,
I can therefore simplify the analysis by collapsing the choice of nurse composition into a
single-dimensional index.
However, when regulation is introduced that restricts the ratio of patients per registered
nurse, rather than the ratio of patients per unit of nursing services, the problem becomes
more complex. Formally, suppose the regulation takes the same form as in (3) : D < KNR.
The hospital's problem of minimizing the costs of treating P patients becomes the following
two-step problem:
C (P, K; 0) = min {WN (N, D) N + WDD} (7)
N,D
subject to
P(ND;0) > P
and
WN(N, D) = min {wRNR + wANA : #(NR, NA) ND < KNR}.
For a given number of patients P, a constrained hospital will not only substitute towards
nurse inputs, but it will substitute towards a mix of nurse inputs that involves relatively
fewer aides. 'While the full problem is difficult to fully characterize, optimizing the mix of
nurse inputs gives an optimal ratio of aides per patient day of
-D aR 
-
. (8)
D (Ca 7 D K
A tightening of the regulation (corresponding to a reduction in K), holding patient days
fixed, reduces the ratio of aides per patient day. However, a reduction in K will also affect
lengths of stay, which by (8) has a direct effect on aides per patient day. In the solution
to the full problem, a reduction in K leads to a reduction in patient days. This reduction
in patient days is greater for more-constrained hospitals. Therefore, the direct effect of a
reduction in K as well as the indirect effect through its reduction in D lead to a reduction in
the aides-per-day ratio. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose a hospital of type 0 solves (7). Tighter input-mix regulations (a
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reduction in K) result in a reduction in aides per patient day: (N* /D) > 0. Further, this
effect is stronger for hospitals with higher values of 0: N*D) > 0.
Empirically, I use the pre-regulation patient-to-nurse ratio as an empirical proxy of a
hospital's 0, the relative importance it places on nurses. Hospitals with a higher value of 0
place a lower importance on nurses in their production function. Therefore, higher values
of 6 correspond to a higher pre-regulation patient-to-nurse ratio. I use this measure to test
the predictions above. Specifically, I test whether, following the regulation, hospitals reduce
their patient-to-nurse ratios, have a higher operating cost per patient, and substitute away
from nurse aides. Further, I test whether these effects are stronger for hospitals with higher
initial patient-to-nurse ratios. In addition, I also look at the effect of the nurse-staffing
mandate on total costs, the skill composition of licensed nurses and closure of units.
3.4 Data Sources and Sample Selection
My analysis of the nurse staffing legislation uses hospital disclosure data from California's
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) for fiscal years6 1997 to
2007. For the purpose of the analysis, each fiscal year is interpreted as the calendar year
when the report ended.7
The data contain information from annual hospital financial disclosure reports on all
non-federal, general hospitals in California.8 The hospitals have to submit information on
number of beds, inpatient days, costs and revenues, and personnel. The cost and employment
data are reported at the hospital-unit level. Because the legislation imposed different nurse
ratios by unit type, this level of detail is useful for the analysis. 9
The legislation explicitly mandates the maximum number of patients a nurse can be
assigned to at any one time. Using information on the number of productive hours10 by
nurse type - for registered nurses (RNs), licensed vocational nurses (LVNs), and contracted
nurse hours'1 - and total patient days, I can approximate the average number of patients
6 Reports are standardized to a one year length by consolidating multiple reports within a year, and
rescaling the outcomes of interest to 365 days when the submission period is longer than a year.
7For example, most reports for 2001 start on either July 1st 2000, or January 1st 2001 and most end by
December 31st 2001. The hospitals are split evenly between the two start dates, with about 23% of hospitals
falling outside both of these.
8Kaiser does not submit full reports.
91n comparison, other data sources such as the American Hospital Association Hospital Survey only report
nurse staffing for the entire hospital, which makes it difficult to compute service-specific nurse hours.
10Defined as hours actually worked.
"Hospitals only report the total employment of contracted nursing personnel, not separately by nurse
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per licensed nurse.12 This measure might not accurately capture the patient load of each
nurse. The productive hours from the disclosure reports can be an overestimate of the actual
number of hours spent at the bedside (Spetz et. al., 2008). In this case, the measure used
would be an underestimate of the true number of patients per nurse.
The theoretical model predicts a substitution away from other types of nursing personnel.
Empirically, I look at the average number of nurse aide productive hours per patient day. In
addition, I look to see whether the composition of licensed nurse hours changes, by looking
at the share of RN in total licensed nurse hours. Because LVNs are much cheaper, hospitals
could try to meet some of the requirement by hiring more LVNs.
The next set of outcomes of interest relates to costs. The theoretical model predicts a
relative increase in operating costs per patient in hospitals with a higher pre-legislation ratio.
To measure operating costs I exclude depreciation, leases and rentals from the total direct
expenses reported at the unit level in the financial reports.13 Empirically, I look at the effect
on operating costs per patient discharge and total operating costs.
Finally, I am interested in looking at unit closure and reduction in unit capacity. For
this, I use the reported number of beds staffed in the unit. I include closed units with zeros
for the years after the closure occurs. Because the data reporting is very complete, I infer
the year of closure as the last year a hospital-unit appears in the fiscal reports, which will
be censored at 2007, the last year of data.
The final sample includes "comparable",' 4 general acute hospitals. The legislation applied
to acute care, acute psychiatric and specialty hospitals. "Non-comparable" hospitals, such
as Kaiser, are excluded because they do not submit all the variables needed for the analysis.
Due to repeated reporting errors in some cases, I drop units that have outlier measure-
ments for the patient-to-nurse ratio in the pre-legislation years that are used for identifica-
tion.15 Although I am instrumenting for the pre-legislation ratio with measurements from
previous years, certain types of reporting errors are correlated over time and would not be
type. For the main analysis, I include the contracted nurse hours in the total number of licensed nurse
hours. The core results are not sensitive to excluding them from the measure of licensed nurse hours.
1Define the patient-to-nurse ratio (PNR) as productive hourspatient days x 24proucefeiner (RN + LVN + contracted nurses)~
"The other categories which are included are salaries and wages, employee benefits, reclassified physician
and student compensation, professional fees, supplies, purchased services, and other direct expenses.4
""Non-comparable" hospitals, as defined by OSHPD, have unique characteristics and can file modified
annual reports. These are: Kaiser Foundation Hospitals which are allowed to submit consolidated financial
statements and limited financial and payroll data, hospitals with a long-term care (LTC) emphasis, state
hospitals, Psychiatric Health Facilities (PHF) which are licensed to provide short-term acute psychiatric
treatment and Shriners Hospitals.
1 5 Following Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), I drop observations with DFITS values greater than, 2 k/n
where k is the number of estimated coefficients and n is the sample size. This statistic is a summary of the
leverage values and magnitude of the residuals.
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dealt with. 16
The final data is at the hospital unit-year level. I include in the analysis the units for
which I was able to ascertain whether they were subject to a ratio mandate by matching
the description in the legislation to the description of the type of unit in the disclosure
files. The final sample contains definitive observation units, medical/surgical acute units,
pediatric acute units, psychiatric acute - adult and pediatric - units and obstetrics acute
units. In addition, I use intensive care and coronary care units, which were already subject
to a staffing requirement, and sub-acute care and skilled nursing care units, which were never
subject to a requirement, in some robustness checks.
The final sample has 861 units with non-missing information on the patient-to-nurse ratio
in 1997 and 2000, which is required for my specification. There is a significant amount of
closures over this period; only 704 units still appear in my data in 2007.
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 gives the basic descriptive statistics for the key variables for the units in the analysis
sample in 1997 and 2007. The sample is divided into units that are above and below the
median ratio for units of that type in 1997. The average number of patients per nurse for
units below the median was 3.1 and 5.5 for units above the median, respectively. Among
the units that are still open in 2007, the average number of patients per nurse was 3.99" for
units below the median in 1997 and 3.82 for units above the median.
Units with more patients per nurse at the baseline are more likely to be for profit, less
likely to be public and less likely to be rural. They also tend to be larger.
The second set of variables represent measures of inputs for a patient stay. The number
of aides hours per patient day is comparable across the two samples, the length of stay is
slightly longer in units above the median. Expenditures per patient discharge are much
smaller in units with ratios above the median $1009 compared to $349 for hospitals below
the median. The registered nurse share of total licensed nurse hours is comparable for the
two groups.
The last two rows show the probability of closure by 2001, and the probability of closure
after 2001, conditional on still being open in 2001. Units with smaller ratios are relatively
more likely to close.
Figure 3-2 shows the time-series evolution of the average patient to nurse ratio for the two
16For example, one unit reports a number of patients per nurse equal to 2800 in 1998 and 20670 in 1999,
compared to an average of 5.27 for the other units.
"Note that this has a very large standard deviation suggesting some outlier observations. The outliers
were dropped from the data for 1997.
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groups, restricted to a sample of units that do not close over this period. There is significant
convergence between the two groups in 1998 and 1999. This is indicative of mean reversion,
as the two groups were defined based on their 1997 patient-to-nurse ratio. The trends are
relatively stable between 1999 and 2002. After 2002, when the CDHS first announced the
recommended ratios there is a striking convergence in the two groups.
This evidence is only suggestive and could be driven by other changes in the hospital
sector that took place at the same time. In the empirical work that follows I will use the
variation in the patient to nurse ratio across hospitals before the implementation, across
hospitals that were more or less constrained by the legislation, to estimate the effect of the
legislation on the patient to nurse ratio and other inputs of interest.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
The mandated staffing ratios should affect hospitals differently based on their pre-legislation
ratio. Because I do not observe disaggregated staffing levels, I rely on variation in annual
averages to parameterize the degree to which hospitals were affected by the legislation. The
assumption is that hospitals with lower pre-regulation ratios were relatively less affected by
the legislation, compared to hospitals with higher pre-legislation ratios. Motivated by this,
I parameterize the impact of the legislation using the continuous measure of the patient to
nurse ratio in a baseline year (Ri).
Assuming units could exactly meet the staffing requirement, then units with baseline
ratios below the mandated level would not be affected directly by the legislation, but could
be affected by market-level changes in norms and wages. Units with baseline ratios above
the mandated level, which did not meet the staffing requirement, would have to decrease the
number of patients per nurse in order to comply with the regulation.
In practice, because of the stringent staffing requirement which had to be met at all times,
almost all units had to increase their staffing and were affected directly by the legislation.
As can be seen from figure 3-1, for medical-surgical acute units, which had a mandated level
of 5 patients per nurse, the average unit after the implementation has around 3.5 patients
per nurse.' 8 Appendix A shows that variation in the minimum staffing needed to meet
the requirement, which depends on patient loads and unit size, in addition to measurement
error will lead to smaller measured effects compared to a model in which units are able to
18 A unit that always complies with the staffing requirement and has a number of patients that is not a
multiple of 5, will have an average annual ratio strictly below 5. This downward rounding error will be larger
for smaller units. For example, a unit with 7 beds, which is always at capacity, will staff two nurses and
have an annual average PNR of 3.5. In comparison, a larger unit with 27 beds, will always staff 6 nurses
and have an annual average PNR of 4.5.
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exactly match the required level. In addition, because of the heterogeneity in the actual
patient to nurse ratio at which the hospital is able to be in compliance, it is not possible
to define ex-ante which units will not be affected by the legislation. I show in Appendix A
that the marginal effects of a higher ratio is similar for units above and below the mandated
level. Because of this, I will not estimate separate effects for hospitals above and below the
mandated level.
The basic estimating equation uses variation in the baseline ratio across all units and
estimates a single coefficient
Yit = ai + 't + # (log Ri x Postt) + Xit + eit (3.1)
where yzt is the outcome of interest in unit i in year t. In the first specifications, I investigate
the effect on the patient to nurse ratio, and separately on licensed nurse hours and patient
days. The regression includes unit fixed effects ac, year fixed effects -y and linear trends by
unit type.
The coefficient of interest in this specification is #, the coefficient on the interaction of
the log of the initial ratio, log Ri, with an indicator for the period after the ratios were
announced, 2002 to 2007. The coefficient # measures the change in the dependent variable
in units with a higher patient-to-nurse ratio in 2000 relative to units with a lower ratio, after
the legislation was implemented. The specification above is equivalent to using instead a
R20 00
normalized measure log Mandatd Ratio. The magnitude of the coefficient can be interpreted
as the change in the outcome variable for each percent change in the baseline ratio needed
to meet the requirement. The difference in the right hand side variable of interest between
the 75th and 25th percentiles is approximately .50. To interpret the magnitude of the
estimates, it is helpful to set a few benchmarks. Appendix A shows that in a setting with
measurement error, perfect compliance, but heterogeneous post-implementation compliance
levels of staffing, the estimate # is equal to -0.462 when the outcome variable is the patient-
to-nurse ratio. Therefore, in this setting, the relevant benchmark is smaller than -1.
The key identifying assumption in the previous specification is that absent the legislation,
any differences between hospitals with higher and lower ratios would have continued on the
same trend. To investigate this further, I also estimate the following variant of the previous
specification
yit = ai + 7t + # (log Ri x Postt) + #2001 (log Ri x Y2001 ) + Xit + Eit (3.2)
where Y2 001 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year 2001. This serves as a pre-
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specification test to test whether there are any differential trends in the variables of interest
before the implementation of the nurse mandate. The coefficient #2001 can also pick up
hospital responses to the legislation after it was passed, but before any information about
the level of the mandated staffing requirements was released.
In addition, because some of the staffing requirements were phased in and became stricter
over time, I also estimate a specification that allows for the effect to increase linearly over
time
yit = aei + 7yt + # (log Ri x PostTrendt) + #2001 (log Ri x Y2 0 0 1 ) + Xit + eit (3.3)
where the variable PostTrendt is equal to 0 for all the years up to 2001 and goes from 1 to
6 for the years 2002 up to 2007.
I also estimate a more flexible specification which allows a separate coefficient for each
year for the patient to nurse ratio. This allows for time-varying post implementation effects.
Because the legislation was implemented in stages, this specification allows me to see how
the effects changed over time and when the mandated ratio started to be implemented. The
estimated equation is
yit = ai + -yt+#0 (log Ri x Postt) + #(log I x Y) + Xit + Eit (3.4)
Where the summation is over years 1999 to 2007, with 2001 omitted as the reference
category. The terms Y, are indicator variables equal to 1 if r = t. The coefficients of interest
in this regression are #,s, on the interaction term between the log baseline patient-to-nurse
ratio and an indicator variable for each year. This specification allows me to estimate flexibly
the changes in the outcome of interest in hospitals that were more or less affected by the
legislation, based on their initial number of patients per nurse. This is useful for two reasons.
First, I can examine the existence of any pre-existing trends in the outcome of interest that
would suggest that the difference in outcomes between the hospitals is due to other factors.
Second, given the wide window over which the ratio was implemented, and the uncertainty
at the time over the exact date, by estimating flexible post-implementation effects, I can see
when the legislation starts to be implemented.
For most of the analysis I use the patient-to-nurse ratio in 2000 as a measure of the
baseline year. Robustness checks will show that the results are similar if using 1999 instead as
the baseline. By 2000, the legislation had already been passed, but no information about the
CDHS required ratios had yet been released. Using a year close to the date of announcement,
January 2002, and implementation, 2004, has the advantage of having more useful variation
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to parameterize the impact of the staffing requirement. However, there are concerns that
the results will be biased due to mean reversion. In particular, that units that have extreme
values of the ratio due to idiosyncratic factors in the baseline year, will converge towards
the mean in the following years. In this case, any convergence observed can either be due to
mean reversion or to the impact of the legislation. To try to correct for this, I instrument
for the 2000 measure with the value of the ratio in 1997. I use years that are relatively
far apart because consecutive years could have a relatively high degree of autocorrelation in
the idiosyncratic factors. Projecting the 2000 measure onto 1997 removes some of the 2000-
specific idiosyncratic factors. However, the coefficients estimated for years close to 1997 will
now suffer from a similar bias. Therefore, I drop years 1997 and 1998 from the baseline
specifications.
To further confirm that the reported results do not pick effects solely due to mean rever-
sion, I also estimate the previous specifications on a sample of units that were not directly
targeted by the legislation. These consists of intensive care and coronary care units, which
already had a staffing requirement in place, and sub-acute and nursing care units which do
not have a staffing requirement in place. In addition, I report results that control for a linear
trend interacted with the baseline ratio.
The regressions will include data for years 1999 to 2007, three years before the announce-
ment of the mandated ratios and six years after. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital
level to correct for potential correlation across units within a hospital and over time.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Effect on the Patient-to-Nurse Ratio
In this section I investigate whether the nurse mandate had a causal effect on improving
nurse staffing by using variation in the baseline patient to nurse ratio. The outcomes studied
are the log patient to nurse ratio, log licensed nurse hours and log patient days. I find
that the legislation is associated with a significant decrease in the patient to nurse ratio in
hospitals with higher initial ratios. This improvement in staffing per patient comes from an
increase in the total number of licensed nurse hours, and not from a decrease in total patient
days.
Figure 3-3 plots the series of coefficients #, from estimating equation 3.4 on the log patient
to nurse ratio. The coefficients are estimated relative to year 2001 which is normalized to zero.
The dashed lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval for each coefficient. Years to the
right of 2001 occur after the CDHS draft ratios were announced. The coefficients #, measure
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changes in the dependent variable in units with higher pre-implementation ratios relative to
units with lower pre-implementation ratios. This specification allows an investigation of the
identifying assumption that units with higher ratios were not changing relative to units with
lower ratios before the introduction of the staffing mandate, as well as an examination of the
response to the mandate in the years after it was introduced.
The pre-period is flat, units with a higher initial ratio did not experience a significant
change in the ratio relative to units with a lower ratio before 2002. There is a signifi-
cant change in this pattern in 2002, the first year after the actual ratio requirements were
announced. Starting in 2002, units with a higher initial ratio experience a statistically sig-
nificant decrease in their ratio relative to units with a lower baseline ratio. This decrease
accelerates in 2004 and 2005 when the ratios started to be enforced. For each 1 percent
increase in the baseline ratio, hospitals respond by decreasing their current ratio by about
.4 percent by 2007. For reference, with simulated data, under perfect compliance with the
mandate, measurement error, and heterogeneous compliance levels due to differences in unit
size, the estimated effect was -0.462 (see Appendix A).
Table 3.2 summarizes the effects on the patient-to-nurse ratio. Column (1) shows the
results from estimating equation 3.1. The coefficient on the interaction term Post x log Ri000
is estimated as -0.274 with a standard error of 0.056. Given that the difference in the baseline
ratio between units at the 75 th and 25th percentiles within a category is approximately .5,
this estimate suggests that the nurse-staffing mandate implementation was associated with a
decrease in the patient-to-nurse ratio of 13.7 percent for units at the 75th percentile relative
to units at the 2 5 th percentile. The difference in the baseline ratio between units at the
9 5th and 5th percentiles within a category is approximately 1, implying a decrease in the
patient-to-nurse ratio of 27 percent for units at the 9 5th percentile relative to units at the
5 th percentile.
Column (2) investigates whether the differential change in the patient-to-nurse ratio
between high- and low- baseline ratio units was present before the implementation of the
legislation by estimating equation 3.2. The coefficient on the interaction between the 2001
dummy and the baseline ratio is small and not statistically significant, and the estimate of
the key parameter of interest is essentially unchanged. The coefficient on the interaction
between the 2001 dummy and the baseline ratio should also pick up any effects of mean
reversion in the baseline ratio. The results indicate that relative to the earlier years, units
with a larger ratio did not experience a significant change in their patient-to-nurse ratio
relative to units with a low ratio in the year 2001. This supports the identifying assumption
that without the implementation of the staffing ratios, units with different patient-to-nurse
ratios would have experienced similar changes in the outcome of interest.
127
Columns (3) and (4) parameterize the post-implementation period using a linear trend
rather than a single post-implementation dummy. This is motivated by the fact that the
staffing mandate was implemented over many years, starting with the draft ratios announced
in 2002. The estimates of interest in the two specifications are essentially the same. There is
no evidence of a pre-implementation differential trend in column (4). The estimate of -. 085
(standard error .017) suggests that over the three years following the announcement of the
ratios, the legislation was associated with a 12.75 percent decline in the patient-to-nurse
ratio for units at the 75th percentile relative to units at the 2 5th percentile.
Figure 3-4 and table 3.3 investigate the changes in licensed nurse hours and patient days
separately. Columns (1) and (2) investigate the differential change in (log) licensed nurse
hours across units with different pre-implementation ratios. The results suggest that the
implementation was associated with an increase in licensed nurse hours; the estimate of #,
the coefficient on the interaction term Post x log Rf000 is 0.306 (standard error 0.073) implies
an increase of 15 percent in licensed nurse hours for units at the 7 5th percentile relative to
units at the 2 5th percentile. The estimate in column (2), which allows for a linear trend after
implementation, are consistent with this magnitude for the relative change in the first three
years after implementation. The coefficient on the pre-trend term is small and statistically
insignificant.
The results for log patient days in columns (3) and (4) indicate no statistical or sub-
stantive effect of the staffing legislation on patient days. Together, these results imply that
hospitals complied with the new staffing mandate by increasing their licensed nurse hours.
3.6.2 Labor Substitution
The financial disclosure reports contain data on employment (productive hours) across dif-
ferent types of labor. In this section, I analyze the effect of the nurse-staffing legislation on
other labor inputs (nurse aides hours per patient day) and the skill composition of licensed
nurse hours.
According to the theoretical model, the staffing requirement will induce hospitals to
substitute away from other types of nurse inputs, implying that nurse aides hours per patient
day will decline. In addition, as hospitals increase their employment of licensed nurses to
comply with the staffing requirement, they have an incentive to use lower-cost nurses, LVNs.
This substitution is limited to some degree by the fact that LVNs can only provide a limited
amount of services. The question of interest is how the skill ratio of licensed nurses (RN
hours divided by total licensed nurse hours) changes as hospitals are forced to increase their
licensed nurse employment.
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The results are shown in table 3.4 and figure 3-5. The estimates suggest that the imple-
mentation of the staffing requirements is associated with a significant decrease in nurse aides
inputs. Figure 3-5 shows a significant break in trend in 2004, when the new staffing ratios
started to be enforced. The estimate of -. 104 (standard error .061) suggests that nurse aide
inputs per patient day declined by approximately 5 percent in units at the 75 th percentile
relative to units at the 25th percentile. The share of registered nurses in total licensed nurse
employment declined by about 2.6 percent in units at the 75th percentile relative to units at
the 2 5 th percentile.
The results are mainly supportive of the identifying assumption of no differential trends
across units prior to the mandated-staffing implementation. Figure 3-5 shows some evidence
of a differential decline in the registered nurse share in 2000 relative to 1999, but not in 2001.
Section 3.7 will explore the robustness of these results to several specification checks.
3.6.3 Operating Costs
The financial disclosure reports include information on direct expenses at the unit level. To
test the prediction of an increase in operating costs, I construct a measure of direct expenses
that includes salaries and wages, employee benefits, professional fees, supplies, purchased
services, but excludes capital expenses such as depreciation and leases and rentals. The
mean values for these variables are shown in the last row of table 3.5, total operating costs
are reported in millions. According to the model, hospitals that are more constrained (have
a higher baseline ratio) will increase their operating cost per patient (discharge) by more
than hospitals that are less constrained. In addition, I also look to see how total operating
costs change in response to the legislation.
The results are shown in table 3.5 and figure 3-6. The estimates suggest that (log)
operating costs increased in hospitals with a higher ratio relative to hospital with a lower
ratio after the implementation. Figure 3-6 shows a break in trend in 2001, but there is also
a relative increase in costs in 2000, but not in 1999 relative to 2001. The estimate of .108
(standard error .063) suggests that operating costs in creased by approximately 5.4 percent
in units at the 75th percentile relative to units at the 25 th percentile. The coefficient on the
interaction Y2001 x log R?000 is small and statistically insignificant. The estimate in column
(2) which interacts a post-implementation linear trend with the baseline ratio suggests an
increase of 2.25 percent per year in units at the 75t percentile relative to units at the 2 5th
percentile.
The estimates for operating costs per discharge are imprecise and not statistically sig-
nificant. The point estimates also suggest an increase in operating costs per discharge in
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hospitals that were relatively more constrained.
3.6.4 Unit Closure and Length of Stay
The last set of outcomes of interest are more exploratory. One potential concern is that the
implementation of the legislation induced a lot of closures for high-ratio units. To examine
this, I use measures of staffed beds as reported in the disclosure reports. Because the reports
are complete, I can infer unit closure based on the last year a given unit is observed in the
data. I analyze the effect of the nurse-staffing implementation on closure by investigating
the effect on (log) staffed beds + 1, where I include the years after closure as zeros.
Finally, because days and nurse hours are substitutes in the production function, a rela-
tively straightforward prediction of the model is that the number of days per patient (length
of stay) decreases in response to the implementation of the legislation.
The results are shown in table 3.6 and figure 3-7. Figure 3-7 shows a linear trend for (log)
staffed beds suggesting that throughout this period, units with higher initial ratios are less
likely to close relative to units with lower initial ratios. This trend is relatively stable around
the time the staffing requirements were implemented. Consistent with this, the estimates in
table 3.6 suggest that hospitals with a high initial ratio have more staffed beds than hospital
with a lower ratio. In addition, there is evidence of a strong pre-trend. The estimate on the
interaction Y2001 x log R?000 is large and highly significant.
The estimates for length of stay are very imprecise. The point estimate in column (3) is
negative, but not statistically significant. These results suggest no statistically or economi-
cally significant effect of the legislation on length of stay.
3.7 Robustness Check
To test the validity of the identification assumptions, I run a falsification check of the same
main spedification on the sample of units that were not affected by this regulation. This
includes two types of units, intensive care and coronary care units which had been subject
to a staffing mandate of 2 patients per 1 nurse starting in the late 1970s, and sub-acute
and skilled nursing care units which were never subject to a staffing requirement. They
are not an ideal control group as they could be subject to spillovers from other units in
the hospital if, for example, hospitals increase their employment in the regulated units by
moving nurses away from the unregulated units. Alternatively, the new staffing mandate
could change staffing norms throughout the hospital. Indeed, there were discussions at the
time for allowing the CDHS to fine hospitals for not complying with the ratios, which would
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affect enforcement even in intensive care units. It is likely that both of these could affect the
staffing in these units on average, but will not necessarily be correlated with their baseline
ratio. With these caveats, the estimates on the previous outcomes for this sample of units
can give some bounds on the extent to which mean reversion could bias the coefficients.
Table 3.7 shows the results for all the outcomes of interest, from estimating specification
3.3 on the set of units that were not affected by the current staffing mandate. The effect
on the patient-to-nurse units is small and not statistically significant -. 018 (standard error
.017), compared to -. 085 (standard error .017) for the units affected by the legislation. This
suggests that the extent of the bias due to mean reversion is likely to be small.
The estimates for both licensed nurse hours and patient days are positive and statistically
significant. However, the coefficients on the interaction term Y2 001 x log R?000 are similar in
magnitude to the main effects. This suggests that for the unaffected units there is no break
in trend around the time of implementation. The higher-ratio units are changing relative
to the low-ratio units in the same way in 2001, before the implementation, and after. This
suggests that the estimates are just picking up differences in trends in units with a high
baseline ratio relative to units with a low baseline ratio, without a differential change around
the time of the implementation. This is in contrast to the previous results for the treated
units which found a statistically significant effect on licensed nurse hours, with no significant
pre-trend.
The estimates for (log) aides per patient day, registered nurse share, (log) operating cost
per discharge and (log) length of stay are essentially zero. This suggests that these outcomes
were not changing differentially in units with a higher ratio relative to units with a lower
ratio around the time of the staffing implementation in units that were not directly affected
by the current legislation.
The estimate for (log) operating cost is large and statistically significant .066 (standard
error .024). compared to .108 (standard error .063) for affected units. The coefficient on
the interaction term Y2001 x log R?000 is similar in magnitude which suggests that there was
no differential change in total operating cost around the time of the implementation in
unaffected units, compared to affected units.
To further test the identification assumptions and stability of results, table 3.8 reports
the results for some of the robustness checks I performed on all the outcomes of interest.
The first row reproduces the baseline results from estimating equation 3.3 on the outcomes
of interest.
Because of the high rate of unit closure over this period, one possible concern is that
the results are biased by mean reversion. The second set of results show the estimates from
using just the sample of units that have not closed by 2007. The point estimates on this
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different sample are largely unchanged, with, not surprisingly, the effect on staffed beds.
Another possible concern is that using 2000 as the baseline year can bias the results due
to mean reversion in the ratio that occurs close to the date of the implementation. For this
set of results, I use 1999 as the baseline year and instrument for it using 1997. The estimates
are robust to this.
The next set of results reports the estimates from the baseline regression estimated with-
out instrumenting for the 2000 ratio. The estimates are very similar, but show much stronger
pre-trends, possibly due to mean reversion.
Finally, to investigate the concern that the results are spuriously picking up underlying
differential trends in units with different pre-legislation ratios, I add an interaction term
between the patient-to-nurse ratio in 2000, Ri, and a linear trend. Because the pre-legislation
period only consists of three years, I drop the interaction term Y2 001 x log R?000 from this
specification. The estimates are smaller and, except for the patient-to-nurse ratio, no longer
statistically significant. Overall the magnitudes and signs are, however, unchanged. The
estimate of the effect on registered nurse share is an exception and is now positive .011
(standard error .011).
3.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the impact of regulation on hospital input-mix on hospital operating
costs and input-mix choices by looking at the effect of the California minimum nurse-staffing
requirements. I find that hospitals do respond to the legislation; there is a significant amount
of convergence in the patient-to-nurse ratio among hospitals with higher and lower baseline
ratios. Hospitals meet the requirement by hiring more licensed nurses, not by decreasing
total patient days or length of stay. There is a significant amount of closures during this
period. Although I do not find any differential effect of the implementation on units with
higher and lower baseline ratios, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the implementation
affected the overall level of closures across all units. Due to the relatively short pre-period,
there are concerns of pre-existing trends in some of the outcomes of interest. I find suggestive
evidence that hospitals substitute away from lower skilled nurse aides which were not subject
to the ratio and that overall costs increased. Given the increased interest in minimum staffing
legislation, this paper provides useful evidence on how such legislations impact costs.
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Figure 3-1: Histogram of the Patient-to-Nurse Ratio for Medical-Surgical Acute Units
Note: Figure 3-1 shows the distribution of the measure of interest, patients per nurse, in 1999 and 2007
for medical and surgical acute units. The vertical line at 5 shows the mandated ratio for this type of unit.
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Figure 3-2: Average Patient to Nurse Ratio for Units Above and Below the Median in 1997
Note: Figure 3-2 shows average number of patients per nurse by year, for units above and below the
median in 1997. The sample is restricted to units that are in the data for the entire sample.
133
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
1997
Patient-to-Nurse Ratio
Below the Median
mean s.d.
3.11 0.89
Above the Median Below
mean s.d. mean
5.54 2.04 3.99
the Median
s.d.
14.52
Above the Median
mean s.d.
3.82 3.12
Hospital Characteristics
For-profit
Public
Rural
Unit-Level Staffed Beds
Inputs
Aides hours per patient day
Length of stay
Operating costs per discharge
RN share of licensed nurse hours
Closure
Unit closed by 2001
Unit closed after 2001
(conditional on being open in 2001)
Observations
0.24
0.18
0.19
36.6
1.63
3.60
1349.0
0.85
0.42
0.38
0.39
49.0
1.91
3.60
1971.5
0.15
0.28
0.16
0.08
46.2
1.71
4.09
1009.0
0.84
0.45
0.36
0.27
49.2
1.27
4.83
1379.8
0.14
0.20 0.40 0.13 0.34
0.16 0.37 0.12 0.32
494 494
Note: The table reports averages for various hospital and unit-level characteristics. Operating costs
are reported in dollars, not adjusted. The units are divided into above and below median based on their
patient-to-nurse ratio within their type of unit in 1997.
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2007
0.22
0.20
0.18
48.1
1.85
3.88
2593.2
0.88
0.41
0.40
0.39
65.1
1.94
3.18
2394.1
0.14
0.28
0.17
0.09
53.2
1.93
4.56
2453.2
0.86
0.45
0.38
0.29
54.7
1.65
5.63
2907.6
0.14
332 380
Log Patient to Nurse Ratio
Year
Figure 3-3: Impact on Patient to Nurse Ratio
Note: Figure 3-3 plots the #, regression coefficients from estimating equation 3.4 with the log of the
patient-to-nurse ratio as the dependent variable. The dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence interval
on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. The CDHS ratios were announced in
January 2002; all the years to the right of the vertical line represent fiscal years that end after this date.
The regression includes unit fixed effects, year fixed effects and linear trends by unit type. An observation
is a hospital unit-year, years 1999 to 2007.
Table 3.2: The Impact on Patient to Nurse Ratio
Log Patient to Nurse Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x log(R7000) -0.274*** -0.269***
(0.053) (0.056)
PostTrend x log(R?000) -0.086*** -0.085***
(0.017) (0.017)
Y200 1 x log(R2000 ) 0.015 0.016
(0.048) (0.043)
Observations 6911 6911 6911 6911
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.926 4.926 4.926 4.926
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients from estimating equations 3.1 and 3.2 respectively on
the log patient-to-nurse ratio. Columns (3) and (4) replace the Post dummy in the previous regressions with
a linear trend starting at 1 in 2002, equation 3.3. All the specifications include unit-level fixed effects, year
fixed effects and separate linear trends by unit type. R?000 is the patient-to-nurse ratio measured in year
2000, instrumented for using year 1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Data is at the
hospital unit-year level, years 1999 to 2007. The estimation was done using xtivreg2 in STATA.
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Figure 3-4: Impact on Licensed Nurse Hours and Patient Days
Note: Figure 3-4 plots the p, regression coefficients from estimating equation 3.4 with the log licensed
nurse hours as the dependent variable in the left panel and log patient days in the right panel. The dashed
lines show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the hospital
level. The CDHS ratios were announced in January 2002; all the years to the right of the vertical line
represent fiscal years that end after this date. The regression includes unit fixed effects, year fixed effects
and linear trends by unit type. An observation is a hospital unit-year, years 1999 to 2007.
Table 3.3: The Impact on Licensed Nurse Hours and Patient Days
Log Licensed Nurse Hours Log Patient Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x log(Ri0 ) 0.306*** 0.029
(0.073) (0.062)
PostTrend x log(Ri20 0 ) 0.098*** 0.011
(0.021) (0.017)
Y2001 x log(R0 0 ) 0009 0.008 0.017 0.020
(0.058) (0.051) (0.041) (0.037)
Observations 6912 6912 6916 6916
Mean of Dep. Var. 77767.4 77767.4 12218.9 12218.9
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients from estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively on
the log licensed nurse hours as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same specifications
for log patient days. All the specifications include unit-level fixed effects, year fixed effects and separate
linear trends by unit type. R?000 is the patient-to-nurse ratio measured in year 2000, instrumented for using
year 1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Data is at the hospital unit-year level, years
1999 to 2007. The estimation was done using xtivreg2 in STATA.
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Figure 3-5: Impact on Labor Substitution
Note: Figure 3-5 plots the 3, regression coefficients from estimating equation 3.4 with the log aides
hours per patient day as the dependent variable in the left panel and registered nurse share of total licensed
nurse hours in the right panel. The dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient;
standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. The CDHS ratios were announced in January 2002; all the
years to the right of the vertical line represent fiscal years that end after this date. The regression includes
unit fixed effects, year fixed effects and linear trends by unit type. An observation is a hospital unit-year,
years 1999 to 2007.
Table 3.4: Impact on Labor Substitution
Log Aides Hours per Day + 1 Registered Nurse Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x log(Ri000) -0.104* -0.052***
(0.061) (0.016)
PostTrend x log(R200 0 ) -0.033* -0.010**
(0.018) (0.004)
Y200 1 x log(R?000 ) -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 0.003
(0.039) (0.035) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 6916 6916 6908 6908
Mean of Dep. Var. 1.928 1.928 0.854 0.854
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients from estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively
on the log aides hours per patient day as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same
specifications for the registered nurse share of total licensed nurse hours. All the specifications include unit-
level fixed effects, year fixed effects and separate linear trends by unit type. R?000 is the patient-to-nurse
ratio measured in year 2000, instrumented for using year 1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital
level. Data is at the hospital unit-year level, years 1999 to 2007.
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Figure 3-6: Impact on Operating Cost
Note: Figure 3-6 plots the #3, regression coefficients from estimating equation 3.4 with the log operating
cost as the dependent variable in the left panel and log operating cost per patient (discharge) in the right
panel. The dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are
clustered at the hospital level. The CDHS ratios were announced in January 2002; all the years to the right
of the vertical line represent fiscal years that end after this date. The regression includes unit fixed effects,
year fixed effects and linear trends by unit type. An observation is a hospital unit-year, years 1999 to 2007.
Table 3.5: Impact on Operating Cost
Log Operating Cost Log Operating Cost per Discharge
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x log(RO021) 0.108* 0.052
(0.063) (0.069)
PostTrend x log(R 20 0 ) 0.045*** 0.025
(0.016) (0.017)
Y2001 x log(R?000) -0.018 0.002 -0.038 -0.021
(0.039) (0.033) (0.062) (0.049)
Observations 6914 6914 6912 6912
Mean of Dep. Var. 5.17 5.17 1765.634 1765.634
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients from estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively on
the log operating cost as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same specifications for
the log operating cost per patient (discharge). All the specifications include unit-level fixed effects, year fixed
effects and separate linear trends by unit type. R?000 is the patient-to-nurse ratio measured in year 2000,
instrumented for using year 1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Data is at the hospital
unit-year level, years 1999 to 2007. The estimation was done using xtivreg2 in STATA.
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Figure 3-7: Impact on Staffed Beds and Length of Stay
Note: Figure 3-7 plots the 3, regression coefficients from estimating equation 3.4 with the log staffed
beds + 1 as the dependent variable in the left panel and log length of stay in the right panel. The dashed
lines show the 95 percent confidence interval on each coefficient; standard errors are clustered at the hospital
level. The CDHS ratios were announced in January 2002; all the years to the right of the vertical line
represent fiscal years that end after this date. The regression includes unit fixed effects, year fixed effects
and linear trends by unit type. An observation is a hospital unit-year, years 1999 to 2007. The staffed beds
regression includes closed units with 0 for the number of beds.
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Table 3.6: Impact on Staffed Beds and Length of Stay.
Log Staffed Beds + 1 Log Length of Stay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x log(R?00 0 ) 0.246* -0.026
(0.136) (0.055)
PostTrend x log(R?000) 0.054 -0.009
(0.035) (0.013)
Y2001 x log(R000) 0.113* 0.065 -0.006 -0.007
(0.058) (0.049) (0.049) (0.037)
Observations 7577 7577 6915 6915
Mean of Dep. Var. 43.640 43.640 4.070 4.070
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients from estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively on
log staffed beds + 1 as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same specifications for
log length of stay. All the specifications include unit-level fixed effects, year fixed effects and separate linear
trends by unit type. R?000 is the patient-to-nurse ratio measured in year 2000, instrumented for using year
1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Data is at the hospital unit-year level, years 1999
to 2007. The staffed beds regression includes closed units with 0 for the number of beds. The estimation
was done using xtivreg2 in STATA.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Analysis - Unaffected Units
Log Patient Log Licensed Log Patient Log Aides Registered Log Operating Log Operating Log Length Log Staffed
to Nurse Nurse Days Hours Nurse Cost Cost of Stay Beds + 1
Ratio Hours per Day + 1 Share per Discharge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PostTrend x log(R20 00 ) -0.018 0.087*** 0.070*** 0.003 0.006 0.066*** 0.001 0.004 0.079**
(0.017) (0.028) (0.027) (0.012) (0.005) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.039)
Y2 001 x log(R200) -0.038** 0.092*** 0.052* -0.002 0.004 0.061*** 0.001 -0.008 0.071**
(0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Observations 5453 5453 5458 5458 5453 5457 5456 5457 6073
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.63 55624.72 6183.69 1.19 0.86 3.65 13557.17 38.74 19.63
Note: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation 3.3 on the dependent variable listed at the top for the sample of units that were
not affected by the legislation. All the specifications include unit-level fixed effects, year fixed effects and separate linear trends by unit type. R?
000
is the patient-to-nurse ratio measured in year 2000, instrumented for using year 1997. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Data is at
the hospital unit-year level, years 1999 to 2007.
Table 3.8: Robustness Analysis: Alternative Specifications
Log Patient Log Licensed Log Patient Log Aides Registered Log Operating Log Operating Log Length Log Staffed
to Nurse Nurse Days Hours Nurse Cost Cost of Stay Beds + 1
Ratio Hours per Day + 1 Share per Discharge
Baseline
PostTrend x log(RF000) -0.085*** 0.098*** 0.011 -0.033* -0.010** 0.045*** 0.025 -0.009 0.054
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.035)
Y2 0 0 1 x log(Ri"00 ) 0.016 0.008 0.020 -0.012 0.003 0.002 -0.021 -0.007 0.065
(0.043) (0.051) (0.037) (0.035) (0.011) (0.033) (0.049) (0.037) (0.049)
Observations 6911 6912 6916 6916 6908 6914 6912 6915 7577
Balanced Panel
PostTrend x log(R2000) -0.094*** 0.090*** -0.005 -0.036** -0.009** 0.033** 0.025 -0.012 -0.005
(0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
Y2 0 0 1 x log(Ri 0) 0.006 -0.025 -0.022 -0.008 0.002 -0.029 -0.054 -0.044 0.007
(0.043) (0.041) (0.031) (0.041) (0.013) (0.032) (0.056) (0.041) (0.033)
Observations 6200 6200 6205 6205 6196 6202 6202 6205 6209
1999 Baseline Ratio
PostTrend x log(Ri999) -0.079*** 0.090*** 0.012 -0.026 -0.008** 0.043*** 0.023 -0.008 0.051*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.029)
Y2 0 0 1 x log(RI? 999) -0.004 0.027 0.022 -0.001 0.005 0.029 0.005 -0.008 0.059
(0.043) (0.050) (0.034) (0.032) (0.010) (0.036) (0.048) (0.034) (0.048)
Observations 6915 6915 6925 6925 6910 6923 6922 6924 7912
OLS
PostTrend x log(R2000) -0.084*** 0.082*** -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 0.031*** 0.014* -0.019*** 0.020
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017)
Y2 0 0 1 x log(Ri000) -0.068 0.108** 0.038 -0.001 0.008 0.028 0.020 0.023 0.036
(0.042) (0.053) (0.033) (0.027) (0.007) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.039)
Observations 6912 6913 6917 6917 6909 6915 6913 6916 7577
Add Linear Trend xRatio2OOO
PostTrend x log(R2000) -0.067* 0.056 -0.006 -0.025 0.011 0.039 0.051 0.006 -0.037
(0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.033) (0.011) (0.029) (0.043) (0.037) (0.048)
Observations 6911 6912 6916 6916 6908 6914 6912 6915 7577
Note: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation 3.3 on the dependent variable listed at the top. The first set of results shows
the baseline estimates from estimating this specification. The second set of results restricts the sample to those units that do not close during the
sample period. The third set of results uses Ri 999 for the baseline ratio measure. The fourth set of results does not instrument for the baseline ratio
measure R 2000 . The last set of results controls for a linear trend interacted with log(R?0 00 )
3.A Appendix: Benchmarks for Estimates
This section will discuss a few benchmarks for the estimates in the paper. The goal is to understand how
the fact that units do not meet the staffing requirement exactly at the mandated ratio affects the results. I
will also discuss the effect of mean reversion and the specification used in the paper on the final estimates.
For the purpose of this discussion, I will restrict my attention to a single type of unit, medical-surgical acute
units, which have a mandated ratio of 5 patients per nurse. The main question I will attempt to answer
is how much the estimates are biased towards zero due to the rigid staffing rules, that is, because units
need to meet the legislation at all times and will, on average, have fewer than 5 patients per nurse after the
legislation was implemented.
Throughout this discussion I will report the coefficient #3 from estimating the regression included in the
paper
log (PNRit) = ai + -2 + #3 log (Ri) x Poste + eit
as well as #1 and #2 from the following specification:
log (PNRit) ai + -yt + #1 log (Ri) x Postt + 32 log (Ri) x Postt x 1 (Ri > 5) +
+# 3 PoStt x 1 (Ri > 5) + eit,
where I also include a triple interaction of the baseline ratio with an indicator for the post-implementation
period and an indicator for whether the unit was above the mandated ratio in the pre-period. Here, we
would expect #1 to be close to zero and #2 to capture the effect of the legislation if units below 5 did not
change their staffing, while units above 5 decreased their ratio to meet the requirement.
I explore how the estimates change under a few different simulated scenarios. Throughout this exercise
I will use the realized patient-to-nurse ratio from year 2000, PNR20oo. In the regressions above, we have
Ri = PNRi2ooo. First, to remove any biases due to mean reversion, assume that units have a constant
baseline level for 1999-2001 defined as PNRi20oo + eit. Then estimate the coefficients of interest, #1, #2 and
#3 under the following scenarios:
1. There is no change in the ratio after 2002, that is PNRit = PNRi20oo + eit for years 2002-2007.
Under this scenario we should have #3 = 0.
2. After the implementation all units change to exactly 5, that is PNRit = 5 + eit for years 2002-2007.
Under this scenario we should have #3 = -1.
3. After the implementation, units above 5 decrease to 5, units below 5 stay at the same level. Define
PNRit min (5, PNRi2ooo) + eit for years 2002-2007. Under this scenario we should have #1 = 0
and #2 -1-
4. Assume a more restrictive staffing rule. In particular, because of integer constraints, hospitals will
not be able to always have exactly 5 patients per nurse (e.g. for 6 patients a hospital will always
have to staff 2 nurses resulting in a ratio of 3). In addition, it was reported that some hospitals
had to hire additional nurses to cover lunch breaks and bathroom breaks. Assume an additional
nurse for every 5 nurses and an administrative nurse. Assume that all beds are full, therefore
the number of patients is equal to the number of beds. The staffing rule for nurses in this case
is Nursesmandate = ceil (beds/5) + ceil (beds/25) + 1, where ceil(x) is the smallest integer greater
than x. Then PNRmandate = Beds/Nursesmandate is the maximum number of patients per nurse
a unit with these characteristics can have and still meet the staffing requirement under our as-
sumptions. This particular staffing rule will tend to result in lower ratios for smaller units. Define
PNRit = min (PNRimandate, PNRi2000) + Eit for years 2000-2007.
Finally, consider all of these cases without correcting for mean reversion, that is, using the actual data
for all the pre-implementation years, 1999 to 2001. The results of this estimation are below.
The first table shows the results of the estimation while correcting for mean reversion. The number of
the column corresponds to the scenario number above.
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(1) (2) (3) (3') (4) (4')
log Ri x Postt 0.008 -0.999 -0.244 0.000 -0.640 -0.377
(0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.012) (0.047) (0.048)
log Ri x Postt x 1 (Ri > 5) -0.986 -0.651
(0.017) (0.076)
The estimated effect is 0 if there is no change in the ratio after 2002, column (1). If all units have a ratio
of 5 after the implementation, then the estimated coefficient is -1, column (2). In column (3'), where the
units below 5 do not change, and the units above decrease to 5, the estimates are equal to approximately 0
on the main effect and -1 on the triple interaction term. Not surprisingly, estimating a single coefficient for
all the units, column (3), biases the effect downward as we are averaging in zero effects. Finally, columns
(4) and (4') show the estimates if units cannot meet the ratio exactly at 5. The estimated effects are much
smaller, the coefficient on the interaction term log Ri x Postt is also negative, as even units below 5 have
to decrease their ratio. Interestingly, the estimated effect on the triple interaction in column (4') -0.651 is
similar to the estimated effect on the double interaction term in column (4), which is -0.640. In this case,
there is no downward bias in the estimates from using the simpler specification.
The second table shows the results of the same specifications, without correcting for mean reversion.
This means that for years 1999 to 2001 I am using the actual ratios from the data:
(1) (2) (3) (3') (4) (4')
log Ri x Poste 0.179 -0.823 -0.073 0.160 -0.462 -0.244
(0.037) (0.036) (0.050) (0.055) (0.060) (0.076)
log Ri x Postt x 1 (Ri > 5) -0.876 -0.533
(0.175) (0.193)
Mean reversion biases the estimate in column (1) upward, compared to zero in the previous exercise. If
1999 and 2001 revert to the mean relative to 2000, they would have a negative coefficient. The post-period
is constructed based on year 2000, and would be higher than 1999 and 2001. This would give an upward
bias in the post-period relative to the pre-period (1999-2001). The other columns show a similar effect of
mean reversion on the estimates. In columns (4) and (4') the estimated effects are much smaller and similar
to the sample estimates.
The table below shows the sample estimates for the sample restricted to medical-surgical acute units.
(1) (2)
log Ri x Postt -0.302 -0.248
(0.045) (0.072)
log Ri x Postt x 1 (Ri > 5) -0.287
(0.148)
The coefficient on the triple interaction is not significantly different from the coefficient on log Ri x Postt.
The results are similar if I use a threshold lower than 5. Comparing column (1) and column (2), the measured
effects are not biased towards zero from averaging zeros. However, as shown before, mean reversion as well
as heterogeneous post-mandate complying ratios can bias the effects towards zero.
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